Mikhail Safronov
Faculty of Economics
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CERF Fellow of Cohort 2024 - 2026
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Competition in acquiring stories
When selecting economic events to write about, the media tends to look for extreme cases. This creates inefficiency: The social planner would like agents to focus their attention on events with a large enough average payoff, while the media covers events with a large fraction of extreme payoffs. Compared to the planner, the media covers more events that give a large variance to agents' payoffs and less events with a small variance. Competition among media increases the effect of the media searching for extreme payoffs, but it can also make it easier for viewers to learn about economic events and hence increase efficiency.
Information acquisition by competing media
Information acquisition by competing media
This project combines two features of information acquisition by media. First, due to competition, only the first media which publishes a piece of news, gets rewarded (or punished, if the news is fake). Second, the media may acquire information along multiple dimensions – for example, when it learns about a new financial transaction tax, which is characterized by both welfare redistribution and by reduced efficiency of financial markets.
Moreover, the media may acquire different information depending on whether they interview pro-tax or anti-tax experts. This project studies how competition among media affects the amount and the type of information they acquire.
Efficient dynamic allocations in economies with private information.
Efficient dynamic allocations in economies with private information.
Economic agents often decide on how much wealth to spend today and how much wealth to save for the future. Firms' managers decide on splitting profits between dividends and salaries, or investment. Similar decisions are made in financial markets. With different tastes for monetary expenditure, inequality among agents may increase over time. We aim to compare market equilibria with the solution of a beneficial social planner; and identify the causes of additional inefficiency, and of additional inequality, created by the markets. We aim to propose policy interventions to counter those causes.
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