RESEARCH & SCIENTIFIC CONTRIBUTIONS
My research program is situated at the intersection of Microeconomic Theory, Market Design, and Social Choice. I am primarily focused on resolving long-standing axiomatic enigmas and analyzing the complex stability structures matching markets.
Primary Research Agenda:
Knuth’s Problem 5: A long-term commitment to determining the exact maximum number of stable solutions in the marriage problem (1976), focusing on the combinatorial density of stable sets.
Cyclical Conflicts (CC): A novel theoretical framework to identify strategic interdependencies in preference profiles and their impact on Singleton Cores. This work extends the rotations identified by Irving & Leather (1986).
Multi-Sided Stability: Investigating the fundamental reasons for instability in multi-sided models, addressing the findings of Alkan (1988) within a dynamic framework.
Methodological & Computational Foundation:
While my current long-term research pipeline is strictly theoretical and axiomatic, my academic foundation includes strong computational expertise. During my Master’s research in Social Choice Theory, I self-taught JAVA to bridge a data deficit and independently developed a large-scale, object-oriented simulation framework.
Through this custom framework, I executed over 8,000 computational measurements across multiple extension rules to evaluate the manipulability of social choice correspondences, specifically quantifying the individual cost, benefit, and efficiency of strategic manipulation. This computational breakthrough directly laid the groundwork for my working paper on manipulation.
(A historical snapshot of the custom-built JAVA framework used for these Master's thesis simulations is available at the bottom of this page.)
Working Papers & Publications:
"Individual Cost, Benefit and Efficiency of Manipulation" [SSRN Link]
"Cyclical Conflicts and Singleton Cores in Two-Sided Matching Markets" [SSRN Link]
"A Simple Mechanism to the Roommate Problem" [SSRN Link]
Research Pipeline (In Progress):
"On the Exact Number of Stable Solutions to the Marriage Problem" (Addressing Knuth’s Problem 5).
"A Non-Revelation Mechanism for Centralized College Admissions" (Policy Case Study: Turkish ÖSYM system).
"Stability Analysis of Multi-Sided Matching Models in a Dynamic Framework" (Addressing Alkan, 1988).
Theses:
