2025 / 2026
CERF / Cambridge Finance Seminars in Chronological Order
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CERF / Cambridge Finance Seminars in Chronological Order
Title: The Emergence of Pass-Through Voting and Its Implications for Investor Stewardship
Abstract:
Pass-through voting, which already has a recognisable acronym, PTV, is on the path of becoming the latest buzzword in the world of investor stewardship. Asset managers use pass-through voting to offer clients – both institutional and retail and whether investing via pooled investment funds or via separately managed accounts – stronger control over shareholder voting decisions associated with their investments. Pass-through voting thus allows asset owners to align voting decisions with their own stewardship views and preferences.
Date: Thursday 16 October 2025 at 13:00 - 14:00
Event Location: W2.02, Main Cambridge Judge Business School Building
Agnes Kovacs (King's College London)
Title: The Emergence of Pass-Through Voting and Its Implications for Investor Stewardship
Abstract:
In the United States, credit card companies frequently use machine learning algorithms to proactively raise credit limits for borrowers. In contrast, an increasing number of countries have begun to prohibit credit limit increases initiated by banks rather than consumers. In this paper, we exploit detailed regulatory micro data to examine the extent to which bank-initiated credit limit increases are directed towards individuals with revolving balances. We then develop a model that captures the costs and benefits of regulating proactive credit limit increases, which we use to quantify their importance and evaluate the implications for household well-being.
Date: Thursday 30 October 2025 at 13:00 - 14:00
Event Location: W4.05, Main Cambridge Judge Business School Building
About Radoslawa Nikolowa (Queen Mary University of London)
Title: Biased Promotion
Abstract:
We present a model of biased promotions in which firm size, wages, and internal labor markets are endogenously determined in a competitive labor market equilibrium. Workers value both wages and job amenities, and differ only by a non-productive label: "Blue" or "Red." Firms favor the Blue group in promotions. The equilibrium features partial segregation: large, high-wage firms employ workers from both groups and offer biased promotion opportunities, while small, low-wage firms hire only workers from the unfavored group and offer stable careers. Although individual firms prefer unbiased promotions, biased promotions collectively benefit firms by weakening worker bargaining power. The model endogenizes firm heterogeneity and helps explain why bias-driven gaps in promotions and earnings may persist even in competitive markets.
Date: Thursday 13 November 2025, 12:30 - 13:30
Event Location: Castle Teaching Room, Main Cambridge Judge Business School Building
About Henri Servaes (London Business School)
Title: The Role of Public Relations Advisors in Acquisitions
Abstract:
Bidders that employ top-tier public relations (PR) advisors have merger announcement returns that are 0.78% higher than other firms. The effect is driven by acquisitions of private companies, where returns are 1.33% higher. These are deals for which information about the target is sparser and communication more important. The effect is larger for smaller bidders and bidders with less analyst following. Propensity score matching and IV regressions support a causal interpretation. Our findings suggest that PR advisors can enhance deal quality due to their ability to communicate effectively with stakeholders, thus increasing the likelihood that proposed merger benefits are realized.
Date: Thursday 27 November 2025 at 12:30 - 13:30
Event Location: Castle Teaching Room, Main Cambridge Judge Business School Building