Provider Choice and the Allocation of Healthcare Capacity: Evidence from Pharmacist Prescribing
Cameron Chahal
Expanding health care supply can change both who seeks treatment and how scarce physician capacity is allocated. I study these economic mechanisms through Canadian reforms allowing pharmacists to assess and prescribe for minor ailments, in a publicly funded system where wait times rather than monetary prices shape access. Exploiting staggered prescribing reforms across Canadian provinces, I find suggestive increases in prescription use and reductions in hospital cases involving minor ailments and their progression to more serious conditions. I then estimate a structural equilibrium model using linked Ontario administrative data, in which patients decide whether and where to seek care, physicians allocate capacity between minor and nonminor ailments, and wait times clear the physician market. I use a measure of physician efficiency as a proxy for unobserved wait times. Separately, I assess pharmacist care quality through downstream follow-up assessments and disease progression, finding fewer follow-ups and no statistically significant increase in progression. In a counterfactual without pharmacists, formal care seeking falls by 8.7%, while the physician share among care seekers rises from 87.46% to 97.01%. However, physicians increase their average capacity allocation toward minor ailments only from 4.91% to 4.97%, leaving much of the adjustment to longer underlying wait times. Together, the loss of a treatment option and longer underlying wait times reduce consumer surplus. These findings demonstrate that pharmacist prescribing improves access beyond patients directly treated at pharmacies by easing pressure on physician care.
Expanding Pharmacists’ Scope of Practice for Minor Ailments: Policy Take-Up and System Costs in Ontario
Cameron Chahal, Audrey Laporte, Alex Hoagland, Adrian Rohit Dass, and Melinda Hamill
We evaluate Ontario's 2023 reform allowing pharmacists to assess and prescribe for minor ailments, examining its effects on health care utilization, access to treatment, and public health care expenditures. Using linked administrative health data from January 2022 to March 2024, we examine pharmacist uptake and changes in patient utilization across providers. We employ an interrupted time series design to estimate changes in minor ailment cases relative to pre-policy trends. Pharmacists conducted 842,483 assessments during the first 15 months of the program. Following the reform, emergency department cases declined by 6.4% and family physician cases by 5.93%, equivalent to approximately 1,147 and 17,010 fewer cases per month, respectively. At the same time, total minor ailment care increased by an additional 1.17% per month, suggesting that the reform expanded access to treatment beyond shifting patients between providers. Patients treated by pharmacists also exhibited lower average clinical complexity than those treated by physicians and emergency departments. We estimate reductions of $211.4 million in physician and hospital costs relative to $13.2 million in pharmacist assessment costs, yielding approximately $15 in net public health care savings for every dollar spent. Together, these findings suggest that expanding pharmacist prescribing can improve access to care, shift treatment away from more resource-intensive providers, and generate substantial savings for the publicly funded health care system.
The Economics of Skiplagging: Airline Pricing Anomalies and What Policy Should Do About Them
Cameron Chahal and Ambarish Chandra
Multi-product firms should jointly set prices to internalize demand spillovers across goods. In airline markets, however, such optimization is impractical due to the vast number of fares that are constantly changing. Instead, airlines typically set fares on each route based on local demand and competition, which frequently creates situations where connecting itineraries can be cheaper than constituent legs. We refer to these as pricing anomalies. Consumers can exploit these anomalies in a practice known as hidden-city ticketing, although airlines try to deter such behaviour.
Using OAG data on travel within and between North America and Europe, we document that pricing anomalies are more common when competition is stronger between the endpoints of the full itinerary or weaker on its sub-itineraries. We then estimate a demand model of consumers who choose among airlines and itineraries, with some travellers obtaining lower fares through a strategic choice of connecting itinerary. We use the model to evaluate a recent revision to European Union rules on air passenger rights that would prohibit airlines from penalizing consumers who do not fly all legs of a purchased itinerary. Without enforceable penalties, arbitrage is fully feasible and anomalies cannot persist. Our counterfactuals suggest airlines would re-optimize by raising low fares on connecting itineraries rather than lowering high fares on sub-itineraries, which softens competition in exactly the markets where it was strongest. Thus, well-intentioned efforts to protect consumers may leave them worse off.
Advisors: Heski Bar-Isaac and Alex Hoagland
Committee Members: Victor Aguirregabiria and Ambarish Chandra