Publications
Publications
Are Educated Candidates Less Corrupt Bureaucrats? Evidence from Randomized Audits in Brazil, with R. Tigre.
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 2024, 72(3):1493-1526.
[Working Paper]___[Ungated Version]___ [Replication Material]
In this paper, we test whether more educated candidates make into less corrupt public managers. Leveraging on electoral RDD and a randomized inspection program, we show that more educated candidates commit 32% fewer moderate infringements (associated with public management), but we do not find a differential in severe irregularities (corruption-related). Exploiting data on judicial records, this effect does not stem from differences in corrupt behavior and might be explained by differences in managerial skills. In addition, more educated mayors have the same chance of re-running and of being reelected as their less-educated peers. Taking advantage of administrative labor records, our examination of possible mechanisms shows that educated candidates have more previous experience in the public sector and high-skill positions. Finally, we find no differential in the provision of public goods between these two groups. In summary, we find that more educated candidates are more effective bureaucrats rather than better politicians.
Working Papers
The Kids Aren’t Alright: Parental Job Loss and Children’s Outcomes Within and Beyond Schools, with D. Britto and B. Sampaio.
Revision Requested, The Review of Economic Studies.
Winner of the 2023 Best Paper in Applied Microeconomics of the Brazilian Econometric Society (SBE).
We study the effects of parental job loss on children and how access to unemployment benefits can mitigate these impacts. We leverage unique nationwide data from Brazil linking multiple administrative datasets, and take a comprehensive approach studying impacts on education as well as other key dimensions of children’s lives. First, leveraging mass layoffs for identification, we show that parental job loss increases school dropouts and age-grade distortion by up to 1.5 percentage points. These effects are pervasive, last for at least six years and significantly reduce high school completion rates. Second, we document that other important dimensions of children’s lives are affected. Following the layoff, children are more likely to work informally, commit crime, and experience early pregnancy. In turn, parents reduce educational investments by moving children from private to lower-quality public schools. Using a clean regression discontinuity design, we show that access to unemployment benefits effectively mitigates some of the intergenerational impacts of job loss, notably on teenage school dropouts and crime, and on parental investments in school quality. Our findings indicate that the income losses following parental displacement are an important mechanism of the effects on children, highlighting the importance of policies that provide income support for displaced workers.
This paper studies how looser municipal campaign spending caps in Brazil affect the allocation of public-sector jobs to campaign donors. Identification combines a reform that introduced municipality-specific ceilings, generating a discontinuity in allowed expenditures, with close elections that quasi-randomly assign mayors. Linking electoral alliances, records on roughly 140,000 donors, and administrative labor-market data, I estimate the reform’s impact on donors’ post-election hiring. Financial supporters of elected candidates in municipalities with looser caps are 33% more likely to enter public employment. New appointments concentrate in low-skill positions, favor non-ideological donors, and are especially prevalent under term-limited mayors, suggesting the use of discretionary posts as a quid pro quo tool.
This paper examines how reduced individual influence leads politicians to use public-sector employment as a compensatory instrument. Identification exploits a Brazilian reform imposing population-based ceilings on municipal council size, generating quasi-experimental variation in political leverage. I combine electoral records for city councilors, campaign donation data on roughly 200,000 individuals, and matched administrative labor-market records. Reduced influence raises the likelihood that campaign supporters obtain public-sector jobs by about 26%. These gains concentrate in managerial and supervisory positions, include upward reallocation of already employed insiders, and are associated with lower education and greater skill and pay mismatchs. The results show that public employment operates as a personnel-based distributive instrument, through which politicians offset diminished influence, with consequences for bureaucratic quality and governance.
Work in Progress
Female Leadership and the Market for Representation. Draft soon.
This paper studies whether female political leadership reshapes bureaucratic gender composition through gendered access within campaign donor networks. I exploit close mayoral elections in Brazil between male and female candidates and link election outcomes to individual-level campaign donations and administrative employment records covering the universe of public sector workers. I find that when a female candidate narrowly wins, public-sector entry rises for both genders, but the effect is substantially larger for women: female donors experience a 22% increase, compared with a 15% increase for male donors. These gains are concentrated in discretionary and senior managerial positions, while no comparable effects arise following male candidate victories. The findings identify discretionary hiring as a key channel through which women's electoral representation reshapes gender equity and authority within public administrations.
How Does Inequality Shape Voting Behavior: Evidence from Long-Term Legacy of Slavery. Draft soon.
Technical Notes and Policy Work [in English/Portuguese]
"TIDES of Change: Igniting Productivity Growth in Europe and Central Asia," The World Bank (2025).
"Unleashing Potential: Pathways to Prosperity in Europe and Central Asia", The World Bank (2025).
"Desenvolvimento de Ferramentas de Suporte à Decisão com Machine Learning para o Projeto Mobilização da Indústria pela Primeira Infância", Observatório Nacional da Indústria (2024).
"Comparative Policy Analysis of EU Programs Supporting SMEs vs. Startups Companies", The World Bank (2024).
"Poverty Impact Assessment Tool for a Universal Social Protection Floor: Application for Brazil", International Labour Organisation (2023).
"Impactos do Programa de Educação Básica Articulada com a Educação Profissional sobre Medidas de Violência", Ministry of Education of Brazil (2023).
"Efeitos da Implementação de Escolas de Ensino Médio em Tempo Integral (EMTI) sobre Indicadores de Criminalidade", LEAD Report (2022).
"A Transferência de Líderes de Organizações Criminosas Aumenta o Crime Local? O Caso de Marcola", Ministry of Justice of Brazil (2020).
"Avaliação e Monitoramento de Políticas Públicas no Âmbito do Ministério da Cidadania", Ministry of Social Development of Brazil(2019).