Theses

Abstract

Radiofrequency identification (RFID) systems are among the most important embedded systems that saw fast evolutions during the last years. These systems are used in several applications, such as, health, transportation, access control, etc. However, the communication in this technology is based on radio waves, which poses problems in security and privacy. In the literature of design and implementation of authentication protocols on RFID systems, we can find many protocols developed using various algebraic and cryptographic primitives (asymmetric cryptosystems, symmetric cryptosystems, hash function, bitwise operators, etc.). The limitation of resources (e.g. memory, computation, etc.) on low-cost RFID tags does not permit the implementation of all the cryptosystems. Among cryptographic primitives used to secure the RFID authentication protocols, we cite code-based cryptography. It is very fast, it resists quantum attacks, and does not require any crypto-processor.

In our thesis, we analyse the security of several recent RFID authentication protocols. We propose a new RFID protocol oriented towards access control applications. It uses cryptographic hash function and Biometric hash function. After that, we propose two improved protocols based on two variants of McEliece encryption scheme, the first is the randomized McEliece cryptosystem, and the second is Quasi Cyclic-Moderate Density Parity Check (QC-MDPC) McEliece cryptosystem. Our work also includes a comparison between our proposed protocols and different existing protocols based on error-correcting codes in terms of security and performance. Security properties are proved by AVISPA (Automated Verification Internet Protocol and its Applications) tools, and the privacy property is verified by Ouafi-Phan model. The Performance of proposed protocols is analysed in terms of storage requirement, communication cost and computational cost. The performance of our protocols are effective, don’t need to do exhaustive search, and the tag can perform lightweight cryptographic operations.