I don't understand the dangers of certain warnings. More so the warnings of baronys passing from the realm. Wouldn't I still be their liege? Is it a tax issue? I can see how a county would be an issue, just not with baronys.
I have a duke who has a married a foreign duke which has given me an inheritance warning. This being Crusader Kings, my gut instinct is to have someone killed but I'm not sure who or in what order people must die.
Ck2 Vassal Inheritance Warning
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The breakdown is thus: I am playing a Byzantine emperor with high crown authority (shouldn't that prevent titles from leaving the realm?) with a male duke of Jazira reporting directly to me. He has married (non-matralinially) the duchess of Orkney who is a direct vassal of the King of Norge. They have two male children together.
My first thought was to kill my own vassal duke so that his son inherits his duchy and the son becomes my vassal. Then when his mother dies he inherits Orkney which becomes part of my empire since he's already my vassal (at least I think that's what will happen). That's when I noticed a final confusion in the matter, the duchess and duke have different heirs. Their elder son is the heir to the duchy of Orkney while their younger son is the heir to the duchy of Jazira.
You kill your own Duke. So long as the Duke's son (whichever) inherits his father's lands before his mother's there is no way you lose Jazira. The chance of the Duchess dying first is why you are getting the inheritance warnings. If she dies first there's a chance that her heir could end up inheriting Jazira as well when the Duke dies. With Orkney having Gavelkind succession, if she has enough holdings there's a chance both of her sons could be landed vassals of another realm when your Duke dies. If both sons are vassals of another country when the Duke dies, you'll lose Jazira for sure.
As Affine and Studoku point out, the reason your High Crown Authority isn't preventing this is because Jazira is not De Jure part of Byzantium. It only can prevent out-of-realm inheritance in the De Jure Empire. I don't understand why Primogeniture succession in Jazira would be giving the younger son Jazira while the older gets Orkney, that's just backwards. However, so long as the Duke dies before the Duchess, and before either son is landed, I can assure you the inheriting son (whoever that may be) will be your vassal.
If for some reason you wanted to achieve your goal without killing anyone (a strange concept, but bear with me): If you have a title to spare (even a barony will do) you can land the son that is the heir to Jazira. By giving him the barony, he becomes your vassal. When he inherits further titles those will also become a part of your realm, even if the titles he inherits from outside the realm are of higher rank than his first title. So long as he is landed in your realm, any lands he inherits become and/or remain a part of your realm.
As the King of Aquitaine, I had a vassal Countess of Foix. Her heir was Count of a single county in France (both nations are Elective Gavelkind). I had a Vassal Inheritance Warning, which makes sense; when the countess dies, her title would pass to her heir, who would add it to his French title, that being older.
But when Comtesse du Foix / Duchesse du Toulouse kicked the bucket, I lost Foix to France, and another vassal held Toulouse. Is this an effect of the succession laws? Did one title pass to one heir, and the other to another heir? Could I have seen that, and prevented it somehow?
A Liege cannot lose an existing vassal due to him inheriting new titles UNLESS the inherited title causes his rank to match or exceed that of his Liege. The rank of the title held/inherited makes no difference. It's a question of who he was a sworn vassal to first. The Count in question was sworn to serve the King of France first. At that point, any new titles he inherits will be added to his demense within the Kingdom of France. The only exception would be if he inherited a Kingdom or Empire title, which could not be a vassal of the King of France, which would make him independent.
If your Kingdom of Aquitaine had High Crown Authority, that would prevent the French Count from inheriting. The title would instead pass to the next heir in line that was not currently a vassal to someone outside of your realm.
Aside from Crown Authority, you might have been able to have the French Count assassinated. It's possible the Duchess's new heir would then be someone that is not a vassal of the King of France. If you manage to murder enough people, you might even cause the Count's title to be inherited by your duchess, depending on succession laws, gender laws, family dynamics etc.
The distinction of birth, being subsequent to the inequality of fortune, can have no place in nations of hunters, among whom all men, being equal in fortune, must likewise be very nearly equal in birth. The son of a wise and brave man may, indeed, even among them, be somewhat more respected than a man of equal merit who has the misfortune to be the son of a fool or a coward. The difference, however, will not be very great; and there never was, I believe, a great family in the world whose illustration was entirely derived from the inheritance of wisdom and virtue.
Among nations of shepherds, where the sovereign or chief is only the greatest shepherd or herdsman of the horde or clan, he is maintained in the same manner as any of his vassals or subjects, by the increase of his own herds or flocks. Among those nations of husbandmen who are but just come out of the shepherd state, and who are not much advanced beyond that state, such as the Greek tribes appear to have been about the time of the Trojan war, and our German and Scythian ancestors when they first settled upon the ruins of the western empire, the sovereign or chief is, in the same manner, only the greatest landlord of the country, and is maintained, in the same manner as any other landlord, by a revenue derived from his own private estate, or from what, in modern Europe, was called the demesne of the crown. His subjects, upon ordinary occasions, contributed nothing to his support, except when, in order to protect them from the oppression of some of their fellow-subjects, they stand in need of his authority. The presents which they make him upon such occasions constitute the whole ordinary revenue, the whole of the emoluments which, except perhaps upon some very extraordinary emergencies, he derives from his dominion over them. When Agamemnon, in Homer, offers to Achilles for his friendship the sovereignty of seven Greek cities, the sole advantage which he mentions as likely to be derived from it was that the people would honour him with presents. As long as such presents, as long as the emoluments of justice, or what may be called the fees of court, constituted in this manner the whole ordinary revenue which the sovereign derived from his sovereignty, it could not well be expected, it could not even decently be proposed, that he should give them up altogether. It might, and it frequently was proposed, that he should regulate and ascertain them. But after they had been so regulated and ascertained, how to hinder a person who was all-powerful from extending them beyond those regulations was still very difficult, not to say impossible. During the continuance of this state of things, therefore, the corruption of justice, naturally resulting from the arbitrary and uncertain nature of those presents, scarce admitted of any effectual remedy.
First, in a private copartnery, no partner, without the consent of the company, can transfer his share to another person, or introduce a new member into the company. Each member, however, may, upon proper warning, withdraw from the copartnery, and demand payment from them of his share of the common stock. In a joint stock company, on the contrary, no member can demand payment of his share from the company; but each member can, without their consent, transfer his share to another person, and thereby introduce a new member. The value of a share in a joint stock is always the price which it will bring in the market; and this may be either greater or less, in any proportion, than the sum which its owner stands credited for in the stock of the company.
But during the two years in which their agreement with government was to take place, they were restrained from any further increase of dividend by two successive Acts of Parliament, of which the object was to enable them to make a speedier progress in the payment of their debts, which were at this time estimated at upwards of six or seven millions sterling. In 1769, they renewed their agreement with government for five years more, and stipulated that during the course of that period they should be allowed gradually to increase their dividend to twelve and a half per cent; never increasing it, however, more than one per cent in one year. This increase of dividend, therefore, when it had risen to its utmost height, could augment their annual payments, to their proprietors and government together, but by six hundred and eight thousand pounds beyond what they had been before their late territorial acquisitions. What the gross revenue of those territorial acquisitions was supposed to amount to has already been mentioned; and by an account brought by the Cruttenden East Indiaman in 1768, the net revenue, clear of all deductions and military charges, was stated at two millions forty-eight thousand seven hundred and forty-seven pounds. They were said at the same time to possess another revenue, arising partly from lands, but chiefly from the customs established at their different settlements, amounting to four hundred and thirty-nine thousand pounds. The profits of their trade too, according to the evidence of their chairman before the House of Commons, amounted at this time to at least four hundred thousand pounds a year, according to that of their accountant, to at least five hundred thousand; according to the lowest account, at least equal to the highest dividend that was to be paid to their proprietors. So great a revenue might certainly have afforded an augmentation of six hundred and eight thousand pounds in their annual payments, and at the same time have left a large sinking fund sufficient for the speedy reduction of their debts. In 1773, however, their debts, instead of being reduced, were augmented by an arrear to the treasury in the payment of the four hundred thousand pounds, by another to the custom-house for duties unpaid, by a large debt to the bank for money borrowed, and by a fourth for bills drawn upon them from India, and wantonly accepted, to the amount of upwards of twelve hundred thousand pounds. The distress which these accumulated claims brought upon them, obliged them not only to reduce all at once their dividend to six per cent, but to throw themselves upon the mercy of government, and to supplicate, first, a release from further payment of the stipulated four hundred thousand pounds a year; and, secondly, a loan of fourteen hundred thousand, to save them from immediate bankruptcy. The great increase of their fortune had, it seems, only served to furnish their servants with a pretext for greater profusion, and a cover for greater malversation, than in proportion even to that increase of fortune. The conduct of their servants in India, and the general state of their affairs both in India and in Europe, became the subject of a Parliamentary inquiry, in consequence of which several very important alternations were made in the constitution of their government, both at home and abroad. In India their principal settlements of Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta, which had before been altogether independent of one another, were subjected to a governor-general, assisted by a council of four assessors, Parliament assuming to itself the first nomination of this governor and council who were to reside at Calcutta; that city having now become, what Madras was before, the most important of the English settlements in India. The Court of the Mayor of Calcutta, originally instituted for the trial of mercantile causes which arose in city and neighbourhood, had gradually extended its jurisdiction with the extension of the empire. It was now reduced and confined to the original purpose of its institution. Instead of it a new supreme court of judicature was established, consisting of a chief justice and three judges to be appointed by the crown. In Europe, the qualification necessary to entitle a proprietor to vote at their general courts was raised from five hundred pounds, the original price of a share in the stock of the company, to a thousand pounds. In order to vote upon this qualification too, it was declared necessary that he should have possessed it, if acquired by his own purchase, and not by inheritance, for at least one year, instead of six months, the term requisite before. The court of twenty-four directors had before been chosen annually; but it was now enacted that each director should, for the future, be chosen for four years; six of them, however, to go out of office by rotation every year, and not to be capable of being re-chosen at the election of the six new directors for the ensuing year. In consequence of these alterations, the courts, both of the proprietors and directors, it was expected, would be likely to act with more dignity and steadiness than they had usually done before. But it seems impossible, by any alterations, to render those courts, in any respect, fit to govern, or even to share in the government of a great empire; because the greater part of their members must always have too little interest in the prosperity of that empire to give any serious attention to what may promote it. Frequently a man of great, sometimes even a man of small fortune, is willing to purchase a thousand pounds' share in India stock merely for the influence which he expects to acquire by a vote in the court of proprietors. It gives him a share, though not in the plunder, yet in the appointment of the plunderers of India; the court of directors, though they make that appointment, being necessarily more or less under the influence of the proprietors, who not only elect those directors, but sometimes overrule the appointments of their servants in India. Provided he can enjoy this influence for a few years, and thereby provide for a certain number of his friends, he frequently cares little about the dividend, or even about the value of the stock upon which his vote is founded. About the prosperity of the great empire, in the government of which that vote gives him a share, he seldom cares at all. No other sovereigns ever were, or, from the nature of things, ever could be, so perfectly indifferent about the happiness or misery of their subjects, the improvement or waste of their dominions, the glory or disgrace of their administration, as, from irresistible moral causes, the greater part of the proprietors of such a mercantile company are, and necessarily must be. This indifference, too, was more likely to be increased than diminished by some of the new regulations which were made in consequence of the Parliamentary inquiry. By a resolution of the House of Commons, for example, it was declared, that when the fourteen hundred thousand pounds lent to the company by government should be paid, and their bond-debts be reduced to fifteen hundred thousand pounds, they might then, and not till then, divide eight per cent upon their capital; and that whatever remained of their revenues and net profits at home should be divided into four parts; three of them to be paid into the exchequer for the use of the public, and the fourth to be reserved as a fund either for the further reduction of their bond-debts, or for the discharge of other contingent exigencies which the company might labour under. But if the company were bad stewards, and bad sovereigns, when the whole of their net revenue and profits belonged to themselves, and were at their own disposal, they were surely not likely to be better when three-fourths of them were to belong to other people, and the other fourth, though to be laid out for the benefit of the company, yet to be so under the inspection and with the approbation of other people. be457b7860
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