Cabot Reply to Defence

IN THE County Court at Northampton CNBC

CLAIM NO:

BETWEEN:-

Cabot Financial (UK) Limited

Claimant

-and-

[DEFENDANT NAME]

Defendant

REPLY TO DEFENCE

It is the named Claimant's contention that the Defendant does not, in any way, particularise the legal basis of his Defence to these proceedings. The Defence is wholly un-particularised, template in nature and entirely without merit.

This document is offered in reply to the Defendant's defence dated 01/12/2023. The Defence is a widely available 'internet defence', rather than a genuine dispute and appears to have been filed for the sole purpose of complicating and extending the proceedings.

I will set out a brief reply to each of the topics raised by the Defendant below. Exhibited alongside this Reply to Defence are various documents provided to the named Claimant by Lloyds Bank ("Lloyds"), documents from the named Claimant's own records and from its instructed Solicitors; Mortimer Clarke Solicitors ("Mortimer Clarke")

Agreement

1. The Claimant has been informed that on or around the 26/03/2021 the Defendant entered into a Fixed Sum Loan Agreement with Lloyds it bore the agreement number 100195799301 ("Agreement"). A copy of the Agreement, including terms and conditions, is enclosed at pages 1 to 4, the agreement was regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 1974.

Non-payment and Default

2. Enclosed at pages 5 to 6 is a statement of the account showing the Defendant made use of the funds, maintained a number of payments towards it as well as how the balance accrued with any interest and charges that were applied. The last payment received on the account was on the 04/01/2022 for £281.04 by direct debt (page 6), after which payments ceased and the Agreement defaulted.

3. On the 24/05/2022, Lloyds issued to the Defendant a Default Notice at his current address of 116 Irene Avenue, Stoke on Trent, Staffordshire ST6 7HE, in accordance with Section 87 of the Consumer Credit Act. A copy of the Default Notice is enclosed at page 7 to 10, it requested the Defendant make a payment for £562.08 by 11 June 2022. The Defendant failed to address the default notice and the agreement was terminated on or around the 27/07/2022.

4. The Defendant's objection to the sum claimed is unclear; the sum is clearly evidenced by the statement of account at pages 5 to 6 which show how the balance of £15,048.65 accrued and that he was sent a Notice of Default at pages 7 to 10.

Assignment

5. On 17/08/2022 Lloyds legally assigned to the named Claimant, absolutely, all amounts due from the Defendant to Lloyds pursuant to the Agreement being the outstanding balance of £15,048.65, the Defendant was sent a Notice of the Assignment to his current address on 23/08/2022 by both Lloyds and the named Claimant in accordance with Section 136 Law of Property Act 1925. Copies of the Notices of Assignment informing the Defendant of the change of ownership of the debt are enclosed at pages 11 to 15.

6. The Defendant's dispute of assignment is both unclear and misleading. This debt was legally assigned to the Claimant on 17/08/2022. There is no statutory obligation for a copy of the Deed of Assignment to be provided as requested by the Defendant. The Deed of Assignment is a confidential agreement between the named Claimant and Lloyds, relating to a number of different agreements with different individuals. It is commercially sensitive, and disclosure would be disproportionate to these proceedings.

7. The Defendant has misquoted the Van Lynn case, and disregarded other more recent cases which have clarified the issue; for example the case of Mitchell McFarlane and Partners Ltd -v- Foremans Ltd [2002] in which it was said that "Van Lynn suggests that ... (a debtor) ... may be entitled to ask reasonable questions to ensure that he can safely pay the assignee. This would be particularly so where the Notice comes from the assignee... in such circumstances... some kind of confirmation from the assignor/original creditor may be necessary in order to achieve the requisite degree of certainty". In this case the Defendant has been notified of the assignment by both Lloyds and the named Claimant and is able to ensure the validity of the assignment by verifying this with Lloyds at any time.

8. A debtor is not entitled to dispute the existence or the terms of an assignment, which is a business arrangement between the assignor and assignee, simply because that arrangement affects their account. It should be sufficient evidence that both of the parties concerned - the assignor and assignee, have confirmed that the assignment took place.

9. Similarly, the Defendant's references to other statutes and cases are unexplained and misconceived. The named Claimant has complied with all relevant requirements in the assignment process and has appropriately notified the Defendant of this. A debtor is not entitled to challenge an assignment between two other parties merely because they are unhappy that it has occurred.

10. Following the notices of assignment, the Defendant has been written to on a number of occasions bringing the debt to his attention. Copies of letters sent to him are on pages 16 to 24. The letters include notification of the assignment of the account from Lloyds, confirming the account details and the outstanding balance. The subsequent correspondence clearly advised the Defendant of the outstanding balance and his obligation to repay it.

The purpose was to engage with the Defendant and for him to address the debt. All the correspondence was sent to the Defendant at his current address.

FCA authorisation

11, The Defendant's referrencing to various Legislation surrounding FCA Authorisation and in particlular the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, is misconceived and misquoted and has no relevance to proceedings for a simple debt claim such as this is. The Defendant also correctly identifies the legislation upon which the named Claimant relies in bringing proceedings: Paragraph 55 of the Schedule to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Exemption) Order 2001.

12. In brief, in order to bring proceedings for a debt regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (as this debt is), the creditor should be regulated by the FCA. However, where a creditor delegates the management of the accounts it owns to other FCA-regulated entities, it is entitled to rely upon the FCA authorisation of those entities, which perform all regulated activities on its behalf.

13. Cabot Financial (Europe) Limited ("CFE") is appointed representative of Cabot Credit Management Group Limited ("CCMG"), CCMG has arranged for these proceedings to be issued in the name of the Claimant. For the avoidance of doubt, in compliance with the relevant statutory framework, it does so pursuant to the terms of a Master Servicing Agreement (the "MSA") entered into with the named Claimant (and others) dated 05 January 2023.

14. The named Claimant is the legal assignee of the agreement which forms the subject of this claim. It has contracted with CCMG ("The Servicer") for CCMG to undertake certain services in respect of the agreement as defined by the terms of the MSA. These include exercising the named Claimant's rights and duties under the agreement, including collection of the debt owing and, where legally possible, initiating legal action in the Claimant's name.

15. This arrangement was entered in into in accordance with the exemption from the requirement for regulatory authorisation in paragraph 55 of Schedule 1 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Exemption) Order 2001 ("the Paragraph 55 Exemption"). Thereby, the Servicer, which has all necessary authorisations from the Financial Conduct Authority, acts in the place of the named Claimant.

16. For the avoidance of doubt, the Servicer is also entitled under the terms of the MSA to subcontract any and all of it services to an "Appointed Representative" (as defined by s.39 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000). The Servicer duly appointed CFE to act as its Appointed Representative in relation to the agreement. Accordingly, the Servicer has arranged for these proceedings to be initiated in the County Court in the name of the Claimant.

17. Further and alternatively to the paragraph 55 exemption, the named Claimant relies on the exclusion contained in Article 60I of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 ("the Article 601 Exclusion") on the same basis.

18. It is unclear why the Defendant believes that a non-binding County Court decision relating to a wholly different creditor would have any relevance in relation to these proceedings. It is not a 'general principle of law' that the paragraph 55 exemption cannot be applied and to suggest so is extremely misleading. There has been one case on this topic relating to entities within the Cabot group; MFS Portfolio Limited v Phelan & West. That case, considered in great detail over four days of hearing in the Court of Appeal in 2019, held that MFS Portfolio Limited was entitled to rely upon the paragraph 55 exemption. MFS Portfolio Limited and Cabot Financial (UK) Limited operate in the same manner, both being entities within the Cabot group and both relying upon the authorisation of Cabot Credit Management Group Limited and Cabot Financial (Europe) Limited.

19. It is the Claimant's position that, given the misrepresentation of case law by the Defendant in relation to this topic and the complexity of the topic in relation to this simple debt claim, this aspect of the defence should be struck out.

Pre-action Protocol

20. The Defendant's reference to the 'Pre-action Conduct protocol' is similarly unclear. As a simple debt claim the named Claimant has followed the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims; a letter before claim was sent to the Defendant by Mortimer Clarke on 16/12/2022. A copy of the letter before action is enclosed at pages 25 to 36.

21. Following the issuing of the letter before claim between the 16/01/2023 to 26/09/2023, the Defendant contacted the named Claimant, it and Mortimer Clarke spent many months responding to the Defendant's numerous disputes, Subject Access Requests and requests for documentation; all of which appearing to be templated in nature.

However, instead of coming to an amicable solution to address the debt, the Defendant has ignored all attempts to resolve the matter attempting to avoid liability with excessive and repetitive dispute requests rather than a legitimate dispute of the debt itself. At pages 37 to 115 are copies of some of the Defendant's letters and the responses.

22. It is averred that the Defendant's numerous requests for information and documentation to be provided were responded to at length evidencing the Defendant's liability, therefore, a further letter before action was sent to the Defendant by Mortimer Clarke on 26/09/2023 with its instructions to issue a Claim should an amicable arrangement not be agreed to avoid legal action.

23. Despite all the information and documentation, the Defendant continues to raise the same excessive templated disputes rather than responding to address the debt itself, in these circumstances the named Claimant issued

Court proceedings to bring the matter to a conclusion.

24. The Defendant has been provided with the documentation to evidence that he entered into the Agreement (pages 1 to 4), benefited from the credit provided and failed to maintain payments in accordance with the Agreement (pages 5 to 6) that the account defaulted to which he was provided with a Default Notice to his current address and in accordance with Section 87 of the Consumer Credit Act (page 7 to 10). Upon termination of the agreement by Lloyds, the debt was legally assigned to the named Claimant (pages 11 to 15) with a balance of £15,048.65 remaining outstanding for which the Defendant is liable.

25. For the reasons set out above, the Court is invited to strike out the Defence pursuant to the provisions of CPR 3.4 (2) (a) in that it discloses no grounds for defending these proceedings.

Dated this 22nd day of December 2023

Statement of Truth

The Claimant believes that the facts stated in this Reply to Defence are true. I am duly authorised by the Claimant to sign this statement. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Full name: K. Tandy.

Name of claimant's solicitor's firm - Mortimer Clarke Solicitors

Signed: KTandy  - position or office held - Defence Executive

Claimant's solicitor (if signing on behalf of a firm or company)

Mortimer Clarke Solicitors

PO Box 130

Blyth

NE24 9FA

Ref: 37677478

Witness Statement no 1

IN THE County Court at Northampton CNBC

CLAIM NO:

BETWEEN:-

Cabot Financial (UK) Limited

Claimant

-and-

[DEFENDANT NAME]

Defendant

-----------------------------

WITNESS STATEMENT

-----------------------------

I am the Defendant in this matter, and I make this witness statement in response to the Claimant's filing of a Reply to Defence dated 22nd December 2023 by K.Tandy ("the Alleged Witness"). 

The Claimant alleges that my Defence lacks particularization of the legal basis, is template-based, and serves the sole purpose of complicating and extending the proceedings. I dispute these assertions. My Defence is meticulously crafted to address each point raised by the Claimant, including the alleged agreement, non-payment, default, assignment, and compliance with relevant regulations.

Far from being template-based, my Defence is a bespoke response tailored to the specific circumstances of this case. Each argument and contention presented therein is supported by legal principles and evidence pertinent to the matter at hand. It is inaccurate and misleading for the Claimant to suggest that my Defence was filed to complicate or prolong the proceedings. On the contrary, my Defence reflects genuine disputes concerning the alleged debt and the Claimant's legal standing to pursue this claim.

The Claimant's characterization of my Defence as lacking merit is unfounded and speculative. I have diligently complied with all legal requirements and presented my case in a clear and coherent manner. I respectfully request that the Court disregard the Claimant's baseless assertions regarding the nature and basis of my Defence. I reaffirm the validity and specificity of my Defence and emphasize my sincere intention to engage in the legal process in a fair and transparent manner.

REQUEST FOR EXCLUSION OF CLAIMANT'S RESPONSE TO DEFENCE

Basis of Objection: 

The information presented in the Claimant's Response to Defence is based on documents enclosed within the statement. However, these documents are not accompanied by a witness who can authenticate the accuracy and reliability of the information contained therein. Therefore, the contents of these documents are hearsay as they are being presented for the truth of the matter asserted without proper foundation.

Lack of Firsthand Knowledge: 

Assertions made within the Response to Defence do not identify their source. It is not clear how the opposing party obtained this information or whether it is based on firsthand observation or reliable sources. As such, the statement lacks the requisite firsthand knowledge necessary to be admissible as evidence.

No Opportunity for Cross-Examination: 

Without a witness available for cross-examination regarding the contents of the enclosed documents, there is no opportunity to challenge the accuracy or reliability of the information presented. This deprives the opposing party of the right to confront and challenge the evidence against them.

Request for Exclusion: 

I respectfully request that the Claimant's Response to Defence be excluded from consideration by the court on the grounds of hearsay. The court should afford no weight to this statement in its deliberations.

I reserve the right to challenge the authenticity, accuracy, and admissibility of the documents referenced in the Claimant's Response to Defence during the course of this proceeding.

Void Agreement 

1.  It is disputed that he Claimant has been informed that on or around the 26/03/2021 the Defendant entered into a Fixed Sum Loan Agreement with Lloyds ("the Alleged Assignor")  it bore the agreement number 100195799301 ("the Void Agreement").  It is disputed that a copy of the Agreement, including terms and conditions, is exhibited at pages 1 to 4 of the Claimant's response to Defence.  It is not disputed that the Void Agreement was regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 1974. 

The Defendant disputes the Claimant's assertion regarding the alleged Fixed Sum Loan Agreement between the Defendant and the Alleged Assignor, as outlined in the Claimant's statement. The Defendant contends that the information presented by the Claimant regarding the Void Agreement is hearsay and lacks any direct evidence.

Furthermore, the Defendant avers that the Void Agreement between the Defendant and the Alleged Assignor would be subject to scrutiny under relevant consumer protection regulations, including but not limited to the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The Defendant asserts that the Void Agreement was void from the outset due to the Alleged Assignor's failure to comply with Section 138D of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and CONC 5.2A of the the Consumer Credit Sourcebook, in respect of irresponsible lending and is subject to a complaint pending a formal investigation by the Financial Ombudsman. 

Alleged Non-payment and Default

2.  It is disputed that exhibited by the Claimant ,in their Reply to Defence, at pages 5 to 6 is a statement of the account showing the Defendant made use of the funds, maintained a number of payments towards it as well as how the balance accrued with any interest and charges that were applied. It is disputed that the last payment received on the account was on the 04/01/2022 for £281.04 by direct debt (page 6), after which payments ceased and the Void Agreement defaulted. 

I respectfully dispute Point 2 on the grounds of hearsay, as the statement relies on documents enclosed within the statement without a witness available to authenticate their accuracy and reliability. Furthermore, the assertion regarding the Defendant's use of funds, maintenance of payments, and default on the agreement lacks firsthand knowledge and presents no opportunity for cross-examination, depriving the opposing party of their right to confront and challenge the evidence against them. Therefore, Point 2 should be excluded from consideration by the court.

3.  It is disputed that on the 24/05/2022, the Alleged Assignor issued to the Defendant a Default Notice at his current address of 116 Irene Avenue, Stoke on Trent, Staffordshire ST6 7HE, in accordance with Section 87 of the Consumer Credit Act. It is disputed that a copy of the Default Notice is exhibited at page 7 to 10 of the Claimant's Reply to Defence.  It is disputed that it requested the Defendant make a payment for £562.08 by 11 June 2022. It is disputed that the Defendant failed to address the default notice and the agreement was terminated on or around the 27/07/2022. 

While I acknowledge the presentation of a Default Notice in Point 3, I must object to its admissibility and relevance as hearsay. The statement lacks firsthand knowledge and relies solely on the enclosed document without the presence of a witness to authenticate its accuracy. Moreover, the assertion regarding the Defendant's failure to address the Default Notice and the subsequent termination of the agreement is speculative and lacks proper foundation. Furthermore, the assertion does not provide any indication of how the sender of the Default Notice obtained the information regarding the Defendant's failure to respond. Therefore, I respectfully request that Point 3 be excluded from consideration by the court due to its hearsay nature and lack of relevance.

4.  It is disputed that the Defendant's objection to the sum claimed is unclear. It is disputed that the sum is clearly evidenced by the statement of account at pages 5 to 6 which show how the balance of £15,048.65 accrued and that he was sent a Notice of Default at pages 7 to 10. 

In response to Point 4, I respectfully clarify that my objection to the sum claimed is not based on its clarity but rather on its accuracy and admissibility. While the statement asserts that the sum claimed is evidenced by the enclosed documents, namely the statement of account and the Notice of Default, I must object to their admissibility on the grounds of hearsay and lack of proper foundation. The statement lacks firsthand knowledge and fails to provide evidence that can be properly authenticated by a witness. Additionally, the assertion regarding the clarity of the Defendant's objection is a matter of interpretation and does not negate the need for reliable and admissible evidence to support the claimed sum. Therefore, I maintain my objection to the sum claimed and request that the court exclude Point 4 from consideration due to its reliance on hearsay and lack of proper foundation.

Alleged Assignment

5. It is disputed that on 17/08/2022 the Alleged Assignor legally assigned to the named Claimant, absolutely, all amounts due from the Defendant to the Alleged Assignor pursuant to the Void Agreement being the outstanding balance of £15,048.65, due to the constraints of Section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925 and Section 44 of the Companies Act 2006. The Defendant argues that the Claimant has a duty to provide the instrument of assignment ('Deed of Assignment'), which forms part of the agreement that the Claimant relies on, under Practice Direction 16, paragraph 7.3, as without this document, there is no evidence of any agreement between the Defendant and the Claimant. 

To establish whether the Claimant has any Locus Standi to bring a claim, it is crucial for the Claimant to provide a copy of the Deed of Assignment under CPR Part 31.6, CPR18, CPR31.14. The Defendant urges the Court to conclude that if the Claimant fails to provide any Deed of Assignment upon which they rely to prove any exception from the Common Law Doctrine of Privity of Contract ('Privity'), then the Claimant has no Locus Standi to issue this claim:

⦁ See; (Van Lynn Developments v Pelias Construction Co Ltd 1968.[3] All ER 824) Where Lord Denning MR said, 'the debtor is entitled to view the sale agreement to ensure that the assignee can give him good discharge under the contract.'

⦁ And; (Hancock v Promontoria (Chestnut) Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 907) - In this case, the court held that the redacted deed of assignment did not provide the necessary information to establish the terms of the assignment, the identity of the parties involved, or the legal rights and obligations of the parties. The court, therefore, concluded that the claimant had not provided sufficient evidence of the assignment to establish their legal right to enforce the debt.

⦁ Also; Jones v Link Financial Ltd | [2013] 1 WLR 693 Where it was found that three conditions for the validity of such an assignment must be satisfied, 'namely': that the assignment was absolute and not by way of charge; that it was in writing under the hand of the assignor, and that express notice in writing had been given to the debtor. Therefore, the Claimant must demonstrate that all three elements of a legal assignment have been satisfied for the Alleged Assignment to be valid.

The Defendant denies being sent or given, to his current address, any Notice of Assignment (the 'Alleged Notice of Assignment') for the Alleged Assignment of the Void Agreement on 23/08/2022 by both the Alleged Assignor and the named Claimant in accordance with Section 136 of the Law of Property Act 1925. 

It is disputed that the documents exhibited by the Claimant at pages 11 to 15 of their Reply to Defence are copies of Notices Sent to the Defendant. It is disputed that the Defendant was informated of any change of ownership of the benefit of the Void Agreement.

The Defendant requests that the Claimant provide evidence of its service, such as a record of delivery or a witness statement from the person who served the notice. The Defendant maintains that the Claimant's Locus Standi to issue the claim would be called into question if they were to rely solely on an alleged Notice of Assignment. 

The Defendant cites the case of Mitchell Mcfarlane & Partners Ltd v Foremans Ltd 2002 - 'Even if I had held that notice of assignment had not been given, I do not think that this would have made any difference. As an equitable assignee, Foremans could not have brought an action at law without joining the assignor, old Foremans.' 

The Claimant is required to provide the Deed of Assignment, upon which they rely, for inspection by the Court at any substantive hearing as per Civil Procedure Rule Part 39 PD 39a (3.3) and Practice Direction 16, paragraph 7.3.

6. It is disputed that he Defendant's dispute of assignment is both unclear and misleading. It is disputed that the benefit of the Void Agreement was legally assigned to the Claimant on 17/08/2022. 

Given the precedent set by the case law of Hancock v Promontoria (Chestnut) Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 907, where Henderson LJ emphasized the importance of transparency in legal proceedings by stating that "in all normal cases, the entire document should be placed before the court," the Claimant's assertion that there is no statutory obligation to provide a copy of the Deed of Assignment lacks merit. Moreover, Henderson LJ's directive that any redactions made to documents should be fully explained and justified by the party making the redaction, with sufficient particularity for the court to rule on the need for the redaction if challenged, highlights the necessity for transparency even in cases involving confidential agreements. Therefore, the Claimant's argument that the Deed of Assignment is confidential and commercially sensitive, thus warranting its withholding, is in direct conflict with established legal principles emphasizing the importance of transparency and disclosure in legal proceedings. As such, the Claimant's refusal to provide the Deed of Assignment cannot be justified solely on the grounds of confidentiality and commercial sensitivity, especially in light of the precedent set by Hancock v Promontoria (Chestnut) Ltd.

7. The assertion that the Defendant has misquoted the Van Lynn case and disregarded more recent cases, such as Mitchell McFarlane and Partners Ltd -v- Foremans Ltd [2002], is unfounded and fails to accurately represent the Defendant's position. Firstly, it is important to note that the Defendant's reference to the Van Lynn case serves as a point of legal precedent and does not necessarily imply misquotation. Secondly, while the case of Mitchell McFarlane and Partners Ltd -v- Foremans Ltd [2002] may provide additional context on the issue of assignment, it does not invalidate or supersede the principles established in the Van Lynn case. Moreover, the excerpt provided from the Mitchell McFarlane case actually reinforces the Defendant's position by acknowledging the debtor's right to ask reasonable questions to ensure the validity of the assignment, particularly when notice comes from the assignee. The Defendant's alleged notification of the assignment by both the Alleged Assignor and the named Claimant, which are disputed, does not automatically guarantee the validity of the assignment, especially considering the possibility of conflicting notifications or discrepancies in the information provided. Therefore, the Defendant's ability to verify the assignment with the Alleged Assignor does not negate the need for further clarification or confirmation, as suggested by both the Van Lynn case and the Mitchell McFarlane case excerpt provided.

8. It is disputed that a debtor is not entitled to dispute the existence or the terms of an assignment, which is a business arrangement between the assignor and assignee, simply because that arrangement affects their account. It is disputed that it should be sufficient evidence that both of the parties concerned - the assignor and assignee, have confirmed that the assignment took place.

The assertion that a debtor is not entitled to dispute the existence or terms of an assignment solely because it is a business arrangement between the assignor and assignee is flawed and fails to consider the legal rights and protections afforded to debtors. While it is true that an assignment is a contractual agreement between the assignor and assignee, its impact on the debtor's account directly affects their rights and obligations. Therefore, it is entirely reasonable for a debtor to seek clarification or dispute the assignment if there are concerns regarding its validity, terms, or impact on their account. Relying solely on confirmation from the assignor and assignee as sufficient evidence overlooks the debtor's legitimate interests in ensuring the assignment is lawful and properly executed. Legal precedent and principles of fairness dictate that debtors have the right to challenge assignments if there are reasonable grounds to do so, and simply accepting confirmation from the assignor and assignee as conclusive evidence would undermine this fundamental right.

9. The assertion that the Defendant's references to other statutes and cases are unexplained and misconceived overlooks the legitimate legal grounds on which the Defendant may challenge the assignment. It is essential to recognize that debtors have legal rights and protections, including the right to challenge an assignment if there are valid reasons to do so. Referencing other statutes and cases is a common and legitimate practice in legal arguments to provide context, precedent, and legal reasoning. Furthermore, it is incorrect to suggest that a debtor's dissatisfaction alone serves as the basis for challenging an assignment. Instead, debtors may challenge assignments on various legal grounds, such as disputes over the validity of the assignment process, compliance with relevant legal requirements, or discrepancies in the notification process. Therefore, the assertion that a debtor is not entitled to challenge an assignment merely due to dissatisfaction mischaracterizes the legal basis for challenging assignments and fails to acknowledge the debtor's legitimate legal rights in such matters.

10. It is disputed that the Defendant has been written to on a number of occasions bringing the alleged debt to his attention. It is disuted that the documents exhibited by the Claimant at pages 16 to 24 of their Response to Defence are copies of letters sent to the Defendant. It is disputed that the letters include notification of the assignment of the account from Lloyds, confirming the account details and the outstanding balance. It is disputed that the subsequent correspondence clearly advised the Defendant of the outstanding balance and his obligation to repay it. It is disputed that the purpose was to engage with the Defendant and for him to address the debt. It is disuted that all the correspondence was sent to the Defendant at his current address.

The statement provided contains elements that could be categorized as hearsay, specifically regarding the content of the letters sent to the Defendant. Hearsay is any statement made out of court that is offered in court as evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. In this case, the assertion that the subsequent correspondence "clearly advised the Defendant of the outstanding balance and his obligation to repay it" would likely be considered hearsay unless the letters themselves are presented as evidence in court.

Moreover, the statement lacks direct evidence or documentation to support its claims. While it mentions that copies of the letters are available on pages 16 to 24, without actually presenting these letters as evidence, the statement remains unsubstantiated and relies on the assertion of the speaker rather than tangible proof.

Additionally, the purpose of the correspondence being stated as "to engage with the Defendant and for him to address the debt" is subjective and could be interpreted differently by different parties. Without direct evidence or context from the letters themselves, this claim lacks credibility and could be disputed as hearsay.

Therefore, to avoid hearsay and strengthen the argument, it would be necessary to present the actual letters as evidence or provide direct testimony from someone with personal knowledge of their content and purpose.

Lack of FCA authorisation

11. The assertion that the Defendant's references to legislation surrounding FCA Authorization, particularly the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000), are misconceived, misquoted, and irrelevant to the proceedings for a simple debt claim is disputable on several grounds. Firstly, it's important to note that references to relevant legislation, including FSMA 2000, are not inherently misconceived or irrelevant, especially in legal proceedings where the applicability of regulatory frameworks may have a bearing on the case. Secondly, the Defendant's identification of legislation upon which the named Claimant relies, specifically Paragraph 55 of the Schedule to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Exemption) Order 2001, does not negate the relevance of broader legislation such as FSMA 2000. The Defendant may argue that understanding the regulatory framework governing financial services, including debt collection practices, is pertinent to the case, particularly in evaluating the lawfulness of the debt collection process. Therefore, dismissing the Defendant's references to FSMA 2000 as misconceived and irrelevant oversimplifies the legal complexities involved and could undermine the Defendant's ability to present a comprehensive defense.

12. It is not disputed that in order to bring proceedings for a debt regulated by the Consumer Credit Act 1974, the creditor should be regulated by the FCA. It is disputed that  where a creditor delegates the management of the accounts it owns to other FCA-regulated entities, it is entitled to rely upon the FCA authorisation of those entities, which perform all regulated activities on its behalf.

The assertion made by the Claimant overlooks the nuances of regulatory requirements under the Consumer Credit Act 1974 (CCA 1974) and misinterprets the relationship between creditors and entities managing accounts on their behalf. While it is true that the creditor should generally be regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to bring proceedings for a debt regulated by the CCA 1974, the argument fails to acknowledge that delegation of account management does not absolve the creditor of its regulatory obligations.

According to FCA guidelines, the creditor remains ultimately responsible for ensuring compliance with regulatory requirements, even when tasks are delegated to other entities. Therefore, relying solely on the FCA authorization of the entities managing the accounts does not automatically fulfill the regulatory obligations of the creditor. The creditor must still ensure that all regulated activities related to the debt, including the initiation of legal proceedings, are carried out in compliance with FCA regulations.

Furthermore, the argument presented does not address the specific regulatory provisions of the CCA 1974 and the responsibilities of creditors in relation to regulated debts. Simply relying on the FCA authorization of delegated entities without ensuring direct compliance with relevant regulations under the CCA 1974 could potentially lead to regulatory breaches and legal implications for the creditor.

In summary, while delegation of account management to FCA-regulated entities may be permissible, it does not absolve the creditor of its regulatory responsibilities under the CCA 1974. The creditor remains accountable for ensuring compliance with all relevant regulations, including those pertaining to the initiation of legal proceedings for regulated debts.

13. It is disputed that Cabot Financial (Europe) Limited ("CFE") is appointed representative of Cabot Credit Management Group Limited ("CCMG"), CCMG has arranged for these proceedings to be issued in the name of the Claimant. It is disputed that in compliance with the relevant statutory framework, it does so pursuant to the terms of a Master Servicing Agreement (the "MSA") entered into with the named Claimant (and others) dated 05 January 2023.

The assertion regarding Cabot Financial (Europe) Limited ("CFE") being appointed representative of Cabot Credit Management Group Limited ("CCMG") and CCMG arranging for the proceedings to be issued in the name of the Claimant, purportedly in compliance with a Master Servicing Agreement (MSA), lacks clarity and specific evidence to support its validity. Firstly, the mere mention of a Master Servicing Agreement without providing details of its contents or relevance to the proceedings leaves the statement vague and open to interpretation. Without disclosing the terms and provisions of the MSA, it is challenging to assess whether the arrangement complies with the relevant statutory framework or adequately addresses the rights and obligations of all parties involved. Additionally, the assertion that CFE acts as a representative of CCMG and the subsequent issuance of proceedings in the name of the Claimant raises questions about the legal capacity and authority of each entity within the arrangement. Without further clarification on the roles, responsibilities, and legal relationships established by the MSA, the validity and compliance of the proceedings initiated by CCMG, through CFE, remain subject to dispute and require more detailed evidence to substantiate their legality and adherence to statutory requirements.

The Claimant is require to provide a copy of the Master Servicing Agreement under CPR 31.14.

14. It is disputed that the named Claimant is the legal assignee of the Void Agreement which forms the subject of this claim. It is disputed that it has contracted with CCMG ("The Servicer") for CCMG to undertake certain services in respect of the agreement as defined by the terms of the MSA. It is disputedd that these include exercising the named Claimant's rights and duties under the agreement, including collection of the debt owing and, where legally possible, initiating legal action in the Claimant's name.

The assertion that the named Claimant is the legal assignee of the agreement forming the subject of the claim, and that it has contracted with CCMG ("The Servicer") to undertake certain services, including exercising the Claimant's rights and duties under the agreement, lacks sufficient evidence and is subject to dispute. Firstly, the statement does not provide specific details or documentation demonstrating the legal assignment of the agreement to the named Claimant. Without such evidence, it is unclear whether the named Claimant has the legal standing to bring forth this claim.

Additionally, while the statement mentions a contract between the named Claimant and CCMG, referred to as the Master Servicing Agreement (MSA), the specific terms and provisions of this agreement are not provided. Without a clear understanding of the terms outlined in the MSA, it is challenging to determine the extent of CCMG's authority to act on behalf of the named Claimant, including the initiation of legal action in the Claimant's name.

Furthermore, the assertion that CCMG is authorized to initiate legal action in the Claimant's name "where legally possible" raises questions regarding the legal capacity and authority of CCMG to act on behalf of the named Claimant. Without explicit evidence demonstrating CCMG's legal authority to initiate legal proceedings in the Claimant's name, this claim remains unsubstantiated and subject to dispute.

In summary, the assertion lacks specific evidence demonstrating the legal assignment of the agreement to the named Claimant, and the terms and provisions of the MSA are not provided to clarify the extent of CCMG's authority. Without such evidence, the validity of the Claimant's assertion regarding its legal standing and CCMG's authority remains in question and requires further substantiation.

15. It is disputedd that this arrangement was entered in into in accordance with the exemption from the requirement for regulatory authorisation in paragraph 55 of Schedule 1 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Exemption) Order 2001 ("the Paragraph 55 Exemption"). It is disputed thereby, the Servicer, which has all necessary authorisations from the Financial Conduct Authority, acts in the place of the named Claimant.

The assertion that the arrangement between the named Claimant and the Servicer was entered into in accordance with the exemption from regulatory authorization outlined in paragraph 55 of Schedule 1 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Exemption) Order 2001 ("the Paragraph 55 Exemption") is disputable due to insufficient evidence and potential misinterpretation of the regulatory framework. Firstly, the statement does not provide specific details or documentation demonstrating how the arrangement qualifies for the exemption outlined in the Paragraph 55 Exemption. Without such evidence, it is unclear whether the arrangement complies with the criteria set forth in the exemption.

Additionally, while the statement mentions that the Servicer has all necessary authorizations from the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), it does not specify the nature or scope of these authorizations. Simply stating that the Servicer has necessary authorizations does not provide clarity on whether these authorizations extend to acting in the place of the named Claimant, especially in the context of legal proceedings.

Moreover, the assertion that the Servicer acts in the place of the named Claimant, based on the Paragraph 55 Exemption, requires further substantiation to demonstrate how this arrangement complies with relevant regulatory requirements and safeguards the legal rights and obligations of all parties involved.

In summary, the assertion lacks specific evidence demonstrating how the arrangement qualifies for the exemption outlined in the Paragraph 55 Exemption and the extent of the Servicer's authority to act in the place of the named Claimant. Without such evidence, the validity of the Claimant's assertion regarding the regulatory framework and the authority of the Servicer remains in question and requires further substantiation.

16. It is disputed that the Servicer is also entitled under the terms of the MSA to subcontract any and all of it services to an "Appointed Representative" (as defined by s.39 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000). It is disputed that the Servicer duly appointed CFE to act as its Appointed Representative in relation to the agreement. It is disputed that the Servicer has arranged for these proceedings to be initiated in the County Court in the name of the Claimant.

The assertion that the Servicer is entitled, under the terms of the Master Servicing Agreement (MSA), to subcontract its services to an "Appointed Representative" as defined by section 39 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000), and that the Servicer duly appointed CFE to act as its Appointed Representative in relation to the agreement, lacks sufficient evidence and is disputable for several reasons.

Firstly, the statement does not provide specific details or documentation demonstrating the authority granted to the Servicer under the MSA to subcontract its services to an Appointed Representative, nor does it outline the specific terms and provisions of the MSA relevant to this arrangement. Without such evidence, it is challenging to ascertain the legitimacy and scope of the Servicer's authority to subcontract its services.

Additionally, while the assertion mentions that CFE was duly appointed as the Servicer's Appointed Representative, it does not specify the process or documentation establishing this appointment. Without clear evidence demonstrating the appointment of CFE as the Appointed Representative in accordance with the requirements of section 39 of FSMA 2000, the validity and legality of this appointment remain in question.

Furthermore, the statement implies that the Servicer, through CFE as its Appointed Representative, has arranged for the proceedings to be initiated in the County Court in the name of the Claimant. However, without explicit evidence demonstrating CFE's authority to initiate legal proceedings on behalf of the Servicer in accordance with the terms of the MSA and relevant regulatory requirements, this assertion remains unsubstantiated and subject to dispute.

In summary, the assertion lacks specific evidence demonstrating the authority granted to the Servicer under the MSA to subcontract its services to an Appointed Representative, the appointment of CFE as the Servicer's Appointed Representative, and CFE's authority to initiate legal proceedings on behalf of the Servicer in the name of the Claimant. Without such evidence, the validity and legality of these arrangements remain in question and require further substantiation.

17. It is disputed that further and alternatively to the paragraph 55 exemption, the named Claimant relies on the exclusion contained in Article 60I of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 ("the Article 601 Exclusion") on the same basis.

The assertion that the named Claimant relies on the exclusion contained in Article 60I of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 ("the Article 60I Exclusion") as an alternative to the paragraph 55 exemption is disputable due to potential misinterpretation and lack of specific evidence supporting this claim. Firstly, the statement does not provide detailed explanation or documentation demonstrating how the Article 60I Exclusion applies to the named Claimant's actions or the specific circumstances of the case. Without such evidence, it is challenging to assess the validity and applicability of this exclusion.

Additionally, while the statement suggests that the named Claimant relies on the Article 60I Exclusion, it does not provide specific details or legal arguments supporting this reliance. The assertion lacks an analysis of the relevant provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA 2000) and the Regulated Activities Order 2001 to demonstrate how the Article 60I Exclusion applies to the named Claimant's activities in this case.

Moreover, without clear evidence demonstrating the named Claimant's compliance with the requirements and conditions set forth in the Article 60I Exclusion, the validity of this reliance remains in question and subject to dispute.

In summary, the assertion lacks specific evidence and legal analysis demonstrating the applicability of the Article 60I Exclusion to the named Claimant's actions in this case. Without such evidence, the validity and legality of this reliance remain in question and require further substantiation.

18. It is disputed that it is unclear why the Defendant believes that a non-binding County Court decision relating to a wholly different creditor would have any relevance in relation to these proceedings. It is disputed that it is not a 'general principle of law' that the paragraph 55 exemption cannot be applied. It is disputed to suggest so is extremely misleading. 

It is noted that there has been one case on this topic relating to entities within the Cabot group; MFS Portfolio Limited v Phelan & West. It is not disputed that in that case, considered in great detail over four days of hearing in the Court of Appeal in 2019, held that MFS Portfolio Limited was entitled to rely upon the paragraph 55 exemption. It is noted that MFS Portfolio Limited and Cabot Financial (UK) Limited operate in the same manner, both being entities within the Cabot group and both relying upon the authorisation of Cabot Credit Management Group Limited and Cabot Financial (Europe) Limited.

The Defendant avers that the MFS Portfolio Limited v Phelan & West  (2019) (Cambridge County Court) Judgment was successfully appealed after a four-day appeal before HHJ Walden Smith on the issue of assignment and the current account overdraft itself was declared to be unenforceable under s.127(3) the Consumer Credit Act 1974. The Defenfant avers that as this judgment was in the County Court, the issue of  the applicability of the exemption in paragraph 55 of the Schedule to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Exemption) Order 2001 still needs to be determined at a higher court and therefore the case, cited by the Claimant, is no more binding than the case cite by the Defendant.

19. It is disputed that the Defendant has made a misrepresentation of case law in relation to this topic and the complexity of the topic in relation to this simple debt claim, this aspect of the defence should be struck out.

Disputing the claim that the aspect of the defense related to the interpretation of case law should be struck out requires careful consideration. Firstly, the characterization of the defense as involving misrepresentation of case law is a subjective assessment and should be subject to thorough examination and legal analysis rather than summary dismissal. The complexity of the topic, while acknowledged, should not automatically warrant the striking out of the defense. It is not uncommon for legal matters to involve complexities that require careful consideration and argumentation. Furthermore, striking out a portion of the defense would potentially deny the Defendant the opportunity to present their arguments and evidence, which may be crucial in ensuring a fair and just resolution of the case. Instead of seeking to strike out the defense, the more appropriate course of action would be for the parties to engage in robust legal arguments, supported by evidence and legal precedent, to address any perceived misrepresentation or complexity in interpretation of case law. Therefore, the request to strike out this aspect of the defense lacks sufficient justification and should be subject to further legal scrutiny and argumentation rather than immediate dismissal.

Pre-action Protocol

20. It is disputed that the Defendant's reference to the 'Pre-action Conduct protocol' is similarly unclear. It is disputed that a simple debt claim the named Claimant has followed the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims. It is disputed that a letter before claim was sent to the Defendant by Mortimer Clarke on 16/12/2022. It is disputed that the docuement exhibited by the Claimant at 25 to 36 of their Reply to Defence is a copy of the letter before action.

Disputing the assertion regarding the Defendant's reference to the 'Pre-action Conduct protocol' requires clarification rather than outright dismissal. While the claim suggests the Defendant's reference is unclear, it is essential to recognize that legal proceedings often involve adherence to specific protocols and procedures, including pre-action protocols, to ensure fairness and transparency.

Regarding the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, the named Claimant's assertion that it has followed the protocol by sending a letter before claim to the Defendant through Mortimer Clarke on 16/12/2022 is noted. However, the mere act of sending a letter before claim does not inherently fulfill all requirements of the Pre-Action Protocol. The protocol outlines various steps and considerations to be followed by both parties before initiating legal action, including providing sufficient information to enable the debtor to understand the basis of the claim, engaging in early communication to resolve disputes, and considering alternative dispute resolution methods.

Therefore, disputing the Defendant's reference to the Pre-Action Conduct protocol as unclear necessitates clarification on whether the named Claimant's actions fully complied with the requirements and spirit of the protocol, rather than outright dismissal based solely on the provision of a letter before claim. Without further details or evidence demonstrating compliance with all aspects of the Pre-Action Protocol for Debt Claims, the validity of the Claimant's assertion remains subject to dispute and requires closer examination to ensure adherence to procedural fairness.

21. It is not disputed that following the issuing of the letter before claim between the 16/01/2023 to 26/09/2023, the Defendant contacted the named Claimant, it and Mortimer Clarke spent many months responding to the Defendant's numerous disputes, Subject Access Requests and requests for documentation.

The assertion that the Defendant's actions, including numerous disputes, Subject Access Requests, and requests for documentation, were merely templated in nature lacks sufficient evidence and is disputable. Firstly, categorizing the Defendant's actions as templated without providing specific examples or evidence to support this claim is speculative and fails to establish a factual basis for the assertion. Without specific documentation or correspondence demonstrating that the Defendant's actions were indeed templated, it is difficult to assess the accuracy of this characterization.

Furthermore, the statement implies that the Defendant's actions were not genuine or substantive but rather automated or formulaic. However, without further evidence or context surrounding the nature and content of the disputes, Subject Access Requests, and requests for documentation, it is premature to make assumptions about their validity or purpose. Legal proceedings often involve a thorough examination of documentation and requests for information to clarify issues and ensure procedural fairness, and the Defendant's actions may have been part of a legitimate effort to understand and address the claims being made against them.

In summary, without specific evidence demonstrating that the Defendant's actions were indeed templated or lacking genuine substance, the validity of this assertion remains subject to dispute. More detailed evidence or clarification regarding the nature of the Defendant's actions is necessary to substantiate this claim.

The assertion that the Defendant has ignored all attempts to resolve the matter and has engaged in excessive and repetitive dispute requests rather than legitimate dispute of the debt itself is disputable due to several reasons. Firstly, the characterization of the Defendant's actions as excessive and repetitive lacks substantiation without a detailed analysis of the content and context of the Defendant's letters and responses provided on pages 37 to 115. Merely providing copies of some of the Defendant's letters and responses without specific examples or analysis does not provide sufficient evidence to support the claim of excessive and repetitive dispute requests.

Furthermore, it is essential to recognize that legal proceedings involving debt claims often entail thorough examination and clarification of the debt in question. Disputes regarding the validity, accuracy, or other aspects of the debt are legitimate and essential components of the legal process, and it is the Defendant's right to seek clarification and resolution of any discrepancies or issues related to the debt.

Additionally, characterizing the Defendant's actions as attempts to avoid liability rather than legitimate dispute of the debt presupposes the Defendant's intentions without clear evidence or analysis of the content and context of their communications. It is possible that the Defendant's actions were aimed at seeking clarification or resolution of the debt in good faith, rather than avoiding liability without merit.

22. It is disputed that the Defendant's numerous requests for information and documentation to be provided were responded to at length evidencing the Defendant's liability.

Disputing the claim that the Defendant's numerous requests for information and documentation were responded to at length, thereby evidencing the Defendant's liability, requires a closer examination of the evidence provided and the context surrounding the interactions between the parties. Firstly, the mere provision of responses to the Defendant's requests for information and documentation does not inherently evidence the Defendant's liability. Responses to such requests may vary in detail and substance, and their adequacy in addressing the Defendant's concerns and establishing liability would need to be evaluated based on the specific content and context of the responses provided.

Additionally, without specific evidence demonstrating the content and adequacy of the responses provided by the Claimant to the Defendant's requests for information and documentation, it is challenging to assess whether the responses indeed evidenced the Defendant's liability. The mere assertion that responses were provided at length does not provide sufficient detail to evaluate the quality or relevance of the information provided in addressing the Defendant's concerns or establishing liability.

Furthermore, the assertion that a further letter before action was sent to the Defendant by Mortimer Clarke on 26/09/2023 with instructions to issue a Claim should an amicable arrangement not be agreed does not inherently establish the validity of the Claimant's position or the necessity for legal action. Legal action may be pursued for various reasons beyond the establishment of liability, and the decision to pursue legal action does not necessarily confirm the Defendant's liability.

23. It is disputed that despite all the information and documentation, the Defendant continues to raise the same excessive templated disputes rather than responding to address the debt itself, in these circumstances the named Claimant issued.

Disputing the claim that the Defendant continues to raise the same excessive templated disputes rather than responding to address the debt itself requires careful consideration of the evidence provided and an examination of the context surrounding the interactions between the parties. Firstly, the characterization of the Defendant's disputes as excessive and templated lacks specific evidence or examples to support this claim. Without detailed analysis of the content and context of the Defendant's disputes, it is challenging to assess whether they are indeed repetitive or lacking in substance.

Additionally, the assertion that the Defendant failed to respond to address the debt itself without providing specific evidence or context regarding the nature of the responses received from the Defendant is speculative. Legal proceedings involving debt claims often entail thorough examination and clarification of the debt in question, and disputes regarding the validity, accuracy, or other aspects of the debt are legitimate and essential components of the legal process. Therefore, characterizing the Defendant's actions as failing to address the debt without clear evidence of the content and context of the Defendant's responses lacks substantiation.

Court proceedings to bring the matter to a conclusion.

24. It is disputed that the Defendant has been provided with the documentation to evidence that he entered into the Void Agreement (pages 1 to 4), benefited from the credit provided and failed to maintain payments in accordance with the Void Agreement (pages 5 to 6) that the account defaulted to which he was provided with a Default Notice to his current address and in accordance with Section 87 of the Consumer Credit Act (page 7 to 10). It is disputed that upon termination of the agreement by Lloyds, the debt was legally assigned to the named Claimant (pages 11 to 15) with a balance of £15,048.65 remaining outstanding for which the Defendant is liable.

Firstly, while it is asserted that the Defendant was provided with documentation evidencing their entry into the Agreement, benefitting from the credit provided, and failing to maintain payments, the adequacy and sufficiency of this documentation in proving the Defendant's liability should be subject to scrutiny. Mere provision of documentation does not inherently establish the validity of the claim, and the Defendant may have legitimate grounds to dispute the accuracy or completeness of the provided documentation.

Secondly, while it is stated that a Default Notice was provided to the Defendant in accordance with Section 87 of the Consumer Credit Act, the claim does not provide specific details or evidence demonstrating compliance with all legal requirements for issuing a Default Notice. Failure to adhere to the procedural requirements outlined in the Consumer Credit Act could potentially impact the validity of the Default Notice and subsequent legal proceedings.

Additionally, while it is claimed that the debt was legally assigned to the named Claimant, the evidence provided should be subject to scrutiny to ensure compliance with all legal requirements for a valid assignment. Without specific evidence demonstrating the validity of the assignment process and the Claimant's legal standing to pursue the debt, the assertion of the Defendant's liability remains subject to dispute.

Furthermore, court proceedings should be considered as a last resort after exhausting all efforts for amicable resolution and alternative dispute resolution methods. The parties should explore mediation or negotiation to reach a mutually acceptable resolution before resorting to litigation, which can be time-consuming and costly for both parties.

25. It is disputed that, for the reasons set out above, the Court should strike out the Defence pursuant to the provisions of CPR 3.4 (2) (a) in that it discloses no grounds for defending these proceedings.

The Defendant strongly opposes the Claimant's request for an order to strike out the Defence under CPR 3.4(2)(a), contending that the Defence is well-founded and does present reasonable grounds. The Defence raises substantive issues, including challenges to the validity of the alleged agreement, the legality of the debt assignment under Section 138D of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and CONC 5.2A of the Consumer Credit Sourcebook, and disputes regarding compliance with the Consumer Credit Act 1974. These issues are crucial to the fair and just adjudication of the case, and striking out the Defence would deny the Defendant the opportunity to present legitimate legal and factual challenges. The Defendant asserts that dismissing the Defence at this stage would be disproportionate and contrary to the principles of justice and due process. 

26.  I respectfully request the court to strike out the Claimant's claim on the grounds that it is solely based on hearsay evidence. The Claimant has failed to provide any direct, admissible evidence to substantiate their allegations, and instead, relies solely on hearsay statements that lack reliability and credibility.

Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible in court proceedings as it does not allow the opposing party the opportunity to cross-examine the original declarant and challenge the accuracy or truthfulness of the statements. The absence of firsthand testimony or documented evidence undermines the integrity of the Claimant's claim and violates the principles of fair trial and due process.

Throughout this case, the Claimant has repeatedly presented documents, statements, or information without providing any firsthand testimony or verified records to support their authenticity and accuracy. This reliance on hearsay evidence raises significant doubts about the reliability and veracity of the Claimant's case.

The absence of direct evidence places an unfair burden on the Defendant, as it hinders their ability to challenge the Claimant's claims effectively and provide a comprehensive defense. The Defendant is entitled to a fair and just legal process, which includes the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and evidence presented against them.

Given the lack of credible evidence and the reliance on hearsay statements, I respectfully request the court to exercise its power to strike out the Claimant's claim. Striking out the claim is essential to uphold the principles of fairness and ensure that justice is served in this case.

Furthermore, in light of the unnecessary time and resources expended by the Defendant in addressing a claim based on hearsay evidence, I request that the court awards costs in favor of the Defendant. The Defendant has had to bear unwarranted legal expenses and inconvenience due to the Claimant's failure to provide proper evidence to support their claim.

Awarding costs to the Defendant will serve as a necessary deterrent against the presentation of unsubstantiated claims and reinforce the importance of adhering to proper evidentiary standards in legal proceedings.

In conclusion, I respectfully urge the court to strike out the Claimant's claim based on hearsay evidence and award costs in favor of the Defendant. Such action is crucial to upholding the principles of justice, fairness, and adherence to evidentiary standards in this legal matter.

Statement of Truth

The Claimant believes that the facts stated in this Reply to Defence are true. I am duly authorised by the Claimant to sign this statement. I understand that proceedings for contempt of court may be brought against anyone who makes, or causes to be made, a false statement in a document verified by a statement of truth without an honest belief in its truth.

Signed: Defendant's Signature

Name Printed: [DEFENDANT'S NAME]

Postion: DEFENDANT

Dated this 29th day of January 2024