We study the effects of parental job loss on children and how access to unemployment benefits can mitigate these impacts. We leverage unique nationwide data from Brazil linking multiple administrative datasets, and take a comprehensive approach studying impacts on education as well as other key dimensions of children’s lives. First, leveraging mass layoffs for identification, we show that parental job loss increases school dropouts and age-grade distortion by up to 1.5 percentage points. These effects are pervasive, last for at least six years and significantly reduce high school completion rates. Second, we document that other important dimensions of children’s lives are affected. Following the layoff, children are more likely to work informally, commit crime, and experience early pregnancy. In turn, parents reduce educational investments by moving children from private to lower-quality public schools. Using a clean regression discontinuity design, we show that access to unemployment benefits effectively mitigates some of the intergenerational impacts of job loss, notably on teenage school dropouts and crime, and on parental investments in school quality. Our findings indicate that the income losses following parental displacement are an important mechanism of the effects on children, highlighting the importance of policies that provide income support for displaced workers.

Regulations governing campaign finance play a central role in safeguarding the integrity of democratic institutions. Yet, despite their widespread adoption, little is known about how politicians adjust their behavior when financial constraints change and how these adjustments affect patterns of patronage. This paper examines how looser campaign spending limits shape the allocation of public-sector positions as rewards for political and financial support. To identify causal effects, I exploit two sources of exogenous variation: a Brazilian electoral reform that introduced municipality-specific spending ceilings, creating a discontinuity in permitted expenditures, and close elections that generate quasi-random variation in who holds office. Municipalities characterized by more permissive campaign spending provide politicians with greater resources, facilitating enhanced political patronage through discretionary appointments. By combining electoral data on municipal political alliances, detailed records on roughly 140,000 individual campaign donors, and comprehensive Brazilian administrative labor market records, I analyze the effect of the financial reform on the likelihood of campaign donors entering public-sector employment after the elections. I find that financial supporters of elected candidates experience a 33% increase in the likelihood of public sector employment in municipalities subject to looser spending caps. Further analysis shows that these appointments concentrate in low-skill positions, disproportionately benefit non-ideologically-aligned donors, and are more pronounced among term-limited mayors, indicating the extensive use of discretionary posts as a patronage tool.

This paper examines whether female executive leadership reshapes the gender composition of municipal bureaucracies through discretionary appointment power. I analyze close mayoral elections in Brazil between female and male candidates and link electoral outcomes to individual-level campaign donation records and administrative employment data covering the universe of formal public-sector jobs. When a female candidate narrowly wins, campaign donors become more likely to enter municipal public employment. The effect is not uniform across genders. Female donors experience an approximately 27% increase relative to baseline, while male donors experience a 15% increase. These gains are concentrated in discretionary municipal appointments and in higher-ranking professional and managerial positions. By contrast, I find no effects in segments insulated from mayoral control. I also find no evidence of declining qualifications or donation-size gradients consistent with a quid pro quo exchange. Together, the results indicate that executive discretion over hiring provides a mechanism through which women’s electoral representation can alter access to, and authority within, public administrations.

"TIDES of Change: Igniting Productivity Growth in Europe and Central Asia," The World Bank (2025).

"Unleashing Potential: Pathways to Prosperity in Europe and Central Asia", The World Bank (2025).

"Desenvolvimento de Ferramentas de Suporte à Decisão com Machine Learning para o Projeto Mobilização da Indústria pela Primeira Infância", Observatório Nacional da Indústria (2024). 

"Comparative Policy Analysis of EU Programs Supporting SMEs vs. Startups Companies", The World Bank (2024).

"Poverty Impact Assessment Tool for a Universal Social Protection Floor: Application for Brazil", International Labour Organisation (2023).

"Impactos do Programa de Educação Básica Articulada com a Educação Profissional sobre Medidas de Violência", Ministry of Education of Brazil (2023). 

"Efeitos da Implementação de Escolas de Ensino Médio em Tempo Integral (EMTI) sobre Indicadores de Criminalidade", LEAD Report (2022). 

"A Transferência de Líderes de Organizações Criminosas Aumenta o Crime Local? O Caso de Marcola", Ministry of Justice of Brazil (2020). 

"Avaliação e Monitoramento de Políticas Públicas no Âmbito do Ministério da Cidadania", Ministry of Social Development of Brazil(2019).