Working papers

When is TSLS actually LATE? 

R&R at Review of Economic Studies, new version January 2025.

joint with John Bonney, Magne Mogstad, and Alexander Torgovitsky. 

Abstract: Linear instrumental variable estimators, such as two-stage least squares (TSLS), are commonly interpreted as estimating non-negatively weighted averages of causal effects, referred to as local average treatment effects (LATEs). We examine whether the LATE interpretation actually applies to the types of TSLS specifications that are used in practice. We show that if the specification includes covariates—which most empirical work does—then the LATE interpretation does not apply in general. Instead, the TSLS estimator will, in general, reflect treatment effects for both compliers and always/never-takers, and some treatment effects for the always/never-takers will necessarily be negatively weighted. We show that the only specifications that have a LATE interpretation are “saturated” specifications that control for covariates nonparametrically, implying that such specifications are both sufficient and necessary for TSLS to have a LATE interpretation, at least without additional parametric assumptions. This result is concerning because, as we document, empirical researchers almost never control for covariates nonparametrically, and rarely discuss or justify parametric specifications of covariates. We apply our results to thirteen empirical studies and find strong evidence that the LATE interpretation of TSLS is far from accurate for the types of specifications actually used in practice. We offer concrete recommendations for practice motivated by our theoretical and empirical results.

Who Benefits from Worker Representation on Corporate Boards?

Re-submitted at The Economic Journal, new version July 2025.

joint with Lancelot Henry De-Frahan, Magne Mogstad, Peter Nilsson, and Ola Vestad.

Media: CQ Roll Call, Forbes, VoxEU, ProMarket.

Abstract: We study a size-contingent law in Norway that grants workers the right to board representation in firms with 30 or more employees. To analyze the impact of the law, we embed the regulation into an equilibrium model of the labor market. We show how to use behavioral responses to the regulation to identify (i) the direct effects of the policy on regulated firms and workers, (ii) the distortions from firms adjusting their size to avoid the regulation, and (iii) the equilibrium effects in the labor market. We evaluate these effects on both firms profit and production as well as worker compensation, including wages and non-wage amenities.