A central focus of contemporary philosophy of action is the kind of control that is distinctive of intentional action. A prominent view---dubbed the Single Phenomenon View by Bratman (1984)---is that this distinctive kind of control involves an intention. In this talk, I will offer a new argument for the Single Phenomenon View by attending to the functions played by our capacity to track the control which characterizes intentional action. I’ll first sketch a view on which the concept of intentional action plays a particular functional role in the structure of concepts with which we engage in normative evaluation, namely to track the doings which are prioritized candidates for normative evaluation. I’ll then show that given this normative function of the concept of intentional action, we have good reason to accept the Single Phenomenon View. I’ll conclude by considering what this functional approach to studying intentional action says about the stronger view---the Simple View---according to which an intentional Xing involves not just an intention but an intention to X specifically.

Throughout his work, Michael carefully develops and defends accounts of intention and intentional action. Intention, he argues, is to be understood in terms of a distinctive planning attitude differing from belief or desire; intentional action in terms of the execution of intention. In the process, investigating the precise relationship of intention and intentional action, Michael considers and famously rejects what he dubs the 'Simple View' (according to which an intentional action involves the execution of a corresponding intention), arguing for a more subtle 'Single Phenomenon View' instead. Michael investigates extensively and in great depth the nature, formation, and integration of intentions, both in individual and shared agency, comparatively less so aspects concerning the execution of intention. I do so here. I argue that attention to such aspects helps elucidate further the form and formation of intention, in ways that help support Michael's account (specifically in response to cognitivist competition, according to which an intention is to be understood as—or entailing—a corresponding form of belief). It also invites careful further examination of Michael's takes on the Simple View and Single Phenomenon View. 

How many types of mental states do we need to posit in order to explain intentional action and related types of goal-directed behavior? Michael Bratman’s famous answer is: two. In response to “video games”-type cases, where agents appear to rationally pursue multiple ends they believe to be incompatible, Bratman argued that we need to posit both ordinary or “full” intentions and what he called states of endeavoring, which we call weak intentions. The latter states play some but not all of the functional roles associated with ordinary intentions. Similarly bifurcated theories of intentional action have been associated with Velleman, Holton, and others. Our goal is to argue that all the data used to motivate the bifurcated theories can be explained by theories that posit just one of these two types of states–and, what is more, that it doesn’t matter which you posit. Both can do the job. So, which should we posit? We give some meta-theoretic reasons for preferring full intentions to weak intentions. 

We often form intentions on the basis of what we treat as reasons for action. It is generally assumed, albeit tacitly, that the relation between the endorsement of reasons and intention is simply that of the former serving as a basis for the formation of the latter. Intention is formed on the basis of the endorsement of reasons; but once it is formed, it plays its characteristic functional roles in tracking action in independence of such normative endorsement. In this talk, I challenge this “sequential model” of the relation between the endorsement of reasons and intention. I argue that the endorsement of reasons influences not only the formation of intention but also its functional profile. It is partly responsible for many of the roles intention plays in tracking action.

In his collections of essays titled “Planning, Time, and Self-Governance: Essays in Practical Rationality” Michael Bratman develops a complex argumentative strategy whose aim is to establish that the norms of practical rationality have genuine normative force. His hope, in particular, is to be able to show that these norms are not mere rules of thumb and to show this without grounding them in norms of theoretical rationality. The strategy has several components. The key final component is an argument for the claim that these norms track the structure of an ideal which we –mature human agents with a planning capacity – have reasons to have as an end: the ideal of self-governance. Some of us, undoubtedly, have self-governance as an end, and it seems plausible that all mature human agents with a planning capacity have some reason to have it as an end. But certain questions arise about the strength and uniformity of those reasons. In this short talk I reflect on Bratman’s argument for the final component of the ‘self-governance strategy’.

Much of Bratman's theory of individual agency is motivated by the question of how a desire, for example, can "speak for the agent" and not be a mere bubble or "wriggle" in a "psychic stew". I will take a look at the question behind the metaphors and the personal autonomy project that it drives, arguing that the concern in question is overblown (but plans are still cool).

First, contra Michael Bratman’s recent articulation of a broadly systemic functionalist picture of his planning theory of agency, I argue that there are considerable advantages to an underappreciated form of etiological functionalism. Second, I advance a novel proposal for a third kind of functionalism, which I call “evaluative functionalism.” Evaluative functionalism holds that within a causal system, particular components or sets of components (in this case: agents, psychological features, and the ecology of action) jointly realize particular values. I go on to argue that evaluative functions are especially useful for understanding particularly important forms of complex agency. 

One of Michael Bratman's most impactful contributions to the philosophy of action has been to redirect our attention to the phenomena of planning for the future, both individually and together.  We gain insight into a different set of philosophical challenges and solutions when we look at agency through the lens of cross-temporal and interpersonal ties, rather than focusing solely on individuals acting now.  Similarly, in this talk, we ask what happens when we view philosophical puzzles about agency through the lens of "striving."  Rather than focusing on examples in which the agent knowingly exercises a high degree of control, or in which she has knowledge of what she is doing and will have done, we center cases of agency that involve significant uncertainty: about whether success in achieving a difficult goal will be possible, or about what it would be like; about the kinds of opportunities we will be given, or denied; and about what our own capabilities are, or will be.  We argue that some of the central challenges we face as agents look different when viewed through the lens of striving agency.

When we claim that people ought to relate as moral equals, what are the minimal demands of sociality that such relating involves? That is, setting aside the normatively substantive question of what the patterns of such egalitarian relating are, what is it for people to be suitably socially related so that they are eligible to relate as moral equals, in contrast with being socially disconnected and unrelated? Relational egalitarians have mostly punted on this question, even though answering it is important for thinking through such issues as whether and how relational equality can be realized across generations or nation-state borders, or within institutional contexts such as the firm. I think an answer to this question should do three things: (i) take seriously the contrast between relational equality and social hierarchy, (ii) avoid Niko Kolodny's deflationary maneuver, and (iii) capture how the relevant form(s) of relating might entail widespread mutual recognition while still allowing for some non-compliance (or alienation). I aim to explore whether we can satisfy these three criteria by following Bratman's lead in paying attention to H. L. A. Hart's distinction between primary and secondary social rules. As Bratman points out, primary social rules are naturally viewed as social norms, and he provides a promising planning agency model of what these are, at least in some central cases. While the planning agency model of social rules/norms suggests a theory of being socially related that neatly satisfies criteria (i) and (ii), it runs into trouble with (iii), because the normative flexibility and volitionalism of the planning agency model (i.e., it requires that we intend compliance with rules and thus does not strictly constrain the reasons for such intended compliance) makes it difficult to account for genuinely attitudinal social rules/norms, of the sort that facilitate the requisite form of mutual recognition. I close by considering some amendments to the planning agency model that might resolve this difficulty.