Reviews matching:
Tag selected: Russia
Results matching: 5
Results matching: 5
It is common in the modern age to read stories, watch movies, or hear of countless examples of men and women who have risked all to help their nation, their people, or their cause by spying on a foreign nation, an enemy, or a threat. Their success stories are perhaps no more inspiring than the stories of their failures, for we can see that, either by winning or losing, they were serving a good cause. And while they may have failed in their mission, their inclusion in the annals of history signifies that they did not fail at the mission. But how does our moral narrative fare when, instead of examples of greatness, we hear stories of debauchery? What happens when, instead of spies protecting their nation, we hear of spies selling information to another nation at the expense of their own?
This is exactly what Antonia Senior’s new, penetrating look at the Cambridge Five does. In Stalin’s Apostles, Senior shows how these five men, young and idealistic in the beginning, were brought into the folds of Soviet intelligence and then proceeded, over the next two decades, to funnel information to their Russian bosses through a World War and the beginning of the decades-long Cold War.
Senior does not give us a typical biography. Although it broadly follows the lives and fortunes of Anthony Blunt, John Cairncross, Donald Maclean, Kim Philby, and Guy Burgess, this is a biography not of a man, or of men, but of a faith. This faith was a faith in communism—in the ability of man, through his own efforts, to bring heaven down to man—and it was this religious zealotry that drove these five to do the unthinkable.
1930s England was a time when two competing perceptions of the world had collided. One of them was in its death spiral; the other was skyrocketing in popularity. It was ironic, but the idealism of war that had led so many young men to their deaths in the First World War—the idealism, as it were, of the real—was giving way to the realism of the ideal. This realism of the ideal, which saw the problems created by nationalism, war, and the economic effects of the Industrial Revolution, was nonetheless no less idealistic than the patriotism of the pre-war era. The only difference was that this new and renewed confidence was not in the nation-state but in the nationless state—utopia.
Gone with the confidence, patriotism, and relative stability of the Victorian age were also the religious convictions and ethical mores of the same. While any age has moral problems with which it must deal—child slavery in the nineteenth century, the deviancy of the aristocracy in the early nineteenth century—a rejection of the foundations of these mores led to a wholesale rejection of the mores themselves, and Senior chronicles, with devastating simplicity, the effects of this abandonment. Two of the Cambridge Five were the sons of devoutly religious fathers—and religious in twentieth-century England meant Christian. Yet none of the five would maintain even a semblance of this faith, instead swallowing the alluring hook of utopian Marxism—hook, line, and sinker. Further, the mores holding society in place were also thrown out with Christian belief: four of the five spies were deviant homosexuals who, besides spying on their governments, engaged in some of the most promiscuous behavior imaginable, from marital abuse to affairs with countless men and women, and with each other, to the sponsoring of male brothels.
Yet we would be in error to suppose that this rejection of traditional faith was a rejection of faith. While it is all too common today to think of people in terms of the “religious” and “secular” labels, and to think of Stalin’s regime, Mao’s China, or Fidel’s Cuba as secular states, this is both an egregious misunderstanding and a dangerously naive view. For the Cambridge Five, their rejection of faith was not a rejection of the Christian eschatology, but a stripping of its theology in its entirety; it was an attempt to preserve, in atheistic form, many of the moral goods that Christianity had once and again asserted.
Senior, as a secular journalist, only just hints at these realities. It would perhaps have been a stronger argument had she made these things explicit, linking the lack of Christian theology with its replacement, but this lack of acknowledgement is understandable. Further, while it is perhaps not the goal of this book to explain the causes of their actions as much as their consequences, it would have been helpful had the author spent considerably longer explaining the ideological appeal of communism, to which she alludes but which she never fully encapsulates.
And yet, unlike true Christianity, this new zealotry of the communist idealists was entirely unquestioning: a blind leap of faith instead of a reasoned acceptance of reality itself. Far more than the miracle of the Virgin Birth or any similar element of Christian theology, communism demanded of its adherents a genuinely irrational faith—one that required them to violate all their commitments in pursuit of its goal. In the late 1930s, the Cambridge Five’s faith was shaken by the show trials in Stalin’s USSR. The heroes they had quoted, modeled their lives after, and looked up to were now the enemies of the State they served. Bukharin, Zinoviev—even the five handlers themselves—were evidence of the fact that revolutions eat their own. And yet the Five helped eat them, or at least stood by passively while they were eaten, their commitment to Stalin’s regime neither marred nor affected. Telling themselves that it was for the defeat of fascism that Stalin had to do this, their loyalty still remained firm even when Stalin himself became Hitler’s principal ally, their arch-nemesis, through the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. The worldview of these men was so zealous, so unthinking, so committed in spite of all else, that by the end of the 1940s, they themselves were actively involved in the betrayal of their own agents into the hands of the NKVD. Rebels in Eastern Europe, from Ukraine to Poland to Albania and Lithuania, working with British intelligence to undermine the Soviet system, were betrayed by the very people they were helping, their fates sealed by the demonic attributes of the oppressive communist dictatorship.
The slippery slope of Stalinism becomes evident through these pages. Like Lenin, who was, for all intents and purposes, deified after his death, Stalin was the god-man during his life. His word was infallible. To question him was to question the Soviet experiment; to question the Soviet experiment was to question the revolution; to question the revolution was to question and deny the principles that motivated it, which made one an enemy not only of the state but of mankind generally. Thus, Dostoevsky’s statement rings true: “Without God, all things are permitted”—if the new God, the state, allows it.
Senior’s key strength is not simply in showing the ideological motivators behind the Cambridge Five, though this goes far further than other historians, some of them Soviet apologists, have done. Instead, her brilliance is captured in the fact that she puts a face on the consequences of their actions. Telling the story of the people inside the Iron Curtain, who had survived Hitler’s Nazi tyranny only to fall into the hands of their would-be liberators, makes the reader sympathize with the plight of European resistance. Not only the reader, but also the leaders of the Western nations, who, perhaps for reasons of realpolitik, or perhaps out of actual concern—we do not know—understood the importance of these movements, are forced to come to terms with how best to help them. The strategy of containment was only part of it; the provision of resources, infiltration by agents, and intelligence support were all means by which these patriotic, pro-Western men and women risked everything and subsequently lost it. Why? Because of the Cambridge Five.
Of particular interest to modern readers should be the setting at the beginning of the story. Our own conception of spies works something like this: a rival nation sends its intelligence agents to infiltrate a rival intelligence agency of a different nation. Perhaps, with promises of money, a better future, or some other reward, they succeed in turning an agent or two and thus obtain information critical to their own government. We may be forgiven for thinking that this was the case with the Cambridge Five, but it wasn’t. The communist method for gaining power and influence is far deeper and far more insidious, as we have seen in decades prior. All five men were recruited while still in college. None of them was in an influential position, and there was no reason to believe that they ever would be. Later on, after distancing themselves from communism for the purpose of casting off suspicion, the Five would dismiss their college-days socialism as youthful idealism—but if it was youthful idealism, then they were always young, for they never lost it. Indeed, Senior points out that agents who are in it for the money can be turned simply with the offer of more money. Agents who are in it for the excitement or novelty will soon find it boring, old, or simply too dangerous. But by choosing fanatically committed ideologues, the Soviets ensured that, barring a change in convictions, the communists would remain communist.
Using original and previously unearthed archival materials, Senior presents clear and undeniable proof—yes, proof—that the actions of the Five directly led not only to the betrayal of rebel groups but also to the rapid nuclearization of the Soviet Union. She convincingly points out that, were it not for Donald Maclean’s reading of communications between the President of the United States and Prime Minister Churchill, Russia would likely have been delayed by months, perhaps years, in the successful testing of its own nuclear weapon. This success, which gave the Cold War a new and more devastating potentiality, would not have been possible, or at least would not have occurred within its historical timeframe, without their aid.
As all stories do, this story has its end—and it is not a particularly glorious one for any of the Five. All of them passed through death into eternal death, from suffering into unending misery; broken and sick, having experienced the pleasures of the world for a season, their lives evoke the biblical lesson: “Be sure your sin will find you out.” Stunningly, all five managed to evade the justice system; none would face political or legal repercussions for their involvement. But while they were never convicted in a court of law, they stand convicted in the court of public opinion and, more reliably, in the court of the eternal, immutable law.
Perhaps the most celebrated of the Five, Kim Philby, whose statue stands in Prokhorovka, near the site of the Battle of Kursk, where his spying helped the Soviets defeat the Germans, provides the most striking example of this. His flight to Moscow, unexpected and unwanted, helped him escape the hangman’s noose or a judge’s verdict, but it hardly brought him the revered status for which he longed. A drunkard, forgotten by most and condemned by all, he had spent most of his adult life serving Soviet intelligence, yet his last years were not spent in his ideal utopia but in a living hell. Guy Burgess, noted for his witty and outrageous personality, was abandoned in Russia: no longer sought, an exile from the world in which he flourished.
Review Written by Caleb A. Gerber
October 27th, 2026
Mystic guide or heretic? Unsung hero, or the villain who changed the history of the twentieth century? Many descriptions, conflicting ones at that, but all are focused on a single man.
Talented military historian Antony Beevor turns his attention to one of the most overlooked and mysterious players in Russian history and focuses not only on Grigory Rasputin, but on the world into which he was born, in which he lived, and in which he was killed: the world of Orthodox Russia before the Bolshevik coup and the abdication of Nicholas II, which marked the end of the Romanov dynasty. Rasputin was born into humble origins, but he would eventually rise to the top and be introduced into the most powerful and elite circle in czarist Russia. His supposed mystical powers would win him a reputation which, when it came to the ears of the Tsarina Alexandra, would mark the beginning of his rise to the top and the beginning of the Romanovs' fall to the bottom.
For a military historian, Beevor is certainly an interesting writer. Many historians specializing in the history of warfare tend to get bogged down in the details while missing the overall picture. Not so with Beevor, who, with a wealth of sources, manages to encapsulate both the particulars and the universals: both Rasputin the man and the men and women around that man.
Interestingly, this is one of Beevor's shorter works, coming in at around 350 pages of substantive writing, plus footnotes and bibliography. The fact that Rasputin, like all men, lived a full life, and further, the fact that his life was by no means dull, will of course mean that many details which may interest the reader will inevitably be left out. Certainly, this is one of the impressions that will be received when reading the book. Beevor's biography of Rasputin is not a typical biography. Only a couple of pages are given to the first decades of Rasputin's life, while a full three chapters are focused on his assassination. While many biographies will only briefly mention the players who figure prominently in the life of their protagonist, Beevor goes deeper. Not only does he introduce the characters in their relationship with the mystic, but he also presents them as dynamic characters themselves, showing the reader their world as well as Rasputin's, even when the two do not necessarily intersect. At times this makes the overall thrust of the work feel vague, but on the flip side, it adds much depth, both cultural and political, that is not normally found in a simple biography.
While this style may, to some, seem distracting, this unconventional structure ultimately works to the book's advantage. Instead of focusing on Rasputin's birth, early decades, and formation, which would in most cases be desirable, the author's emphasis on the world of late imperial Russia helps underscore the fact that although Rasputin may have been the catalyst for the downfall of the Romanovs, he was not the only, or even the principal, figure. Beevor does not make this explicit, though I wish he did, but this underlines an interesting historical point: everyone should ultimately bear responsibility for his or her own actions. Blame for the fate of a nation may hinge on a particular person, but that hinge should not be mistaken for the door. The author demonstrates that the collapse of the dynasty cannot and should not be attributed to Rasputin alone, despite the enduring popular myth that he single-handedly brought down the entire empire.
Although not in depth, several philosophical and theological questions are tossed around by the author through the people in this story. Rasputin's perverted behavior can be seen, in part, as the consequence of his belief that, to be forgiven much, it is necessary to sin much. Obviously, this is dangerously unorthodox, not in the denominational sense, teaching, as it places a strong emphasis on sinning instead of any attempt to avoid illicit behaviors and acts. The consequences of this mistaken belief may become obvious at once to those more versed in biblical theology and will add a layer of depth to this book which could very easily be missed by those who are not as well versed. Indeed, the opportunity to engage not only with the political philosophy of Nicholas and Alexandra, as well as that of the moderates and those on the right and left of the political spectrum, but also with the theological and philosophical questions which played such a role in the Russia of the early twentieth century, is one of the most enjoyable and commendable parts of this work.
Two areas of weakness in this book are of note. Firstly, with a subject as complex as Rasputin, and with contrasts so stark between the "man of God" that the Czar and the Czarina saw him to be and the "man of the world," the carnal Rasputin accused and likely guilty of rape, the facts alone cannot suffice. Most readers, upon concluding the read, will be left confused as to Rasputin's legacy. Certainly, history is full of shades of gray, but the shades of gray do not negate the black and the white which, when summed, the grays produce. Beevor's attempt at objectivity, while commendable and understandable, is unsatisfactory because it leaves the reader with little sense of historical judgment. Was he good or bad? Perhaps the author intends to leave this question unanswered; perhaps he believes the question is unanswerable; or perhaps he wishes to leave it up to the reader to decide, to weigh the evidence in the balance of history and make the decision for himself. Yet the brevity of the work, coupled with the conflicting facts, makes such a task nearly impossible. Beevor is a master at narrating facts; he is less successful at drawing conclusions from them. Consequently, the central question of who Rasputin truly was remains frustratingly unresolved.
The second area of criticism is less universal and will likely not be shared by all readers. Once more it centers on the author's attempt at objectivity. The way in which he deals with Rasputin, who was after all a primarily religious figure, is almost entirely secular. He narrates what those around him, in a highly superstitious culture fed by Eastern Orthodox mysticism, thought about Rasputin's actions and whether they came from a divine origin, but notably, Beevor never attempts either to debunk any claims of spiritualism or to confirm them. The conflict within the Russian Church is also of note here; not everyone inside the church hierarchy agreed on Rasputin and how the church should deal with him. Beevor also shows that the Tsar's attempts to interfere with ecclesial authority were not welcome, yet no contrast is shown between the orthodoxy of the Orthodox and the orthodoxy of Rasputin. To those readers unfamiliar with the teachings, practices, and liturgy of Orthodoxy, this may be a problem.
Despite these criticisms, Rasputin is a highly worthwhile work and a welcome contribution to the study of late imperial Russia. Readers will emerge with their interest in this period not satisfied, but decidedly piqued. It is a good starting point, a good beginning to a road that will lead deeper into the struggles of history and the struggles of the soul.
Review Written by Caleb A. Gerber
May 31st, 2026
It can’t happen here; it can’t happen now — or can it? In Live Not by Lies, cultural commentator Rod Dreher answers the age-old question of how we should act in the face of falsehoods, and how we should respond to the increase of totalitarianism in our culture. Elucidating, firstly, how totalitarianism in any of its forms can take root in society, Dreher argues that while Eastern culture was threatened and devastated by an Orwellian totalitarianism that controlled everything, including the thoughts and words of its citizens, we, living in the modern Western hemisphere, are in danger not of an Orwellian system, but a Huxleyan one.
Drawing heavily on the writings of dissidents Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Vaclav Benda, as well as information received through extensive interviews with survivors, or children of survivors, of the Communist regimes, Dreher recounts the stories of courageous individuals who “lived not by lies.”
Arguing that “the ideal subject of a totalitarian state is someone who has learned to love Big Brother,” Dreher shows how the loss of belief in a transcendent moral order left the culture of Eastern Europe susceptible to a communist takeover, and how, more terrifyingly, the loss of this transcendent order in the West, where the very ideal of moral transcendence was founded, is leaving us open and vulnerable to the soft totalitarianism of Huxley’s Brave New World. Indeed, communism answered, and still answers, “an essentially religious longing,” which is why Dreher argues that we must understand that we are fighting not against a rival economic system, or even a political one, but rather against a completely different and uncompromising religion. This soft totalitarianism demands loyalty in every aspect of life; it demands conformity to all its dogmatic teachings; and it demands, above all, the surrender of Truth. For it, “there is no such thing as objective truth — there is only power.”
The author devotes several chapters to examples of how soft totalitarianism has become the norm in our own culture. At times, this can become overly speculative; his warnings about the PATRIOT Act — though he doesn’t mention it by name, he clearly implies it — as conducive to a totalitarian society, and his dismissal of the state as a vehicle of security maintenance, feel overly influenced by libertarian extravagance. Cultural pressures, social media outrage, and corporate conformity are real phenomena, but Dreher occasionally presents them as more unified and monolithic than they actually are. His examples are persuasive in principle but, at times, exaggerated in scope.
Dreher also proposes a solution to the hard times that we are sure to face. If the thesis were only about the fact that we, as Westerners, are in trouble, and that the totalitarianism of the previous century is rising — indeed, that it has even risen in our midst in a new and deadly form — it would be a book ending in despair. Yet through the examples of brave dissidents and Christians from the past, we too can learn how to live the truth in a culture of lies. Using quotes from Romanian pastor Richard Wurmbrand, and the stories of incarceration from multiple Christians, the author shows that suffering is not necessarily a bad thing; indeed, it can bring the community together like never before. As a reader, it was highly appreciated that Dreher did not simply make these points as statements to be accepted at face value, but rather interviewed dozens of men and women who possessed firsthand experience. This lends a level of credibility to this book that is simply not present in other political manifestos.
Central to Dreher’s argument is the concept articulated by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn in his famous essay Live Not by Lies: the refusal to participate in falsehood. Totalitarian systems survive not merely because of the power of the state, but because millions of ordinary people repeat, affirm, and publicly comply with things they know to be untrue. The lie becomes truth, and the truth becomes unknowable. “Let the lie come into the world,” is the rallying cry. “Let it even triumph…,” but, Solzhenitsyn concludes, “not through me.”
A must read.
Review Written by C. A. Gerber
March 12th, 2026
Idealism is not necessarily a virtue, for both tyrants and heroes have been and are idealists. In 1917, two men, different in many ways but similar in one underlying theme, were about to be catapulted to the forefront of the world. Their choices would be choices that would shape the world for the next century.
Author Arthur Herman argues that both Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States, and Vladimir Lenin, the revolutionary Marxist who would soon be deified as the founder of the Soviet Union, were not only alike in their fervent belief that history could be bent toward a grand design, but also in their confidence that they themselves understood that design. From a distinctly Hegelian lens, one which saw progress as an inevitable force that would lead to harmony, both believed that they could use government, or, in a Bismarckian sense, “the state,” to further their ends. The state was a means to an end for both men, and as a means it was applied in every possible way.
1917 explores how the visions of these two men collided in a colossal way during the terminus of the Great War. Wilson entered the war reluctantly, despite the clamor from those in the Republican Party, such as Theodore Roosevelt, who urged him to stand with their European allies from the start. Yet when he entered, he applied his vision of liberal democracy and an international order to every aspect of the conflict. It would be the mission of the United States Expeditionary Force, under the talented command of “Black Jack” Pershing, to secure a peace, but it would be, Wilson urged, a peace without victory.
Herman argues that that is exactly what he got.
On the other hand was the Russian exile living in Switzerland, the avowed Marxist Vladimir Lenin. Unlike today’s perception of Lenin as a fundamentally different man from his successor, Joseph Stalin, Herman points out that it was Lenin, and not Stalin, who was in command of the purges following the Bolsheviks’ triumph in the Revolution of ’17. It was Lenin, though this applied as well to Stalin or to Stalin’s nemesis Trotsky, who was the brutal warlord who murdered his political opponents, no matter their innocence. Yet Lenin too was an idealist, and Lenin also was willing to use the state to achieve progress. While Wilson viewed progress as that which could be achieved by peaceful coexistence, Lenin saw it in starkly different terms. Well might Mao Zedong’s motto, “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” have served as the unofficial motto of Vladimir Lenin’s revolution. Where Woodrow Wilson spoke the language of diplomacy, congresses, and international law, Lenin spoke the language of force, class war, and revolutionary necessity. Yet both men believed they were accelerating the march of history. The difference lay not in their certainty, but in the methods which they believed history required.
The irony is that Lenin need not have succeeded. The Soviet Union was an experiment, and like all experiments, was not bound to succeed. By its very nature, communism, argues Herman, eats its own creation, and indeed, following the stories of the leaders of the Revolution, such as Trotsky, such a proposition is historically evident as well. Rather than being bound to an inevitable victory of the proletariat, as Lenin firmly believed, the Russian Revolution nearly ended in failure many times. Alexander Kerensky and the fragile Provisional Government might well have crushed the Bolshevik movement had events taken only a slightly different course. The Whites, under the command of Alexander Denikin, could have stood up to Lenin had not inner turmoil and distrust between Denikin and Kerensky bloomed. Indeed, had Woodrow Wilson himself not intervened on behalf of the Bolsheviks, it is likely that the experiment in communism would have ended not in 1991 with the quiet dissolution of the Soviet Union, but in 1919 amid the smoke and confusion of the Russian Civil War. Ironically, it was the Hegelian idealism of Wilson that preserved the Soviet Union from destruction.
Wilson himself would fail, his idealism running aground when the Republican Senate, under the leadership of Henry Cabot Lodge, blocked Wilson’s pet project, the League of Nations. It was idealism that prevented Wilson from acceding to the demands made by the Republican Congress. It was idealism that made Wilson see the entire conflict over the League as a conflict for the future of humanity rather than an opportunity for compromise, which could have led to a fundamentally better League, one backed by both parties. It was idealism that drove Wilson mad with fury and would lead to several massive strokes that would leave him incapacitated for the remainder of his term and that would sink all hopes of running for a third term in 1920.
In clear prose, Herman successfully defends his central thesis: that the idealism of both Wilson and Lenin led to the disorder of the next century. The naivety of Wilson’s Fourteen Points and his belief that World War I was “the war to end all wars” would lead to the appeasement of Nazi Germany. The desperate, Machiavellian, yet at heart idealistic policies of Vladimir Lenin would lead to the deaths not only of Russians during the fifty-plus years of Soviet rule, but would also, albeit indirectly, cause the surge of bloody communist revolutions across the globe, from Mao’s China, where seventy million people died, to Pol Pot’s Cambodia and Kim’s North Korea. Although Herman makes no attempt to disguise his contempt for Wilson, and his hatred of Lenin, from beginning to end, the facts are neatly ordered, the thesis is well defended, and the writing is masterfully articulated.
Review Written by C. A. Gerber
March 8th, 2026
Idealism is not necessarily a virtue, for both tyrants and heroes have been and are idealists. In 1917, two men, different in many ways but similar in one underlying theme, were about to be catapulted to the forefront of the world. Their choices would be choices that would shape the world for the next century.
Author Arthur Herman argues that both Woodrow Wilson, the President of the United States, and Vladimir Lenin, the revolutionary Marxist who would soon be deified as the founder of the Soviet Union, were not only alike in their fervent belief that history could be bent toward a grand design, but also in their confidence that they themselves understood that design. From a distinctly Hegelian lens, one which saw progress as an inevitable force that would lead to harmony, both believed that they could use government, or, in a Bismarckian sense, “the state,” to further their ends. The state was a means to an end for both men, and as a means it was applied in every possible way.
1917 explores how the visions of these two men collided in a colossal way during the terminus of the Great War. Wilson entered the war reluctantly, despite the clamor from those in the Republican Party, such as Theodore Roosevelt, who urged him to stand with their European allies from the start. Yet when he entered, he applied his vision of liberal democracy and an international order to every aspect of the conflict. It would be the mission of the United States Expeditionary Force, under the talented command of “Black Jack” Pershing, to secure a peace, but it would be, Wilson urged, a peace without victory.
Herman argues that that is exactly what he got.
On the other hand was the Russian exile living in Switzerland, the avowed Marxist Vladimir Lenin. Unlike today’s perception of Lenin as a fundamentally different man from his successor, Joseph Stalin, Herman points out that it was Lenin, and not Stalin, who was in command of the purges following the Bolsheviks’ triumph in the Revolution of ’17. It was Lenin, though this applied as well to Stalin or to Stalin’s nemesis Trotsky, who was the brutal warlord who murdered his political opponents, no matter their innocence. Yet Lenin too was an idealist, and Lenin also was willing to use the state to achieve progress. While Wilson viewed progress as that which could be achieved by peaceful coexistence, Lenin saw it in starkly different terms. Well might Mao Zedong’s motto, “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” have served as the unofficial motto of Vladimir Lenin’s revolution. Where Woodrow Wilson spoke the language of diplomacy, congresses, and international law, Lenin spoke the language of force, class war, and revolutionary necessity. Yet both men believed they were accelerating the march of history. The difference lay not in their certainty, but in the methods which they believed history required.
The irony is that Lenin need not have succeeded. The Soviet Union was an experiment, and like all experiments, was not bound to succeed. By its very nature, communism, argues Herman, eats its own creation, and indeed, following the stories of the leaders of the Revolution, such as Trotsky, such a proposition is historically evident as well. Rather than being bound to an inevitable victory of the proletariat, as Lenin firmly believed, the Russian Revolution nearly ended in failure many times. Alexander Kerensky and the fragile Provisional Government might well have crushed the Bolshevik movement had events taken only a slightly different course. The Whites, under the command of Alexander Denikin, could have stood up to Lenin had not inner turmoil and distrust between Denikin and Kerensky bloomed. Indeed, had Woodrow Wilson himself not intervened on behalf of the Bolsheviks, it is likely that the experiment in communism would have ended not in 1991 with the quiet dissolution of the Soviet Union, but in 1919 amid the smoke and confusion of the Russian Civil War. Ironically, it was the Hegelian idealism of Wilson that preserved the Soviet Union from destruction.
Wilson himself would fail, his idealism running aground when the Republican Senate, under the leadership of Henry Cabot Lodge, blocked Wilson’s pet project, the League of Nations. It was idealism that prevented Wilson from acceding to the demands made by the Republican Congress. It was idealism that made Wilson see the entire conflict over the League as a conflict for the future of humanity rather than an opportunity for compromise, which could have led to a fundamentally better League, one backed by both parties. It was idealism that drove Wilson mad with fury and would lead to several massive strokes that would leave him incapacitated for the remainder of his term and that would sink all hopes of running for a third term in 1920.
In clear prose, Herman successfully defends his central thesis: that the idealism of both Wilson and Lenin led to the disorder of the next century. The naivety of Wilson’s Fourteen Points and his belief that World War I was “the war to end all wars” would lead to the appeasement of Nazi Germany. The desperate, Machiavellian, yet at heart idealistic policies of Vladimir Lenin would lead to the deaths not only of Russians during the fifty-plus years of Soviet rule, but would also, albeit indirectly, cause the surge of bloody communist revolutions across the globe, from Mao’s China, where seventy million people died, to Pol Pot’s Cambodia and Kim’s North Korea. Although Herman makes no attempt to disguise his contempt for Wilson, and his hatred of Lenin, from beginning to end, the facts are neatly ordered, the thesis is well defended, and the writing is masterfully articulated.
Review Written by C. A. Gerber
March 8th, 2026