Selected Papers
AI Ethics, Adoption, & Governance
An Institutional Taxonomy of Adoption of Innovation in the Classic Professions, Cordasco, C., Gherhes, C., Brooks, C., & Vorley, T. Technovation (2021).
Self-Esteem and Technological Unemployment: Should We Halt AI to Protect Meaningful Work? Cordasco, C. L., Véliz, C., J Bus Ethics (2025).
The Accuracy-Explainability Trade-Off, the Right to Explanation, and Implications for Organisations, Cordasco, C. L., Véliz, C., J Bus Ethics (2026).
Ethics & Business
The Ethics of Entrepreneurship: A Millian Approach, Cordasco, C.L., J Bus Ethics (2024).
Market Participation, Self-Respect, and Risk Tolerance, Cordasco, C.L., Cowen, N. J Bus Ethics (2024).
Political Philosophy
Is a More-Than-Minimal State the Meta-Utopia?, Cordasco, C. L., Philosophy and Public Affairs, (2026).
Abstraction as Flexibility: The Veil of Evaluative Uncertainty, Cordasco C. L., Economics and Philosophy, (2026).
Revise & Resubmit
The Duty to Aid as a Duty to Hire, with Billy Christmas. (Business Ethics Quarterly)
The Transitional Lens: Re-Professionalisation in the Age of AI, with Atif Sarwar (Journal of Management Studies)
Ken we keep them? Sunstein's Barbie Goods Reconsidered, with Gianluigi Giustiziero. (Journal of Business Ethics)
Under Review
A Non-Tradeability Approach to Threshold Minimalism, with Dora Xu. (The Philosophical Review, under review)
The Experience Machine and the Independence Criterion. (Philosophical Quarterly, under review)
Moral Residue and Acting Without Closure (Ethics, under review)
Works in Progress
What Organisations Cannot See: Epistemic Asymmetry and the Governance of Cognitive Offloading
Will AI Agents Kill the Firm? Specification, Monitoring, and Evaluative Diversity Under Agentic Production
Commitment under Evaluative Uncertainty With Alessandro Sontuoso
Institutions require decision-makers to commit to evaluative criteria before encountering the cases those criteria must govern. Commitment enables verification but restricts rules to depend only on pre-specified dimensions, and when the relevant dimensions are uncertain, the restricted class may exclude the optimal rule. We extend the preference-for-flexibility framework from menus of alternatives to menus of decision rules, where the restriction is a verifiability condition. In a linear-Gaussian environment, a single object—the conditional covariance between committed and uncommitted dimensions—governs the accuracy cost of commitment across action spaces and loss functions.
Understanding Without Grounding? Pragmatic Structure, Linguistic Compression, and the Conditions of Competence in Language-Trained Systems
A familiar objection to the possibility of understanding in large language models holds that systems trained on language alone lack the non-linguistic grounding required for genuine competence. I argue that a significant class of failures attributed to the absence of sensory grounding are better explained by the pragmatic structure of the training signal. Language produced under cooperative conversational norms is systematically optimised to omit what speakers can cheaply recover from shared context. A system trained on such language inherits a communicative practice that presupposes a common ground it does not possess. This reframing does not settle whether any current system understands, but it shows that the evidential basis for the grounding objection is weaker than it appears.
The Stakeholder Dilemma: Person-Affecting Evaluation and the Problem of Future Generations
Stakeholder theory is widely regarded as the natural home for intergenerational concern in business ethics. I argue that this extension is structurally incoherent. Stakeholder theory's evaluative apparatus depends on identifying determinate constituencies whose interests can be specified and weighed. When the theory extends to non-overlapping future persons, it confronts the non-identity problem: corporate decisions of sufficient scope determine which future persons will exist, and person-affecting evaluation loses its determinate subject. Shareholder theories face no analogous dilemma because the tradeable-claim mechanism, indirect reciprocity, and the structural features of the corporate form handle the temporal dimension institutionally.
Institutions as Lossy Compression
Institutions are constitutively lossy compressions of the informational environments in which they operate. To treat an arrangement as an institution, on the account developed here, is to treat it as performing a specific kind of informational operation, one that takes a high-dimensional input and produces a lower-dimensional representation which the relevant community sustains collectively and treats as authoritative for the situations the arrangement governs. The account is descriptively extensive enough to capture the full range of things ordinarily called institutions, including social norms, conventions, formal rules, and organised bodies, without collapsing into everything that structures action; and it has consequences for the analysis of institutional suboptimality, of institutional failure, and of the relation between institutions and the algorithmic systems increasingly occupying domains institutions have historically governed.
Book Project
Stubborn Uncertainties
In this book, I take seriously the possibility that our uncertainty about evaluative commitments is a permanent feature of the moral landscape, and trace the consequences of that condition across moral epistemology, political philosophy, and the governance of artificial intelligence. Drawing on imprecise probability theory, I argue that an honest representation of our moral evidence requires credal ranges rather than sharp credences, and that a rival evaluative framework may be dismissed only when one's entire evidentially licensed range treats it as negligible. Because most of our moral evidence does not warrant that degree of confidence, the range of frameworks that retain standing is wide, and the implications extend well beyond epistemology. At the individual level, premature evaluative settlement prevents the encounter with genuine resistance that self-formation requires. At the institutional level, rational agents under such uncertainty have reasons to prefer flexible arrangements that preserve a range of evaluative options. At the level of AI governance, systems aligned to fixed moral specifications foreclose the evaluative discovery on which moral progress depends. The governing claim throughout is that the inability to settle on evaluative commitments, far from constituting a deficiency in our moral reasoning, is the condition that makes moral progress structurally possible.