RESEARCH & SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS
My research program is situated at the intersection of Microeconomic Theory, Market Design, and Social Choice. I am primarily focused on resolving long-standing axiomatic enigmas and analyzing the structural stability of complex assignment mechanisms.
Primary Research Agenda:
Knuth’s Problem 5: A long-term commitment to determining the exact maximum number of stable solutions in the marriage problem (1976), focusing on the combinatorial density of stable sets.
Cyclical Conflicts (CC): A novel theoretical framework to identify strategic interdependencies in preference profiles and their impact on Singleton Cores. This work extends the rotations identified by Irving & Leather (1986).
Multi-Sided Stability: Investigating the fundamental reasons for instability in multi-sided models, addressing the findings of Alkan (1988) within a dynamic framework.
Computational Methodology:
To verify axiomatic structures, I develop large-scale JAVA-based object-oriented simulations. My work includes the computational analysis of over 8,000 social choice scenarios to quantify the trade-offs between strategic equilibrium and individual welfare.
(A snapshot of the custom-built JAVA framework used for these simulations is available at the bottom of this page.)
Working Papers & Publications:
"Individual Cost, Benefit and Efficiency of Manipulation" [SSRN Link]
"Cyclical Conflicts and Singleton Cores in Two-Sided Matching Markets" [SSRN Link]
"A Simple Mechanism to the Roommate Problem" [SSRN Link]
Research Pipeline (In Progress):
"On the Exact Number of Stable Solutions to the Marriage Problem" (Addressing Knuth’s Problem 5).
"A Non-Revelation Mechanism for Centralized College Admissions" (Policy Case Study: Turkish ÖSYM system).
"Stability Analysis of Multi-Sided Matching Models in a Dynamic Framework" (Addressing Alkan, 1988).
Theses:
