The 2018 US Midterm Elections was a time to see what the government, platform companies, and civil society organizations had learned from lessons of 2016. In many ways, the threat landscape was the same. Russia, through intermediaries like the G.R.U. and the Internet Research Agency (IRA), was again the main state actor attempting to undermine US Elections. The US political environment remained as partisan and fractured, in part due to the ongoing investigation by Special Counsel, Robert Mueller and a growing distrust in America’s institutions. And Americans’ confidence in their everyday reality was once again rocked by yet another politically-charged scandal by the platform companies in the aftermath of Cambridge Analytica.
Yet, in other ways, this was a new situation entirely. 2018 saw the addition of new state actors attempting to undermine the integrity of US elections like Iran among others. While these influence campaigns were noticeably different, the tactic of sowing division where there was already strife was a mainstay of these attacks. As well, technological advancements in artificial intelligence matched with the ease of use with apps like Lyrebird, presented new challenges in the form of deepfakes and the ability for “reality” to be created. Lastly, the amount of homegrown disinformation which contributed to the increased polarization of American society was on the rise.
Though these new scenarios were problematic, many groups were able to work in a coordinated way towards mollifying the threat. In the lead up to November, companies like Facebook had established elections integrity war rooms to counteract coordinated inauthentic behavior. They took steps to create misinformation policies around “verifiably false information” which enabled targeted takedowns of voter suppression content. Facebook in particular, was able to build connections with counterparts at the US State Department and Homeland Security to stay abreast of threats both political and digital.
Government was also much better prepared this time around. In addition to working with platform companies, the Government established special units to counter disinformation like the Countering Foreign Influence Task Force. These groups were geared towards understanding the nature of disinformation within the US and working with stakeholders across state and local governments, as well as (social) media and other civil society organizations. Additionally, the US government mounted offensive pre-measures before the elections, launching cyber attacks against the IRA to limit their access to spread disinformation.
Finally, traditional media organizations played a pivotal role in exposing and softening the brunt of disinformation campaigns. Recognizing the chasm between platform companies’ policies and the real-world effects of unchecked information, journalists from the New York Times and Washington Post attempted to report on the tactics that disinformers were using to confuse and deceive the public. In particular, the New York Times collaborated with daily readers to “name and shame” sources of disinformation across the web. This resulted in a live, on-going series of reporting on online mis/disinformation activities leading up to the 2018 elections.