• Working Papers:

1. Endorsements and Referrals: Product Recommendations in Bilateral Trade(with Peter Achim and Lily Yang) 

Abstract: In this paper, we investigate monopoly pricing when the buyer can acquire information about the value of the seller's product from an independent expert. We demonstrate that the expert is advantageous to the buyer only when the cost of seeking advice is not too low. When the buyer faces a moderate cost of obtaining information from the expert, the seller ’prices out’ the expert by offering discounts to dissuade the buyer from seeking advice. This approach generates a positive surplus for the buyer. In contrast, when the buyer’s cost is low, the seller ’prices in’ the expert, capitalizing on the buyer’s easy access to information to demand a premium. We also show that the seller and intermediary may benefit from tacit collusion and direct payments in pricing-out equilibria but never in pricing-in equilibria. 

2. On the England University Dormitory Assignment Problem(with Zaifu Yang)

Abstract: In the dormitory allocation systems used by many universities in England, new students are systematically granted higher priority than senior students. Motivated by this institutional practice, we develop an assignment model that formally captures this priority structure. Our framework stands in sharp contrast to the existing literature, where students endowed with dormitories typically retain priority in the allocation process. Within this setting, we study the joint assignment of new and senior students to dormitories and introduce the Proposing and Swapping Deferred Acceptance (PSDA) mechanism to find a stable matching. We further demonstrate that, under this mechanism, it is a dominant strategy for all students to truthfully report their preferences..

3. Job Matching in Sports (with Zaifu Yang) 

Abstract: In the English Premier League, the regulation states that the ceiling constraint imposed on the club is endogenously changed with the number of players a club hires. Motivated by this feature, we propose a two-sided matching model with endogenous constraint. The model draws a sharp contrast to the existing literature, in which the constraint is given exogenously. Based on the framework of matching with contracts, we examine the problem of how to assign players to clubs under this endogenous constraint. Through our Club Proposing Multiple Stages (CPMS) mechanism, a stable and group-stable assignment can be found. Besides, we prove it is a dominant strategy for each club to report true preference in this mechanism.   

4. The Allocation of Doctors Temporarily: A Phenomenon in China (Job Market Paper)

Abstract: The allocation of scarce medical resources remains a critical challenge, particularly in regions with supply-demand imbalances. In China, the "FeiDao" phenomenon, where doctors from resource-rich hospitals travel to under-resourced hospitals for surgeries, underscores the need for a structured matching mechanism. This paper develops a two-sided matching model with hospital-specific capacity and floor constraints. We propose a two-stage Deferred Acceptance (TDA) mechanism that ensures stable, appropriate, and distributionally Pareto-efficient allocations. By integrating inter-hospital mobility and fairness considerations, our model optimizes doctor-patient assignments while preserving hospital operations.

5. Matching over couples (with Zaifu Yang)

Abstract: will be added soon. 

6. Dynamic Stability Across Multiple Platforms (with Rui He)

Abstract: Many matching markets are fragmented, with agents interacting across multiple platforms or locations and adjusting their participation over time. This paper studies a dynamic one-to-one matching model with history-dependent preferences, in which agents’ preferences evolve in response to past matching outcomes and agents may switch platforms to improve their matches. We refine the concept of stability to account for both fragmentation and dynamics, distinguishing among local stability, global stability, and dynamic stability, the latter requiring convergence to a stationary matching that admits no profitable deviations over time. We propose a Men-Preceding Global Mechanism (MPGM), building on deferred acceptance, and show that when each platform implements a stable matching mechanism, MPGM guarantees the existence of a dynamically stable matching. We also establish an impossibility result: without stability at every platform, global and local stability are incompatible.