• Working Papers:

1. Endorsements and Referrals: Product Recommendations in Bilateral Trade(with Peter Achim and Lily Yang) 

Abstract: We study monopoly pricing in markets where buyers can consult a third-party expert before purchasing. The expert is strategic but constrained: she cannot charge buyers directly and instead gains from attention or side contracts with the seller. We fully characterize the seller’s optimal strategy. When information costs are high, the seller deters learning with low prices. When costs are low, she induces learning with high prices. For intermediate costs, the seller turns to contracts that pay the expert either for unconditional endorsements or for referrals tied to sales. Endorsements eliminate informativeness and shift surplus to the seller and expert, while referrals typically benefit the buyer and can even generate strict Pareto improvements. Our results show how expert intermediation yields a non-monotonic relationship between information costs, buyer surplus, and market efficiency, implying a cost of cheap information to the buyer.

2. On the England University Dormitory Assignment Problem(with Zaifu Yang)

Abstract: This paper presents a model for the university dormitory allocation problem that allows for off-campus choices, in which extending the traditional housing allocation problem with existing tenants. The model incorporates the contractual relationship between students and their assigned dormitory or house. Specifically, when a senior student is assigned to a house, there is a conventional constraint, but no such relationship exists between senior students and dormitories. All students and landlords have preferences over multiple contracts, and dormitories have an institutional constraint that favouring new students over senior students. To address these features, we propose a Sign a Contract-Swap a Contract mechanism, which is permissible, stable and Pareto efficient, and results in a student's core assignment. Additionally, we provide incentive compatibility results for the mechanism, proving it is a truncation-proof mechanism.

3. Job Matching in Sports (with Zaifu Yang) 

Abstract: In the English Premier League, the regulation states that the ceiling constraint imposed on the club is endogenously changed with the number of players a club hires. Motivated by this feature, we propose a two-sided matching model with endogenous constraint. The model draws a sharp contrast to the existing literature, in which the constraint is given exogenously. Based on the framework of matching with contracts, we examine the problem of how to assign players to clubs under this endogenous constraint. Through our Club Proposing Multiple Stages (CPMS) mechanism, a stable and group-stable assignment can be found. Besides, we prove it is a dominant strategy for each club to report true preference in this mechanism.   

4. The Allocation of Doctors Temporarily: A Phenomenon in China

Abstract: The allocation of scarce medical resources remains a critical challenge, particularly in regions with supply-demand imbalances. In China, the "FeiDao" phenomenon, where doctors from resource-rich hospitals travel to under-resourced hospitals for surgeries, underscores the need for a structured matching mechanism. This paper develops a two-sided matching model with hospital-specific capacity and floor constraints. We propose a two-stage Deferred Acceptance (TDA) mechanism that ensures stable, appropriate, and distributionally Pareto-efficient allocations. By integrating inter-hospital mobility and fairness considerations, our model optimizes doctor-patient assignments while preserving hospital operations.

5. Matching over couples (with Zaifu Yang)

Abstract: will be adding soon.