The British Occupation of Manila, 1762-1765, through Franciscan Eyes

The British Occupation of Manila, 1762-1764,

through Franciscan Eyes©

Bruce Cruikshank, 17 May 2015[1]

         The British attacked the Spanish colony of the Philippines as part of the Seven Years War, what might arguably be seen as the first global conflict.  On the 22rd of September 1762[2] a fleet from the British bases in India sailed into Manila’s bay, landed troops and munitions on the next day, and on the 4th of October they successfully breached the city’s walls.  Within two weeks of their arrival (in spite of brave resistance by Filipinos[3] who came from the provinces around Manila to defend the capital), they received the surrender of the Spanish colony on the 5th of October 1762 from the acting Governor General, Archbishop Manuel Antonio Rojo del Rio y Vieyra (Archbishop Rojo here).    The British then allowed their troops leave to ravage the capital city, a pillage that lasted almost two full days, and entered into negotiations with the Archbishop of how best to collect the ransom agreed to in the capitulation. 

The British also were concerned about effecting the total surrender of the Islands, a process that was prevented by the resistance of an escaped government official (Simón de Anda y Salazar), other Spanish officials and religious leaders, and what appears to have been significant Filipino resistance throughout the islands.  Only in the Ilocos and Pangasinan was there an attempt by Filipinos to throw off Spanish rule and ally with the British.  This resistance, led by Diego Silang and (after his assassination) his widow in Ilocos and by Juan de la Cruz Palaris in Pangasinan,[4] was eventually defeated, as were Chinese attempts to facilitate British conquest.  Even before the European peace treaty between the Spanish and the British, which returned the Philippines to Spanish rule, the Spanish had effectively restricted the British to an area in and around Manila. 

         The British Occupation of Manila between 1762 and 1764 has received a fair amount of attention from scholars.[5]  However, with the partial exception by Father Antolin Abad Pérez,[6] the rather large body of Franciscan letters and reports (often to and from Anda y Salazar) has not been systematically examined to see what they tell us about this period in Philippine history.  My plan is to do so, with particular attention to what new information or perspective the manuscripts give us and with careful notation of questions and lacunae for other scholars to address or answer.  The core of the materials I examine is from the Archivo Franciscano Ibero-Oriental in Madrid, and I thank the Franciscans and particularly the archivist P. Fr. Cayetano Sánchez Fuertes for allowing me access and opportunities to study these manuscripts back in 1980.

         One of the strengths of the collection at the Archivo Franciscano Ibero-Oriental is the number of letters written there written by Anda.  Of the 90 manuscript signatures I will be working with, at least 68 were written by the acting Governor General Simón de Anda y Salazar.  Most were to the Franciscan Provincial, P. Fr. Roque de la Purificación, and spoke specifically to issues related to the resistance against the British.  

         The issues the Spanish Franciscans had to address immediately upon the British conquest was how best to protect Spanish and other citizens in Manila during the almost 48-hour sack of the city and the subsequent forced collections of the ransom money.  They also had to decide whether to accept the authority of the Archbishop as acting Governor-General of the Philippines once he had surrendered to the British; or to accept the authority of Anda y Salazar as acting governor-general under a provision for succession.  Overarching all questions was the issue of how to deal with the British while being both Spanish and priests with responsibilities to the Roman Catholic faith and to their parishioners.

         The question of protection against the rampaging soldiers in the service of the English king and the general period of lawlessness that ensued after the Spanish surrender focused initially on the safety and cloistering of the nuns of Saint Clara, the Clarisas.[7]  After the British landed and fighting had commenced, P. Fr. Antonio de Luna, the Franciscan Guardian of the Manila community, consulted with Archbishop Rojo on behalf of the Franciscan Provincial about moving the nuns to a safer location, outside of Manila.  The Archbishop initially gave his approval, and when the Franciscan leaders polled the Sisters, twenty-five of the thirty-two opted to leave their cloister for a safer location.  Time passed and with the fighting and logistical difficulties the Sisters remained in their convent.  By the 3rd of October, with surrender imminent, the Franciscans again consulted Archbishop Rojo, who now indicated that if the city were surrendered the threat to the sisters from the siege would be moot.  The Sisters, he opined, could safely stay where they were, in their usual seclusion.  By the morning of October 4th, though, the Archbishop indicated that the Franciscans should do what they thought best.  With this authorization in hand, the Franciscans told the Sisters to make up a personal, small bag of essentials and prepare to leave the convent.

         Given transport difficulties and chaos in the city, taking the Sisters outside of Manila, perhaps to Laguna, appeared to be impractical.  Given the rains and the age or illness of many of the Sisters, any move seemed impossible, even as the rest of the day was spent looking for horses and boats they might be able to use.  At one point the Archbishop asked the Sisters to come stay at his Palace, but ultimately it was decided to have them stay put for now and turn to prayer.  On the 5th of October, the British exploited the breach in the walls and received the surrender from Governor General Rojo.  The Franciscan P. Fr. Rosendo de la Trasfiguración was able to procure a three-man British guard for the convent while he went to see the British commander.  In retrospect it appeared to the writer of this manuscript that the Sisters were probably safer where they stayed than if they had been transported outside of Manila, since there were reports of looting and violence in the provinces.

         The Sisters were not threatened during the sack of the city on the 5th and 6th of October 1762.  Indeed the British and the captive Archbishop were solicitous of the nuns’ welfare, with the former providing wine for Mass at no cost and the Archbishop personally giving two pesos per month toward their support.  Still the Franciscans continued to discuss the possibility of moving the Sisters, perhaps outside of Manila, perhaps to Polo or some other municipality or pueblo parish administered by the Franciscans.  However, since the British severely limited movement to and from the city, indeed prohibiting Spaniards to leave at all, these plans came to naught.

         By February and March of 1763, the situation was still the same, but now shortages of food were beginning to be felt as acting Governor General Anda outside of the city had imposed a blockade of food and other supplies to the capital.  By April, with more fighting in the provinces around Manila, the British decided to clear out the heart of Intramuros and restrict it to British personnel only.  The Clarisas would have to leave their convent.  Even the Archbishop could not prevent this.  The Franciscans determined that the best location for the Sisters would be Santa Ana de Sapa, rejecting the Augustinian mother house that had been plundered and damaged by the British.  With British permission, the move was carried out on the 5th of May 1763.  Within two days a routine had been established and the life of prayer and community was restored.

         Uncertainties continued, however, especially when armed sorties of the British passed by and irregulars from Anda’s forces were reported to be nearby.  In fact, though, it appears that both Anda and the British recognized the inviolability of Santa Ana thanks to the presence of the nuns.  Nonetheless, the Sisters lived with “the disquieting news and lies that ran through the pueblo … as well as the coming and going of the English to Pasig and to Laguna … with the fear that they would come and burn the municipality” (f. 11v).

         Relief was at hand, though, since in July a British ship brought news of a truce between Spain and Great Britain.  While Anda did not yet recognize the validity of the news, maintaining armed actions and the blockade of food to Manila, most did, resulting in many desertions from the British forces.  Many of the Spaniards and Filipinos who had been on the fence flocked to Anda’s side.  Anda on the 28th of September decreed that the Clarisas would have to move to Polo, that their safety in Santa Ana de Sapa was problematic, given food difficulties and deterioration in public order.  Nothing happened, though, during this period of disquiet and conflict in the Philippines, “even as all of Europe was quietly enjoying the peace” (f. 12).

         With the arrival of a ship from Mexico carrying Don Francisco Javier de la Torre, the new Governor General of the Spanish Philippines, along with letters from both the kings of Spain and Great Britain that the British forces were to evacuate Manila immediately and sail back to India, this uneasy period ended and a return to normality began.  On the 7th of April 1764, Anda, representing Governor General de la Torre, entered Manila with his forces.  As part of the British withdrawal to Cavite and then their exit from the Islands, the British who had occupied the convent of Santa Clara departed.  The Franciscans immediately began the repair and restoration of the building, that the writer indicates had been substantially damaged.  By 21 May 1764, the Sisters were back in their convent, after one year and 16 days away.  After a public reception and the appropriate prayers, the Sisters were taken to the doorway of their convent.  They then entered, “very content and happy to see the old building and to be free from” the upsets and terrors of the war (f. 13v).  Their life of seclusion and prayer was begun anew.

         I have spent some time with this first document and the Clarisas to try to suggest something of the uncertainty and ups and downs of life from the British capture of Manila to its restoration to Spanish rule.  It of course is a limited glimpse, since it focuses on the Sisters and on conditions in Manila.  It does not speak much of the war’s events, the tactical situation, nor of conditions among Filipinos in and outside of the city.  Anda only appears in passing as well.

Let’s stay in Manila and with this limited focus for a bit longer to glimpse additional Franciscan efforts to aid and protect others impacted by the British capture of Manila.  The central figure in these efforts seems to have been P. Fr. Antonio José Alvarez de Luna, the Franciscan Guardian in Manila.  His case introduces us to the politics and passions of the effects on the Spanish “citizens” occasioned by the British occupation and divisions between Anda and Rojo partisans.  Born in Spain as were almost all of the Franciscans, Father Luna (as he is commonly known, rather than Alvarez de Luna), was around thirty-three years old when the British attacked the Pacific colony.  He had been in the Philippines for about ten years and assumed his position as Guardian for a three-year term in May 1762.  We are told by one of the major Franciscan writers that after the British invasion, “many residents of Manila hid their wealth and jewels in the rectory of San Francisco,” in Intramuros.[8]  They wanted to avoid losses to the victorious British or forced contributions to the ransom the victors demanded.  Luna, in order to protect the rectory and the items hidden there by these citizens of Manila, prepared a great banquet the first day of the sack of Manila, and “invited officers from the invasion force.  The invitation was accepted gratefully by the British, who interpreted it as proof of support for their cause.  The leaders put guards on both the convent of Santa Clara as well the rectory of San Francisco, which helped to impede any attacks” against them and people thereabouts.  The citizens’ goods were protected and, later (as we have seen) the nuns were safely moved to Santa Ana. 

However, “once the British withdrew from Manila, [some of the] same persons whose wealth had been protected through Father Luna’s tactics called him a traitor and complained to government officials.”  Fearing abuse, Father Luna took what seems to have been rather a remarkable, perhaps unprecedented, and possibly even an excessive action.  He fled and hid out “near Baler, where for two years he lived a life of privation.”  The case against him was sent on to Madrid and the king determined he was innocent and issued a royal order on 22 September 1766 appointing him Bishop of Nueva Caceres.  Father Luna then was contacted by government envoys from Manila, emerged from hiding, accepted the appointment in Manila on 6 August 1767, and took formal possession of the office on 28 February 1768,

As we have just seen, Father Luna, indeed all Spanish priests, had to decide how to reconcile their responsibilities as priests as well as Spaniards supporting Spanish imperial rule in the Philippine colony.  Those in or around Manila faced the decision most acutely.  Once the interim Governor General, Archbishop Rojo, had surrendered to the British, the question became: were the British to be obeyed through Archbishop Rojo and the orders he issued on the invaders’ behalf?  What about Anda y Salazar’s claim to be the legitimate Spanish government ruling authority?  He had fled from Manila the night of 4 October with the approval of Archbishop and Governor General Rojo as well as the Audiencia.  Working from Bacolor north of Manila, after the city fell he claimed to represent the Spanish king, governmental legitimacy, and leadership of resistance against the British.  Which side should the Franciscans support?

The Franciscan Provincial, P. Fr. Roque de la Purificación, was not in Manila.  Like the leaders of the other friar organizations, he had left Manila shortly after the British arrived (the Jesuit leader, in contrast, returned to Manila[9]).  Father Roque had like Father Luna begun his three-year term of office in May of 1762.  Now, within six months as Provincial, he was faced with the invasion and British occupation of Manila, Whose side would he favor, Anda’s or Rojo’s, Spanish resistance or collaboration with the invaders using Archbishop Rojo as their cats paw? 

There appears to be no copy of a letter or decree from him in existence stating when he first made and communicated his decision, though as we will see that by the 6th of November his position was clear.  Pressure from both Anda and Rojo was intense. Anda wrote him on the 21st of October 1762 in general terms regarding the priests as subject of the Spanish king and charged with maintaining the parishes “in the Catholic religion.”[10]  Six days later, on October 27th, Anda again wrote the Franciscan Provincial.  He was much more direct this time, speaking of the loyalty of the municipalities of Santa Ana de Sapa and of Pasig to the Catholic faith as well as to the Spanish king.  He added that he hoped the Provincial and the Franciscan Province[11] would do as the Augustinians had done in getting their parishioners’ support against the British.  Even more to the point he added in a postscript that he hoped that the Franciscan Provincial would consider well the “implications and impossibility” that the Archbishop could continue to be considered acting Governor General while a prisoner of the British.[12]  There is a summary of a letter from the Franciscan Provincial dated 24 September 1763, in which Father Roque says that Archbishop Rojo wrote all the religious officials on the 29th of October 1762—and to all the “naturales of these Islands” on 30 October 1762—“exhorting all of them to recognize as sovereign the king of Great Britain.”[13]

By the 1st of November, Anda, responding to a letter from the Provincial (this letter is not in the collection at AFIO), speaks of Franciscan obedience to Anda and the Spanish king.[14]  He restates his view (first voiced in a dispatch of the day before[15]) that British conquest would imperil the religion of the colony and that he has ordered the provincial governors not to obey orders from the British or from Archbishop Rojo.  Anda speaks as well of issues of administrative reorganization and the spiritual needs of French deserters from the British forces. 

On the 6th of November P. Fr. Roque de la Purificación, Provincial of the Franciscans, responded from Mauban to Anda’s 27 October 1762 letter.[16]  His position against the British and the Archbishop’s pretension of still being the Governor General of the Islands is made quite clear.  The Provincial notes that the Franciscans are “loyal subjects of our Catholic Majesty” and that their parishioners “manifest in themselves the due honor and loyalty to their master.”  Father Roque notes that he has written to the Franciscan parish priest of Santa Ana and other parishes near Manila regarding caution and resistance to the British military.  He also reports that he has sent a Franciscan to the pueblo of Pasig to work with the priest there to coordinate efforts against the British.  He is also mobilizing food and Filipinos for support of the resistance at Pasig.  He adds, pointedly, that “it is incomprehensible [Parece falta lugar en el entendimiento para llegar a comprehender] that a prisoner of the king of England, enemy of the king of Spain, could believe he has a right” to run the government of the Islands (f. 1v).  Father Roque adds that it is equally incomprehensible to him that the Archbishop does not recognize that Anda is acting Governor General by law and by right.  Disputes over who should rule, he opines, would merely facilitate British conquest and the destruction of Catholicism in the Islands. 

On the 12th of November, the Franciscan Provincial wrote again to Anda, this time from Atimonan, in response to Anda’s 31 October order.[17]  Father Roque informs Anda that he has sent circulars to all of the Franciscan parish priests that they are to be careful and watchful against the British, that they follow the maxims established by Anda, and that they establish watch posts on the roads and waterways to warn of any British forays.  Moreover, if they find enemy spies they are to capture them while also preparing pueblo defenses.  The Provincial plans to visit all the Franciscan parishes in the provinces of Laguna and Tayabas [ the province today is called Quezon] to speak to the principales or leading male citizens and to rally them in support of the king of Spain.  Those he had already visited had pledged their loyalty and willingness to rally for any effort Anda called for, even at the risk of their lives.  And the Franciscan parish priests are eager to lead their parishioners against the British.

These references to preparations and consultations in the parishes and provinces with Spanish Franciscans and Filipino parishioners are fascinating.  With few exceptions, though, we lack reports of specifics or subsequent actions of this nature.  Most of the later correspondence is rather general and with almost no reference to Filipinos or resistance activity in the provinces where Franciscans administered parishes.

There is a suggestion, though, from a manuscript from December of 1762, after the British had captured Pasig, that the Franciscan Provincial was concerned with Franciscan dedication to the resistance against the British.  In a circular to the Franciscan priests serving in parishes from Mahayhay to Binangonan,[18] Father Roque spoke of some unnamed Franciscan parish priests who wished to raise the “white flag” of surrender to the British.  Yes, he admits, the British have the edge in armaments and formal combat.  However, “in our favor is the knowledge of the ground,” its nooks, crannies, and pathways.  The Filipinos are stronger in this than the British.  “The loss of Pasig was due less” to the enemies who marched against it from outside but to the enemy within, who gave intelligence to the British, corrupted morale, and “fomented discord between Mestizos and Naturales.”  After this the enemy had merely to appear nearby to accomplish Pasig’s capture.

The Provincial goes on to order that no priest consent to surrender and that if priests lack commitment to the fight he will replace them with priests “with more zeal and less cowardice” (f. 1v).  He points out that even the smallest pueblo could set up impediments and ambushes using lances as well as bows and arrows.[19]  He implores them to work up ideas for the best defense of the pueblos, to consult with municipal officials and with the leading men on these matters, and to travel to surrounding pueblos for more ideas and planning.  “For the love of God, I beg you to animate and infuse courage” in your parishioners (f. 2).[20] 

One wishes for more detail and additional reports, admonitions, and concerns.  However, the surviving manuscripts return now to fairly routine letters from Anda to the Provincial, until we get to issues of Treasury funds and silver coin from the galleon the Filipino (more on this below).  Even the uprisings of Diego Silang in Ilocos and the Chinese at Guagua are only mentioned in passing, in an 11 January 1763 note from Anda to the Franciscan Provincial.[21]  There is no mention in these letters of the uprising in Pangasinan.  Franciscans of course were not parish priests in Pangasinan nor in the Ilocos and would have had no first-hand knowledge of the rebellions there.

There is a bit more information on Filipinos, but given the nature of the medium—letters between the acting Governor General and the head of one of the religious corporations—there is not much reference to the majority of the population around them.  What we have, though, does suggest that Filipino actions in the war between the British and Anda need more emphasis than what usually appears in the literature.  We know that during the British attack on Manila’s walls that Filipino resistance and sorties against the invading army were significant and contrasted dramatically with the unprepared, mismanaged, and ineffectual military efforts of the Spanish.  Before the walls were breached, Filipinos, particularly troops from Pampanga, suffered significant losses and finally withdrew, we are told, in disgust and anger at Spanish failures of leadership and valor.

Indeed we see this in passing from Anda himself who wrote in July that when he left Manila shortly before the British conquered the city, he went north to Bulacan.  Along the way he met some patrols of Filipinos who also were fleeing the city.  At first they were insolent “against the Spaniards, considering themselves free of them, but with patience and love” (and some time for reflection) they have “forgotten their first impulses.”[22]  An anonymous manuscript from 1767 reports as well that when Anda heard that Manila had fallen he “consulted with ecclesiastics and called on the [leading male] indios of the provinces of Bulacan and Pampanga” to get their input as he decided on what to do and how to defend the Islands against the British.[23]

Some of this Filipino anger seems to have played a role in events in Laguna, an anger that resulted in the murder of the Spanish governor.  From a report by the new Governor General of the Philippines after the end of the war between England and Spain, we learn that after the fall of Manila, the Filipinos in and around Pagsanghan “took up arms against the Spanish there and as proof of their anger took the life of the Alcalde mayor Don Felix Galán” after holding a trial in front of the leading men of that municipality.  He was found guilty, denied the right of Confession, and killed.  Two others were killed and a woman was wounded.  The lives of the two small children of the governor were threatened.[24]

Unfortunately this execution is undated in the sources and more information on the circumstances seems to be lacking.  However, we have more specifics regarding the Treasury funds that Archbishop Rojo, before the fall of Manila, had sent to Laguna to prevent them from falling into the hands of the British.[25]  After the British had taken Archbishop Rojo’s surrender, they set about trying to collect the ransom set forth in the terms of capitulation.  The Archbishop, working with the British at this time, remembered the 110,000 pesos he had sent to Laguna and sent two representatives to bring it back in order to deliver it to the British.[26] 

Franciscan sources are the best record of what happened next.  On the 29th of May 1763 the Franciscan Provincial wrote a long and frank letter to a Franciscan colleague in Spain where he mentions that many Spaniards and their families fled from Manila and took refuge in Franciscan rectories in Laguna and in Tayabas.  But the Filipinos there were “tumultuous” due to the poor defense the Spaniards had made in Manila and cried out that they hated all Spaniards and wanted “to kill them all.”  The priests worked hard in pacifying the crowds and allowed the Spaniards refuge in the rectories in order to protect them.  Thanks to their efforts “no more disgraceful acts, wounds, or deaths occurred.”  However, “because of the war, there has been an upsurge of heartlessness, iniquities, and banditry so that now one cannot go on the roads without an escort of well-armed men.”  Some of this, he said, was due to sheer wickedness, other because of hunger.[27]

More specifically, in Laguna, we have this frank account from him a day later, this time to a Franciscan in Madrid.[28]  After brief references to wounded or killed Franciscan, Augustinian, Recollect, and Dominican priests in various places around Manila, and the pillage of the Dilao [Paco] rectory by Filipinos, he briefly tells of the “riot” in Pagsanghan when emissaries from Archbishop Rojo came to reclaim the Treasury funds sent out of Manila before the city fell.  “It was a miracle that there were none wounded” in the melee, and the Franciscans were able to move the money to Mahayhay safely (later it was moved to Anda’s headquarters).  There is a fuller account of this incident in Huerta’s 1865 book (163-166), which quotes extensively from an unnamed “witness,” probably not a Franciscan.  His account has Franciscan priests speaking to Filipinos in the provinces of Laguna and Tayabas, asking them to protect the Treasury funds from being taken back to Manila but instead “to free it for the king.”[29] 

Gathered around the rectory in Pagsanghan were about 500 Filipinos, led by the Filipino Don Francisco de San Juan, who had served in a variety of posts in local and provincial administration.  The envoys sent by the Archbishop were inside.  The priests approached them and explained that the Filipinos would not leave until they were assured that the funds would not go back to Manila, would not go to the British.  As they were discussing this, the Filipinos were getting louder and edging closer.  The Franciscans took a hard stand and the envoys backed down, leaving the Treasury funds.  

Struggles over Treasury funds between Rojo and the British on the one hand and Anda and his forces and allies on the other also appear in the other major Franciscan episode within the larger story of this period of British occupation of Manila.  The British knew that the Spanish regularly communicated with Mexico and then to Spain across the Pacific and that the galleon coming from Mexico carried significant amounts of silver coin for government expenses and trade in Chinese goods.  They hoped to capture the galleon that was due, the Nuestra Señora del Rosario y San Juan Bautista, or as more commonly designated, the Filipino.[30] 

Shortly before the city of Manila fell, the Spanish under Archbishop Rojo and the British both learned that the galleon from Mexico had indeed arrived in the Islands.[31]  The Filipino was berthed in the municipality of Palapag, on the northeastern coast of the island of Samar.  The Archbishop immediately sent word that the commander of the Filipino was to fortify Palapag and land the silver and chests.[32]  The British, somewhat later, sent two ships to find and capture the galleon and its cargo.[33]  By now the city of Manila had fallen, Anda was leading the resistance, and he had learned of the galleon.[34]  He contacted the Franciscans and sent representatives, asking the Franciscan Provincial to provide his skills and experience to facilitate the move of the silver coin from Palapag to Bacolor.[35]

We don’t know much detail of what happened at Palapag, which had a Jesuit parish priest, and “… we don’t know if the Franciscan priests accompanied [the silver coin] in the first part of its trip…”[36]  I hope that someone will find a report from the Jesuit or by others detailing the events at that Samar parish and municipality.[37]  The galleon was off loaded and sunk.[38] 

Subsequently Anda’s representatives were able to move the silver coin from Palapag across the San Bernardino Strait to (according to Huerta, 300) Polangui, then to Iriga, and then to the municipality of Mauban.[39]  There the Franciscans were waiting, and they had mobilized 28 boats from nearby pueblos to carry the silver by land, river, and sea up to Dingalan near Baler.[40]  From there it would be transported to Pampanga and give Anda significant resources to pay his forces and for other costs of the war against the British. 

Filipinos, of course, were central to all of this, but the “colonial myopia”[41] common to the times and place give us little detail, the unfocused background, on the boat owners, sailors, and those who loaded the boats and otherwise helped the crews on their dangerous journey with the coin that the British were trying to capture.  Franciscan sources are unique in detailing the trip from Mauban to Dingalan and I propose to use them extensively to detail this remarkable effort.  We know that on the 10th of May (the source used below says it was the 11th) that the boats with the coin left Mauban.[42]  Subsequently, the Franciscans P. Fr. Francisco Torrecilla de San José and P. Fr. Nicolas Valverde ó de Jesus set out from Mauban.[43]

Our source for the details of the move from Mauban to Dingalan is an anonymous manuscript dated 26 January 1767, AFIO 22/86, with a transcription by Father Antolín Abad Pérez, O.F.M.  The anonymity of the source is troublesome (my hunch is that he was male, a Spaniard, and not a Franciscan), but the level of detail lends confidence to its probity and it stands alone in the literature for specifics of the trip from Mauban.[44]  The section in the manuscript is entitled “Itinerary of Our Navigation” and proceeds with first-person diary-like entries from the 11th through the 19th of May 1763.  My translation of portions is not necessarily literal and can be represented as follows (changed to third-person):

         On the 11th of May about 7 in the morning they left the port of Mauban in

19 boats.  Another had left the day before.[45]  They headed toward the Island of

Alabat[46] … overtaking and leaving behind the boat that had left earlier.  … They

made port at San Juan, south of that island, spending the night there.

         May 12th: Leaving early, once they got into open water they encountered

wind and high seas, causing the boats to lose track of each other.  By three p.m.

the fleet was scattered and the winds died, so that the author’s boat was essentially becalmed.  However, by 5:30 p.m. they were able to get to the port at [Binangonan

de] Lampon, with all but six straggling in thereafter.  They kept a lantern lit all night

for them but none of the six arrived.  In the morning of the 13th, two appeared and by

7 a.m. another two showed up.  They spent the rest of the day waiting and by afternoon the last two appeared.

         May 14th: Leaving early by 10 a.m. they had arrived at the point of Dinajican, then on to the port at Polillo where they spent the rest of the day and the next storing supplies from Binangonan and making arrangements and plans for if the fleet were scattered again.  …

         May 16th: Leaving Polillo, they headed for Alipatat, but a head wind stopped

them a bit short of their goal and they took refuge in a cove. 

         May 17th: at 3:30 a.m. they left the cove, and most of the fleet was able to

make the target but others again encountered a head wind and had to stop near the

shore.  Since this was not a safe anchorage for the rest of the day the boats inched

their way until finally all arrived safely at Alipatat.  The rest of the 17th and all of the

18th they spent here awaiting more favorable conditions while rearranging the load …

         May 19th: in the morning they left Alipatat and by 2 p.m. they were at

Dingalan,[47]  where they met up with two other vessels, one of which was in the care

of Don Diego Aresstizaba and the Augustinian P. Fr. Manuel de Villalba.  Don

Martínez de León became ill and died on the 20th around 3 a.m. 

The writer observes (513) that “on this voyage the silver only entered into two pueblos, both by necessity,” namely Mauban and Polillo.  “The rest of the time they always used lesser known [incognitos] and deserted anchorages until they reached Dingalan.” 

They delivered the silver into Anda’s hands “with universal joy” on his side.  Anda “withdrew his forces from the outskirts of Manila, perfected the trenches around Polo” and thus “put the silver coin securely away.”  The coin from the Filipino, 1,304,147 silver pesos in all according to Huerta (244)[48], 2,253,111 pesos according to BRPI,[49] was essential, as Anda said, “a unique resource for the reestablishment of our deteriorated condition.”[50]  Perhaps not coincidentally, Spaniards and French as well as Indian deserters flocked to Anda’s side “in search of better pay and a prompter pay schedule.”[51]  “Even some English deserted.” 

Finally the war ended and as part of the peace treaty concluded in Europe (the Treaty of Paris, 10 February 1763) the Philippine colony was returned to Spanish rule.  (Archbishop Rojo had died in January 1764)  Anda--who had fled Manila “alone, weaponless, with no powder nor shot, with no cannon nor soldiers,” with “no silver nor hopes of being helped by anyone nor to receive aid from anywhere” and with no capability to communicate with his king”[52]--was charged by the new Governor General of the Spanish Philippines to represent him in the march into Manila on the 7th of April 1764.  Anda entered the capital city quite differently than he had left.  A Franciscan describes the contrast quite well:[53] 

… Doctor Don Simón de Anda y Salazar left Manila on the 3rd of October

of 1762 without money, without weapons.  He returned to the city’s plaza

on the 7th of April of 1764 with 1,800 trained troops, 17 cannons, 6 mortars,

and 2 million pesos.  The English had been stunned and stymied by [a man

who was] so faithful to his king and to all of the Spanish nation.

.

Anda was effusive and generous in his thanks to the Franciscans for their help in making this victory celebration possible.  He wrote the Franciscan Provincial in August 1763, that he  recognized the help of the Franciscans as one of the key means by which Divine Providence accomplished the salvation of the Catholic faith and the fidelity of the colonized to the king of Spain.[54] 

Franciscan participation in and sources for events in Manila and Franciscan parishes in Laguna and the Camarines, as well as events associated with treasury funds and silver coin from the Filipino, are clearly of importance for those studying this period of time in the Islands. 

My essay is designed to highlight the contributions the materials in the Archivo Franciscano Ibero-Oriental might lend to such studies.  I add as well a list of the manuscripts from this period in that archive as well as a list of references to correspondence that is missing from the materials there.

[1] I have dated this draft so that I can signal when I have made substantive changes or additions subsequently.

[2] British and Spanish dates differ due to the former coming from the West and the Iberians from Mexico.  As Blair and Robertson [henceforth BRPI] say (v. 49, p. 12, “It is to be noted throughout that all English dates are one day in advance of the Spanish dates, as the English had the same dates as the Portuguese, who reached the Orient by way of the Eastern route.”  Also see p. 611n8 in Horacio de la Costa, S.J., “The Siege and Capture of Manila by the British [Texts and Documents].”  Philippine Studies, 10: 4 (October 1962), 607-654.  I will be using the Spanish dates since almost all the manuscripts I use are written by Spaniards using their dates.

[3] I use the term Filipino to designate all Asians born in the areas under real or claimed Spanish rule.  The usage is, of course, anachronistic.  It is employed for convenience.

[4] Brief sections on the rebellions in Ylocos and in Pangasinan can be found in BRPI, 300-302 and 302-303, respectively.

[5] Please see Bibliography, below, for a fairly complete listing.  I have indicated which sources I have not seen or worked with recently or yet for this draft.  As always, I welcome feedback and corrections or suggestions from others.  Please contact me at dbc_research_institute@yahoo.com .

[6] Antolín Abad Pérez, O.F.M., “Españoles e Ingleses ante la ocupación de Manila en 1762-1764.”  Archivo Ibero-Americano, 38: 149-152 (Jan.-Dec. 1978), 467-517.

[7] The following summary is taken from the manuscript in the Archivo Franciscano Ibero-Oriental (henceforth AFIO), 21/28 [Box 21, Document 28]: Relación de los sucesos acaecidos en la pasada Guerra de los ingleses, por lo perteneciente solamente al convento de Santa Clara de Manila y sus religiosas.  Sept. 1762 al 21 May 1764.  1764, copia moderna, 14ff.  This document is unsigned but appears authoritative and reliable.  I have not summarized the respectful comments regarding some individual nuns, nor many of the details of the siege, the surrender, nor many of the brief comments on life under British occupation of the city of Manila.

[8] Félix de Huerta, O.F.M., Estado geográfico, topográfico, estadístico, histórico-religioso de la santa y apostólica Provincia de San Gregorio Magno, de religiosos Menores Descalzos de la Regular y más estrecha Observancia de n. s. p. s. Francisco en las islas Filipinas; comprende el número de religiosos, conventos, pueblos, situación de estos, años de su fundación, tributos, almas, producciones, industrias, casos especiales de su administración spiritual, en el archipiélago Filipino, desde su fundación en el año de 1577 hasta el de 1865 (2nd ed.  Binondo: M. Sánchez, 1865), 433-435.  Also see AFIO 22/86, transcription by Abad Pérez, 509.

[9] Abad Pérez, 479.  Also see Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A., Documentos Indispensables para la Verdadera Historia de Filipinas, con prólogo y anotaciones (Madrid: Imp. del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1908), v. 1, 274-275n1.

[10] AFIO 22/3: Anda y Salazar, Don Simón de, Gobernador.  Carta al Provincial P. Roque de la Purificación.  Bulacan, 1 fol., 21 October 1762.  (There is a copy of this in AFIO 22/14, as well).  The Franciscans must have been aware of the British threat to the Islands earlier than the actual invasion, because there is a document from March of 1762 discussing ways to develop pueblo self-defense forces in the Franciscan-administered parishes of the Camarines in case of British attack (AFIO 22/1: Godoy, Fr. Juan, Comisario Provincial.  Carta pastoral.  Naga, 1 fol., 3 March 1762).   This early date suggests that the Franciscan Provincial might not have been as surprised by the actual British invasion as sources suggest the Archbishop and Spanish officials in Manila seem to have been.  One source indicates that the Archbishop and the government in Manila had had early and “repeated warnings from unofficial sources,” including a priest “and some Armenian merchants from Madras” (Serafin D. Quiason, English “Country Trade” with the Philippines, 1644-1765 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1966), 158).  Also see Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A., Documentos Indispensables para la Verdadera Historia de Filipinas, con prólogo y anotaciones (Madrid: Imp. del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1908), v. 1, 98-99n2.

[11] I capitalize Province when speaking of the Franciscan administrative entity.  When speaking of the civilian government divisions of the colony, I write province or provinces, with a lower case p.

[12] AFIO 22/4: Anda y Salazar, Don Simón de, Gobernador.  Carta al Provincial P. Roque de la Purifiacación.  Bulacan, 1 fol., 27 September 1762.  Anda’s incredulity that a captive of the British could claim to have authority as the acting Governor General is expressed even more strongly in AFIO 22/9 and in AFIO 22/12.

[13] AFIO 22/66: Purificación, Fr. Roque de la.  Minuta de carta al Gobierno de Filipinas.  Razones para que el Arzobispo de Manila no tome el mando de las Islas.  Mahayhay, 8ff., 24 September 1763, f. 5.

[14] AFIO 22/6: Anda y Salazar, Don Simón de, Gobernador.  Carta al Provincial P. Roque de la Purificación.  Malolos, 2ff., 3 November 1762.  There is a duplicate in AFIO 22/14.

[15] AFIO 22/5: Anda y Salazar, Don Simón de, Gobernador.  Carta al Vicario Provincial en Tayabas. Guera contra los ingleses.  Quingua, 1 fol., 31 October 1762.

[16] AFIO 22/7: Purificación, Fr. Roque de la.  Carta al Gobierno de Filipinas envia un religioso a Pasig para asunto de guerras.  Mauban, 6 November 1762. Minuta.  He is responding to AFIO 22/4.

[17] AFIO 22/8: Purificación, Fr. Roque de la.  Minuta de carta al Gobierno de Filipinas, sobre la guerra contra los ingleses.  Atimonan, 2ff., 12 November 1762.  He is responding to AFIO 22/5.

[18] AFIO 22/11: Purificación, Fr. Roque de la.  Carta pastoral, sobre la guerra contra los ingleses. Provisiones. Mahayhay, 2ff., 2 December 1762.

[19] AFIO 22/14 contains a 29 December 1762 letter from Anda where he refers to two battles.  He says he has ordered that henceforth battles are to be avoided and that ambushes only be used against the British since their artillery and fire power is overwhelming and would result in too many casualties, as apparently occurred in a place he refers to as Meysilon.

[20] I am speculating here, but it is possible that Anda’s concern later regarding three Franciscans and their unspecified actions might be related.  While there is no information on why Anda was annoyed with them nor information in Huerta or in Gómez Platero, willingness to treat with the British and Archbishop Rojo  might have been the reason.  It is also true that two of the three Franciscans Anda names later held positions as parish priests after the war (one died in December 1764), so whatever Anda’s criticisms were, their guilt (if any) did not preclude subsequent service as priests.  For the references, see AFIO 22/63; and AFIO 22/68.  There is also a more extended discussion by Anda, writing from Apalit, of what he characterizes as traitorous acts by an assistant priest (coadjutor) of Tunasan as well as two other priests, but it is quite likely that this 3 March 1763 letter is referring to Jesuits and not to Franciscans (last letter in the collection in AFIO 22/14).  Anda names none of the parties and is rather vague, partly because he is responding to a letter from the Franciscan Provincial, which we do not have.  In AFIO 22/25 we learn that the coadjutor is being held under guard in Apalit.  Also see AFIO 22/86, transcription by Abad Pérez, 508-509.

[21] AFIO 22/18: Anda y Salazar, Don Simón de, Gobernador.  Carta al Provincial P. Roque de la Purificación, sobre la guerra contra los ingleses.  Mexico de la Pampanga, 2ff., 11 January 1763.  Ilocos and Pangasinan rebellions are mentioned in AFIO 22/85—p. 495 of the Abad Pérez essay’s transcription.  The Chinese attack is mentioned in AFIO 22/86, transcription by Abad Pérez, 503.  Moreover, the Chinese do appear as a reference in a January 1763 letter from Anda (AFIO 22/31), declaring them (f. 1v) equally enemies with the British [“… los enemigos Yngleses ó los Chinos que se han declarado comunes Enemigos….”]; and in AFIO 22/23, 30 January 1763, where because of inhumane acts by the Chinese, Anda remarkably and harshly orders that “they be given no quarter” (f. 1), not even if they surrender.  These “ungrateful enemies” are no longer to be admitted in the provinces.

[22] AFIO 22/71, #3, Anda, Apalit, 28 January 1763.

[23] AFIO 22/86, transcription by Abad Pérez, 500.

[24] Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A., Documentos Indispensables para la Verdadera Historia de Filipinas, con prólogo y anotaciones (Madrid: Imp. del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1908), v. 1, 87n1.  Father Eduardo returns to the subject on pp. 295-296n2, but again does not give the date nor a full accounting of the events and causes.  The absence of Confession suggests that no priests were present since of course they would have endorsed the governor’s request for that important sacrament before his execution.

[25] Horacio de la Costa, S.J., “The Siege and Capture of Manila by the British [Texts and Documents].”  Philippine Studies, 10: 4 (October 1962), 607-654, here p. 619: “… at the suggestion of the oidores of the royal audiencia, Rojo took 110,000 pesos from the colonial treasury and gave them to the Treasurer, Don Nicolás de Echaus, to take to safety in the province of Laguna.”  Also see BRPI, v. 49, 210. 

[26] Father Antolín Abad Pérez indicates in his article that the sum was 111,000 pesos (480) and AFIO 22/86, transcription by Abad Pérez, 501. 

[27] AFIO 22/70, #2, 29 May 1763, Franciscan Provincial to the Provincial of the Franciscan, Spanish Province of San José.  He also observes that there were abuses with the innocent being punished and the guilty going free, with “Chinese, Indios, or Mestizos” listened to by government officials before priests.  He states that there was trade with the English, the Dutch, and Chinese, that it was common, and that it was facilitated by bribes.  One of the worst government officials was the Oydor Don Manuel Galban (also see AFIO 22/71-3, quoted in part regarding this individual in Abad Pérez, 475n12).  In subsequent letters in AFIO 22/70, the Provincial does indicate that some Filipinos responded to what he perceived as false British promises to abolish tribute and other forms of Spanish rule if Filipinos would join them in defeating Anda.  [Anda himself would abolish tribute during the war, except for fees to support parish priests.  AFIO 22/54: Anda y Salazar, Don Simón de, Gobernador.  Decreto del Superior Gobierno sobre Tributos.  Bacolor, 1 fol., [3] June 1763.  Copia concuerda con el origin.  Fr. Juan Godoy, Com.  Documento en tagalo.]  And the Provincial admits that some Filipinos supported the British and acted as spies, presumably in the areas the Franciscans knew the best since he makes no reference here to Ilocos or Pangasinan.

[28] AFIO 22/70, #3, P. Fr. Roque de la Purificación al Guardian de San Gil de Madrid, Lucban, 30 May 1763.  BRPI, 49, 243n151, has a reference to this incident, albeit very brief, as well.  Also see AFIO 22/86, transcription by Abad Pérez, 501-502.   

[29] Also see Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A., Documentos Indispensables para la Verdadera Historia de Filipinas, con prólogo y anotaciones (Madrid: Imp. del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1908), v. 1, 283-284n1.

[30] While they did capture a galleon it was the wrong one, it was the Santissima Trinidad (also known as the Nuestra Señora del Buen Fin, which had set out for Mexico on the 1st of August 1762 but had to turn back due to storms and consequent damage to the ship.  While this did not carry the silver coin they particularly wanted, still it was a significant prize and they considered it a fair spoil of war.

[31] Horacio de la Costa, S.J., has a good overview of how the news of the arrival of the Filipino came to the Archbishop and acting Governor General as well as to the British in his “The Siege and Capture of Manila by the British [Texts and Documents].”  Philippine Studies, 10: 4 (October 1962), 607-654; here 619-623.

[32] BRPI, v. 49, 209.

[33] Some detail on British efforts can be found in Serafin D. Quiason, English “Country Trade” with the Philippines, 1644-1765 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1966), 175-176.  Also see Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A., Documentos Indispensables para la Verdadera Historia de Filipinas, con prólogo y anotaciones (Madrid: Imp. del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1908), v. 1, 300-305 and 311-312n1; and 22-424, 427, 475-476, 483, and 494.

[34] Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A., Documentos Indispensables para la Verdadera Historia de Filipinas, con prólogo y anotaciones (Madrid: Imp. del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1908), v. 1, 31-33n2 (here p. 32), suggests that Don Ignacio Barsola was the key figure in establishing contact between the Captain of the Filipino and Anda.

[35] AFIO 22/75, first item, Anda decree, Apalit, 27 January 1763.  Apparently there had been previous discussion, since he says there were three options and he now chose option #3—to the Mission of Lupi, then to Ragay and on to Guinayangan, a sitio of Lamon, finally to Mauban.  Then to Baler and on to Pampanga.  The Franciscan Provincial and the Bishop of Nueva Caceres are to be contacted for help facilitating the plan, with permission given by Anda to modify the route as needed.  On the 3rd of December 1762 Don Ygnacio Barzola was dispatched to move the galleon wealth to Albay or some other safe place (AFIO 22/12; AFIO 22/14.  Also see Anda’s further ruminations on the 10th of February in AFIO 22/26, musing over the possibility of depositing it on Mount Ysarog); and as late as 22 April 1763 he suggests the mountains around Mahayhay as a possible location for the silver coin (AFIO 22/47).  In AFIO 22/33, Anda and the Audiencia’s decree, Apalit, 14 March 1763, names the Spaniards who under the commissioners Don Francisco Xavier Salgado and the Marquez de Monte Castro y Alanahermosa (and Don Andres Blanco Vermudez, “one of the leaders in commerce”) were to effect the collection and move of the silver coin: Don Pedro Antequietta, Don Joseph Acevedo, and Don Joseph Gongora.  At the end the Franciscan Provincial is signaled out for his “prudence, experience, and zeal” and is to provide the means by which the agents communicate with the commissioners and Anda (the Spanish text: “y para el mexor exito, se valdran de la prudencia, y experiencia, y eficassimo zelo de P. Roque de la Purificacion … [who is to] auxilie esta empresa con la generosidad que practica.  Y que dando testimonio en autos, se le remitira a su Reverencia, paraque por su medio, se comunique a los Comisionados”).  More preparations were decreed on the 4th of April 1763 (AFIP 22/35), but it obviously finally became clear to Anda that it would be futile and counterproductive to attempt to micromanage the logistics from afar, writing the Provincial from Bacolor on 23 April 1763 that “I repeat at this time that you are do what is best” [repito en esta occasion orden de lo que deben observar por ser lo que conviene] (AFIO 22/45).  On the 12th of April 1763, Anda sends along the Audiencia order regarding the silver coin (AFIO 22/39. and an associated item in AFIO 22/40), adding that the Franciscan Provincial was to keep 20,000 pesos for expenses.  And on the 16th of April Anda wrote Don Francisco Xavier Salgado (responding to his letter from Lucban on 11 April) specifying Astiquietta, Acevedo, and Gongora again, appointing the Franciscan Provincial as a commissioner for the move, and specifying the transport go to either Dingalan or to Baler (AFIO 22/41, with an another letter of the same date in AFIO 22/42).

[36] Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A., Documentos Indispensables para la Verdadera Historia de Filipinas, con prólogo y anotaciones (Madrid: Imp. del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1908), v. 1, 31-33n2, here p. 32.

[37] There is nothing about this in the classic study on the Jesuits in the Philippines by de la Costa.

[38] Quiason says the British burned the galleon (Quiason, 176), but I think that is less likely than it having been scuttled by the Spanish after off-loading its goods.  Also see BRPI, v. 49, 248-251.  I am inclined to support Navarro’s view that it was scuttled: Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A., Documentos Indispensables para la Verdadera Historia de Filipinas, con prólogo y anotaciones (Madrid: Imp. del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1908), v. 1, 31-33n2, here p. 32: “Terminado el embarque, dieron un barreno al Filipino, que se hundió en las aguas del puerto de Palapag.”  It makes little sense to me that the British would burn a useful ship, no matter how angry and frustrated they might have been.  The dates of the actions in Palapag are obscure, but there is an AFIO letter from Anda to the Franciscan Provincial dated 29 January 1763 thanking the Franciscans for “having liberated from the trap at Palapag, cave of the wolf, the wealth … from New Spain… (AFIO 22/22; AFIO 22/14). 

[39] There is a fuller itinerary in Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A., Documentos Indispensables para la Verdadera Historia de Filipinas, con prólogo y anotaciones (Madrid: Imp. del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1908), v. 1, 31-33n2, here p. 33. 

AFIO 22/51, Anda to P. Francisco de Brozas, Bacolor, 27 May 1763, refers to a letter from the Franciscan of 2 May (which we do not have) reporting that the “treasure” had arrived safely—where is not specified.  Anda writes that he has sent word to Salgado and Astequieta to send men and weapons to protect it and escort it to Mauban and then to Dingalan.  The 2 May notification must have been a great relief for Anda since on 20 April 1763 he wrote the Franciscan Provincial (AFIO 22/44) that he had sent four dispatches with ideas on moving the silver to Dingalan but had received no response.  He also expresses concern on the 11th of January 1763 (AFIO 22/18; AFIO 22/14). The itinerary from Palapag to Mauban may very well have been modified, since AFIO 22/86, transcription by Abad Pérez, 511, indicates that “from Camarines to Maúban they did not enter into any of the pueblos of the fathers” [that is, none of the municipalities where Franciscans were parish priests] until they arrived at Mauban.

[40] AFIO 22/75, #3, 7 February 1763, letter from the Franciscan Provincial, Lucban, to P. Fr. Roque de Brozas asking that as part of service to king and country, please see that boats were provided and necessary food given out.  He adds that under no circumstances were the rectories nor the Franciscan priests to receive anything in return for the boats and food stuffs provided [“Mando a VC por Santa Obediencia que por ningun respeto permita recivan nuestros Conventos ni Religiosos cosa alguna por el servicio de embarcaciones, y recompensa de la prevenciones que suplan.”  The Provincial had written similar instructions already, on 4 February (AFIO 22/4), with the Spanish text this time reading “.. por ningun respecto permita el que en nuestros conventos se reciva cosa alguna por modo de satisfacion, o paga ni aun socolor de agradecimiento por las Embarcasiones”].  According to 22/19 in a 13 January 1763 letter from Anda to the Franciscan Provincial, the Provincial had already on the 1st day of the year sent a circular to the parish priests in the Camarines regarding the silver coin in Palapag and reminding them of the need for caution; AFIO does not appear to have a copy of this circular.  On the 17th of February 1763 the Franciscan representative (Comisario Provincial) for the Camarines was able to say in a circular to the Franciscans there that the silver was now “in this Province of the Camarines” (AFIO 22/27); on the 10th of March he sent another circular reinforcing concerns with rules on silver access, security, and Franciscan reputation (AFIO 22/30).  On the 10th of April 1763, P. Fr. Roque de Brozas responded to the Provincial from Mauban [AFIO 22/75 #4] that he had mobilized twenty-eight boats—eight from Mauban, 4 each from Atimonan and Bumaca, 8 from Paracale, and four from Binangonan de Lampon.  He also states that he has paid for the crews and provided food from parish rectory accounts, covering these expenses for the period from 1 March to 1 April 1763.

[41] I am not sure if I am the first to coin this term or not.  If I have appropriated someone else’s terminology, I apologize.  If I did, it was unintentional.  If someone has developed the term before I published it here, please contact me so I can acknowledge the writer. The point is, as Kristin Patricia Flannery notes in her Master’s thesis from the University of Texas, “Indigenous people are marginalized and their agency denied in both the Anglo and Spanish interpretations of the occupation” (5).  However, see pp. 483-485 of the essay by Abad Pérez for clear recognition of the military roles and value of Filipino forces in the resistance; and 493-494 in his transcription of AFIO 22/85 on the grievous losses Filipino forces suffered defending Manila.

[42] AFIO 22/49, Anda to P. Fr. Francisco de Brozas, Bacolor, 15 May 1763.  Anda wrote that he had heard by way of Laguna that on the 10th the treasure had left Mauban for Dingalan.  He says this is the final piece of the puzzle and is most grateful [the Spanish text reads: esto es poner la ultima piedra a la obra, que con tan notorio celo y aplicacion ha tomado V.R. a su cuidado: Por todo doy a V.R. las gracias, sobre el seguro de que en quanto tenga arbitrio tiene a su disposicion mi persona, y empleo.”]  He adds that he is sending 50 pilones of sugar to Dingalan for the boats to carry on the return trip to Mauban.  The blankets [mantas] he had planned to send as well have not arrived.  He adds the unexplained sentence that the sugar is for the Franciscan Provincial, a bit of a puzzle since commerce is something that the Franciscans in the Philippines explicitly and faithfully eschewed.  The Franciscans were particularly careful to avoid controversy and gossip regarding money matters, avoiding any direct contact and using lay persons (Syndicos) to handle business transactions.  We see this in regards to the silver coin with a 10 March 1763 circular from the Comisario Provincial of the Camarines Franciscans warning the priests to be scrupulous and avoid any act that might in whatever way be misconstrued or bring the Order into disrepute [the Spanish text, from AFIO 22/30: “… estar ya en esta Provincia de Camarines las Embarcaciones en que a de ir la plata ser que la Codicia de los particulares quira aora valerse de la occasion para ocultar parte de la que está por esta Provincia.”  He orders that no parish priest “guarde plata alguna a ningun secular sea de la Calidad que fuere, ni por titulo de piedad, ni de amistad pues no es razon que por amparar nosotros a particulares que de nuestro Santo habito desacreditado, y senos diga, que nuestras Administraciones son Casos de contravando, y defraudadoras, de lo que toca al Rey nuestro Señor”].

[43] Gómez Platero, pp. 481-482 and 476, respectively; these two priests’ names also appear in AFIO 22/52.   Also see Abad Pérez, 481 and 481n26, for more on these two priests.

[44] AFIO 22/86, transcription by Abad Pérez, 509-513.  I have used the transcribed text.  I have not checked it against the original manuscript.  The author, who as I said I suspect is a male, Spanish, non-Franciscan, refers to Franciscans as if speaking from outside the Order—e.g., 510: También tiene gran parte en este feliz suceso la Religión de San Francisco, pues siendo así que hacía aquellos parajes no tienen estos Padres administraciones, fue un religioso de San Francisco a cuya diligencia se debió el buen éxito …--and refers to the person he is writing as Vuestra Merced and amigo; he also refers to “mi amigo” Don José Góngora, which would be unusual usage for a Franciscan at this time (I think).  The letter is from Manila and ordinarily Franciscan letters specify the rectory in which it is written.  He might very well have been one of the Spanish representatives charged by Anda to see to the safety and transport of the coin from the Filipino; and since he talks about “Nuestra Navegacion” it is reasonable to assume he accompanied the transport.  All entries are written as if by an eye-witness.

    One can also find the crucial portions of this section of AFIO 22/86 in Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A., Documentos Indispensables para la Verdadera Historia de Filipinas, con prólogo y anotaciones (Madrid: Imp. del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1908), v. 1, 31-33n2, here p. 33.

[45] My understanding is that the remaining eight, from Paracale, would join them en route but there is no indication that they did so.

[46] I hope to provide maps in the future.

[47] AFIO 22/50, Anda to P. Fr. Francisco de Brozas, Bacolor, 19 May 1763: Anda acknowledges receipt of a letter from the Franciscan Provincial.  Rather surprisingly, Anda states that he had heard on 14 [sic] May that the boats [with the silver coin] had arrived in Dingalan—word came thanks to an unnamed Filipino who arrived at the pueblo of Santor with the news.  I cannot explain this disparity.  Anda also comments that he is sending 50 pilones of sugar to Dingalan for the boats to carry back to Mauban—he had planned to send blankets (mantas) too but they were unavailable at that time in Pampanga.

[48] A figure also used by Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A., Documentos Indispensables para la Verdadera Historia de Filipinas, con prólogo y anotaciones (Madrid: Imp. del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1908), v. 1, 31-33n2 (here p. 32).

[49] BRPI, v. 49, 298-299.  Father Antolín Abad Pérez in his essay (481) also uses the quantity of 2,253,111 pesos, but says that only 222,891 pesos were government funds and the rest belonged private parties [cantidad en metálico de 2,253,111 pesos, de los que únicamente era para el Gobierno 222,891 pesos, y el resto para los particulares.”]. It would be interesting to see Anda’s financial statement for these years, particularly receipt and disbursement of the silver coin from the galleon.  For some of the complexities, see Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A., Documentos Indispensables para la Verdadera Historia de Filipinas, con prólogo y anotaciones (Madrid: Imp. del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1908), v. 1, 269-270n2; 418n1; and 419n1.  Perhaps someone in Spain could check for the data.  There is a reference to lost silver in Lipa, but I have found no explanation nor other information (AFIO 22/61, Anda to the Franciscan Provincial, 25 August 1763).  However, the puzzle might be resolved if one conflates this reference with the incident recounted in Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A., Documentos Indispensables para la Verdadera Historia de Filipinas, con prólogo y anotaciones (Madrid: Imp. del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1908), v. 1, 311-312n1; also see p. 490. 

[50] AFIO 22/62, Anda to the Provincial, Bacolor, 25 August 1763.  The importance of the silver is emphasized in the document quoted by Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A., Documentos Indispensables para la Verdadera Historia de Filipinas, con prólogo y anotaciones (Madrid: Imp. del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1908), v. 1, 71. 

[51] AFIO 22/86, p. 514 of Abad Pérez transcription.  Also see the stronger statement regarding Spanish motives in joining Anda at this time in Eduardo Navarro, O.S.A., Documentos Indispensables para la Verdadera Historia de Filipinas, con prólogo y anotaciones (Madrid: Imp. del Asilo de Huérfanos, 1908), v. 1, 72. 

[52] AFIO 22/86, transcription by Abad Pérez, 500.

[53] Fondo Franciscano, Biblioteca Nacional del Museo de Antropología e Historia, Mexico City.  Vol. 130, ff. 209-215, 26 May 1764, Dilao, P. Fr. Roque de la Purificacion, report on British invasion, 22 September onwards, ff. 209v-212v; here, 212-212v.  The date here is given as 7 April 1764 as it is in AFIO 22/85 (see the Abad Pérez transcription, 496).

[54] AFIO, 22/62.  The Spanish text reads “… que reconozco se ha valido la Divina Providencia, para conservar la Religion catholica, y fidelidad de estos Naturales a su legitimo Dueño.”  Also see BRPI, v. 49, 299: “from the saving of the wealth of said patache had resulted the conservation of the islands…”  The Provincial himself wrote a fellow Franciscan in May 1763 (AFIO 22/70, #3) that he saw it as a “thing of utility for all; and thus I consider myself to have been well employed in serving the king our Señor, who supports us with continued alms, for the religion, and the common need” (“”…como cosa que es en utilidad de todos; y assi lo doy por bien empleado por servir en esto al Rey nuestro Señor, que en nos mantiene con sus Continuadas limosnas; por la Religion, y necesidad Comun”).