Working Papers
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with Massimiliano Furlan and Alkis Georgiadis-Harris.
Alice wants to share some information with Bob, but that dastardly eavesdropper, Eve, is listening! However, Alice and Bob start off knowing something else that Eve doesn't - can Alice use this to inform Bob but not Eve? A simple problem with a myriad economic applications.
Patient players can achieve a lot of outcomes, say the folk theorems, by calibrating knife-edge incentives to their exact level of patience. But what if this is impossible? What outcomes can be achieved with strategies that must form equilibria for all "high enough" levels of patience at once?
with Hyungmin Park
It is good practice to design organizations to ease the flow of statistical information. We argue organizations should also be shaped to facilitate strategic information flows. We study a team facing moral hazard to show how moving the locus of contract design can mitigate strategic uncertainty.
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