15. “Feminist Heterosexuality” for The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Sex and Sexuality, edited by Clare Chambers, Brian Earp, and Lori Watson (Routledge, 2022)

Might there be an incompatibility between feminist commitments and heterosexuality? I imagine most people would find this question strange. However, as a brief examination will reveal, there are serious tensions between the two. In this Chapter, I explain these tensions and explore their implications for the relationship between heterosexuality and feminist commitments. To begin to see the tension, consider heterosexuality as a kind of sexual orientation. I claim that a feature of this kind of sexual orientation is that it involves gender-based sexual attraction (not sex-based sexual attraction, as I explain shortly). Gender-based sexual attraction is a feature of most other types of sexual orientation in our current condition, so heterosexuality is not distinct in this regard. The problem, however, is that sexual orientations that involve gender-based sexual attractions are influenced by gender norms, practices, and institutions, and these are often rightly the subject of feminist critique. In fact, some feminists argue that we should aim for a world in which gender norms and related practices and institutions no longer exist. In such a world, gender-based sexual attraction would no longer exist, and hence, neither would the practice of heterosexuality. I argue that this world represents an ideal that feminists should ultimately pursue. However, I also argue that the concept of heterosexuality is needed to help explain and address the oppression of women, oppression on the basis of certain sexualities and sexual identities, and oppression of trans and nonbinary persons. Further, I argue that, given that persons with non-heterosexual sexual orientations have been oppressed (e.g., stigmatized and subjected to systematic violence), recognition and support for the practice of non-heterosexual orientations (and associated sexual identities) is central to social equality in our present condition, even when these orientations are gender-based. As I argue, in our non-ideal conditions, it is possible to be a feminist and a heterosexual, but it isn’t easy

14. “On Domination and Dependency: Learning from Rousseau’s Critique of Inequality,” co-authored with Lori Watson, in Caring for Liberalism: Dependency and Political Theory, edited by Amy Baehr and Asha Bhandary (Routledge, 2020), 25-49

Human beings are both dependent upon others and interdependent in multiple and intersecting ways that raise serious concerns for justice. In this Chapter, we consider the following three ways in which persons are dependent on others: human beings, at least at times, require the care of others to have certain basic needs met; human beings depend on others (and are often interdependent) for the realization of important social goods relevant to justice (e.g., goods involving support for social interaction and emotional care); and, human beings depend on others for recognition respect as equal moral persons and as equal citizens and for maintaining the social conditions of recognition respect. Then we draw from some of Rousseau’s insights regarding dependency relations and inequality to suggest that a particular form of egalitarianism, namely, relational egalitarianism, is well suited to address issues of dependency and domination that concern justice.

13. “On Equal Citizenship and Public Reason: Reply to Critics” for a symposium on Equal Citizenship and Public Reason, co-authored with Lori Watson, Journal of Applied Philosophy 37 (2020): 881-894

In writing Equal Citizenship and Public Reason, we aimed to show that political liberalism is a feminist liberalism, and, to this end, we developed and defended a particular understanding of the commitments of political liberalism. We argued that these commitments demand the adoption of certain laws and policies that we, and many feminists, believe are necessary for gender justice. In this essay, we consider some of the challenges made by our astute and thoughtful critics to clarify and better defend our view. In particular, we address: why the collective enterprise view of liberal democracy requires shared reasons for the justification of certain laws and policies; how we understand substantive equality and why our understanding of substantive equality does not commit us to a comprehensive doctrine; how we avoid defending a particular political conception of justice in showing that political liberalism is a feminist liberalism; and how it is that, given justice pluralism, public reasons can provide stability for the right reasons.

12. “A Feminist Defense of Political Liberalism,” co-authored with Lori Watson, for John Rawls: Debating the Major Questions, edited by Sarah Roberts-Cady and Jon Mandle (New York: Oxford University Press), 249-262

Some feminists claim that liberal theories lack the resources necessary for fully diagnosing and remedying the social subordination of persons as members of social groups. Part of the problem is that liberals focus too narrowly on the state as the locus of political power. However, equal citizenship is also affected by systems of power that operate in the background culture and that construct social hierarchies in which persons are subordinated as members of social groups. We argue that political liberalism, properly understood, entails a commitment to substantive equality such that it has the internal resources to address the kinds of inequality produced by unjust forms of social power. Although some will claim that if the basic structure is the subject of justice political liberalism will still fall short of securing gender justice, we explain why this worry is misplaced.

11. “Contractualism, Disability and Inclusion,” in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability, edited by Adam Cureton and David Wasserman (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 363-379

This chapter considers why social contract accounts may seem particularly ill-suited to address justice for all persons with impairments or illnesses. Two variants of social contract theory are discussed: contractarianism and contractualism. It is argued that while contractarian theories may be able to address certain basic needs and interests of persons with impairments or illnesses, such theories are, nonetheless, unacceptable if one holds that (nearly all) human beings are owed justice because of their own value or intrinsic worth. Although Rawls did not address justice for those with impairments in his theory in any detail, it is argued that contractualists can develop quite inclusive theories. Two strategies for developing an inclusive contractualism are discussed, both of which focus on a capacity for cooperative contribution possessed by nearly all human beings and in which we can understand the intrinsic value of persons as inhering.

10. “Political Liberalism and Children,” Philosophical Studies 175 (2018): 1095-1112

In this article, I highlight some core ideas that are important for understanding the parent-child relationship within the framework of political liberalism. I stress that, although some ideal or conception of the family is part of most, if not all, comprehensive doctrines, for political liberals, the state’s interest in the family is as a social-political institution in which certain needs of persons as free and equal citizens are met. I discuss the main needs and interests of children and parents in the parent-child relationship. I consider that many children are cared for by multiple people, and I discuss how the state should address the recognition of multiple legal parents. I discuss some contexts in which conflicts arise between the interests of children and caregivers and address how such conflicts should be resolved in the politically liberal state. Although Rawls failed to offer an acceptable account of the family as part of the basic structure and did not adequately address the role of caring relationships in a just society, I hope that this article helps to show how political liberals can offer a plausible account.

9. “Political Liberalism and Religious Exemptions,” co-authored with Lori Watson, in Religious Exemptions, edited by Kevin Vallier and Michael Weber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 97-119

Can political liberals recognize exemptions from generally applicable laws on religious grounds? We argue that despite some initial grounds for skepticism, political liberals can recognize religious accommodations or exemptions in some cases. However, political liberals cannot single out religion for special treatment; when other commitments function in the same way as religiously based commitments, those commitments should enjoy the same status as grounds for exemptions. However, political liberals cannot recognize exemptions or accommodations on any basis from a law that is needed to secure and protect the equal standing of all persons as free and equal citizens. Of course, some cases are complex, as our discussion will show. We close by considering the objection that our view is not administrable and, hence, is practically unworkable. We offer reasons for thinking this worry is unwarranted.

8. “Two Conceptions of Justice as Reciprocity,” Social Theory and Practice 40 (2014): 409-432

Social cooperation based on reciprocity is the cornerstone of many theories of justice. However, what is central to social cooperation based on reciprocity? How does basing social cooperation on reciprocity structure and constrain theories of justice? In this paper, I consider what is central to reciprocity. I argue that the purpose of reciprocal exchange among persons is important for determining the appropriateness of reciprocal exchanges and that sustaining mutually advantageous relations is not always the point or the only point of reciprocity. This has important implications for theorizing about justice. I show this by outlining two conceptions of justice as reciprocity.

7. “Civic Virtue and Political Thought: On Civic Virtue and Political Liberalism,” co-authored with Lori Watson, in Virtues and Their Vices, edited by Kevin Timpe and Craig Boyd (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014), 415-432

In this essay, we discuss civic virtue in political theory. In particular, we discuss civic virtue in perfectionist and anti-perfectionist political theories; such theories differ markedly with respect to their accounts of the role and content of civic virtue. Given that anti-perfectionists do not think the state should aim to promote a particular view of the good life, one might question whether anti-perfectionist political theories include or are compatible with an account of civic virtue at all. We aim to address this question by providing the groundwork for a politically liberal account of civic virtue. Political liberalism, we think, is the most defensible form of anti-perfectionism, and we claim its central tenets provide a substantive basis from which to develop an account of civic virtue.

6. “Political Liberalism, Marriage and the Family,” co-authored with Lori Watson, Law and Philosophy 31 (2012): 185-212

Can and should political liberals recognize and otherwise support legal marriage as a matter of basic justice? In this article, we offer a general account of how political liberals should evaluate the issue of whether the legal recognition of marriage is a matter of basic justice. And, we develop and examine some public reason arguments that, given the fundamental interests of citizens, could justify various forms of legal marriage in some contexts. In particular, in certain conditions, the recognition of some form of legal marriage may be the best way to protect the fundamental interests of women as citizens in freely chosen associations. Or, it may be that, in certain conditions, to secure the social conditions necessary for gays, lesbians and bisexuals to be free and equal citizens, some form of legal marriage can or should be recognized.

5. “Disability and Justice,” Philosophy Compass 6 (2011): 120-132

Historically, philosophers have had little to say about justice and disability. However, in recent years and in response to disability rights movements, philosophers have started to consider the claims to justice of persons with mental and physical impairments. Importantly, some have charged that without extensive revision, social contract accounts of justice – which enjoy immense popularity among political philosophers – cannot address the needs and interests of persons with disabilities. In this article, I explain why social contract accounts are thought to flounder when it comes to justice for persons with disabilities. Then I assess the merits of recent attempts to construct theories of justice inclusive of persons with disabilities. In particular, I consider Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, Kittay’s justice as caring, and various restatements of the social contract.

4. “Is a Feminist Political Liberalism Possible?” co-authored with Lori Watson, Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, www.jesp.org, (2010), vol. 5 no. 1 (10,366 words)

Is a feminist political liberalism possible? Political liberalism’s regard for a wide range of comprehensive doctrines as reasonable makes some feminists skeptical of its ability to address sex inequality. Indeed, some feminists claim that political liberalism maintains its position as a political liberalism at the expense of securing substantive equality for women. We claim that political liberalism’s core commitments actually restrict all reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that secure genuine substantive equality for all, including women and other marginalized groups. In particular, we argue that political liberalism’s criterion of reciprocity limits reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that eliminate social conditions of domination and subordination relevant to reasonable democratic deliberation among equal citizens and that the criterion of reciprocity requires the social conditions necessary for recognition respect among persons as equal citizens. As a result, we maintain that the criterion of reciprocity limits reasonable political conceptions of justice to those that provide genuine equality for women along various dimensions of social life central to equal citizenship.

3. “Feminism, Religion, and Shared Reasons: A Defense of Exclusive Public Reason,” co-authored with Lori Watson, Law and Philosophy 28 (2009): 493-536

The idea of public reason is central to political liberalism’s aim to provide an account of the possibility of a just and stable democratic society comprised of free and equal citizens who nonetheless are deeply divided over fundamental values. This commitment to the idea of public reason reflects the normative core of political liberalism which is rooted in the principle of democratic legitimacy and the idea of reciprocity among citizens. Yet both critics and defenders of political liberalism disagree over whether or not the idea of public reason permits citizens to appeal to their comprehensive conceptions of the good in public deliberation over matters of basic justice. Our aim in this paper is to provide a defense of an exclusive idea of public reason, and at the same time we aim to dispel the underlying concerns of two prominent criticisms of the idea of public reason—the concern of alienation from the political process, as expressed by religiously oriented critics, and the concern over women’s equality, as expressed by feminist critics. Further, we claim, inclusive accounts of the idea of public reason deepen feminist concerns. We think that, properly understood, an exclusive account of the idea of public reason can address feminist concerns about political liberalism and avoid alienating (reasonable) religious persons in an unacceptable way. Thus, we conclude that an exclusive account of the idea of public reason is our best hope for reconciliation.

2. “Justice for the Disabled: A Contractualist Approach,” Journal of Social Philosophy 40 (2009): 17-36

Although Rawls does not address justice for the disabled, I argue the ideas central to the contractualist, as opposed to contractarian, social contract tradition provide a rich basis for thinking about justice for persons with disabilities. In this article, I explore one strategy for developing a contractualist theory that is inclusive of persons with disabilities as members of society entitled to justice. I argue that the deep ideas underlying contractualism actually dictate inclusion of almost all the disabled, since they make essential cooperative contributions to establishing a society based on relations of mutual respect.

1. “An Inclusive Contractualism: Obligations to the Mentally Disabled,” in Disability and Disadvantage: Re-examining Topics in Moral and Political Philosophy, edited by Kimberley Brownlee and Adam Cureton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 138-162

In this essay, I begin to construct a contractualist account of justice that is inclusive of the mentally disabled. I argue that when society is cast as a fair system of cooperation, those with mental disabilities should indeed count as members of society since they have the capacity to engage in cooperative projects that are of fundamental importance to contractualist society. Contractualists do not need to recognize merely having needs as an animal or the ability to feel pain as an independent ground for a claim to justice in order to include the mentally disabled within contractualist theory. Rather, contractualists can construct a theory that is inclusive of the mentally disabled by properly appreciating the numerous ways in which persons with mental disabilities make substantial contributions to the creation, establishment and maintenance of a society based on relations of mutual respect.