In this paper, we test whether more educated candidates make into less corrupt public managers. Leveraging on electoral RDD and a randomized inspection program, we show that more educated candidates commit 32% fewer moderate infringements (associated with public management), but we do not find a differential in severe irregularities (corruption-related). Exploiting data on judicial records, this effect does not stem from differences in corrupt behavior and might be explained by differences in managerial skills. In addition, more educated mayors have the same chance of re-running and of being reelected as their less-educated peers. Taking advantage of administrative labor records, our examination of possible mechanisms shows that educated candidates have more previous experience in the public sector and high-skill positions. Finally, we find no differential in the provision of public goods between these two groups. In summary, we find that more educated candidates are more effective bureaucrats rather than better politicians.

We study the effects of parental job loss on children and how access to unemployment benefits can mitigate these impacts. We leverage unique nationwide data from Brazil linking multiple administrative datasets, and take a comprehensive approach studying impacts on education as well as other key dimensions of children’s lives. First, leveraging mass layoffs for identification, we show that parental job loss increases school dropouts and age-grade distortion by up to 1.5 percentage points. These effects are pervasive, last for at least six years and significantly reduce high school completion rates. Second, we document that other important dimensions of children’s lives are affected. Following the layoff, children are more likely to work informally, commit crime, and experience early pregnancy. In turn, parents reduce educational investments by moving children from private to lower-quality public schools. Using a clean regression discontinuity design, we show that access to unemployment benefits effectively mitigates some of the intergenerational impacts of job loss, notably on teenage school dropouts and crime, and on parental investments in school quality. Our findings indicate that the income losses following parental displacement are an important mechanism of the effects on children, highlighting the importance of policies that provide income support for displaced workers.

Regulations concerning the funding of election campaigns play a critical role in safeguarding the integrity of political processes and institutions in any democracy. However, despite its diffusion, we know little about the consequences of campaign restrictions during the electoral period and how politicians respond to financial constraints. In this paper, I analyze how campaign spending limits affect the selection of workers in the public sector as a reward for political support. To establish causality, I rely on an institutional rule limiting the spending level allowed for mayoral candidates that generates a discontinuity design. Combining electoral data on the composition of municipal alliances, campaign donors, and Brazilian administrative labor market registries, I find that being a member of the winning candidate's coalition leads to a 12 percent increase in the likelihood of public sector employment in municipalities exposed to the spending cap. Exploring the characteristics of the positions, I then show that employment is concentrated in technical-ranked jobs and distributed to non-ideologically connected donors, suggesting that discretionary appointments are widely used to benefit political allies. The increased allotment of public jobs also result in substantial deterioration in policy outcomes, namely health and education indicators.

Politicians aim to exert control over the public administration to gain access to government resources and shape policy outcomes. However, diminished influence can introduce management hurdles, eroding political power and election prospects. This paper investigates how politicians facing reduced political clout distribute public sector employment to maintain control over the local administration. I establish causality by leveraging a legislative reform in Brazil setting the maximum number of local legislators based on population thresholds. Combining data on elected city councilors, 200,000 campaign donors, and administrative labor market registries, I document four empirical findings. First, an increase in the legislature size leads to a 29 percent increase in the likelihood of landing a civil service job for political supporters. Second, appointments concentrate on top managerial roles, hinting at discretionary allotments influencing policy-making. Third, civil servants already part of the local administration are more likely to be reassigned to top-tier management roles. Fourth, these discretionary nominations lead to the selection of less-skilled individuals.