By the model proposed here, high (but not too high) imagination promotes higher RMET performance because the task centers on inventive, conjectural inferences concerning the mental states of others (52, 53). Mechanistically, the model conceives of enhanced RMET performance as involving a high level of social attention as a precondition, and a high but not excessive level of imagination because reading emotions and mental states requires an intuitive inference. Thus, too low a level of imagination results in no clear mental-state hypothesis being intuitively generated (as in autism), and too high a level produces a hypothesis departing too far from the visible information, and produced more from self-generated than externally-cue-generated cognitive-emotional states (as in psychosis, in the extreme). The idea that cognitive empathy performance depends on imagination of mental states and emotions is also supported by fMRI data showing overlap, within the default mode system, between the neural systems that subserve RMET and those that underlie empathy, theory of mind, social cognition, and imagination, especially with regard to activation patterns and functions of the medial pre-frontal and posterior cingulate cortex (16, 54, 55).
"In this unique and compelling treatment, Patrick Schotanus weaves together theoretical economics and the science and philosophy of extended cognitive systems. Essential reading for anyone interested in markets - or minds!" --Andy Clark, Professor of Cognitive Philosophy, University of Sussex
[PDF] The Reading Mind: A Cognitive Approach To Understanding How The Mind Reads.epub
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The Mechanical Mind is accessible to anyone interested in the mechanisms of our minds, and essential reading for those studying philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, or cognitive psychology.
This brings us to the question of the nature of discomfort and pleasure. Since Kant it has been customary to recognize three great divisions of mental phenomena, which are typified by knowledge, desire and feeling, where "feeling" is used to mean pleasure and discomfort. Of course, "knowledge" is too definite a word: the states of mind concerned are grouped together as "cognitive," and are to embrace not only beliefs, but perceptions, doubts, and the understanding of concepts. "Desire," also, is narrower than what is intended: for example, WILL is to be included in this category, and in fact every thing that involves any kind of striving, or "conation" as it is technically called. I do not myself believe that there is any value in this threefold division of the contents of mind. I believe that sensations (including images) supply all the "stuff" of the mind, and that everything else can be analysed into groups of sensations related in various ways, or characteristics of sensations or of groups of sensations. As regards belief, I shall give grounds for this view in later lectures. As regards desires, I have given some grounds in this lecture. For the present, it is pleasure and discomfort that concern us. There are broadly three theories that might be held in regard to them. We may regard them as separate existing items in those who experience them, or we may regard them as intrinsic qualities of sensations and other mental occurrences, or we may regard them as mere names for the causal characteristics of the occurrences which are uncomfortable or pleasant. The first of these theories, namely, that which regards discomfort and pleasure as actual contents in those who experience them, has, I think, nothing conclusive to be said in its favour.* It is suggested chiefly by an ambiguity in the word "pain," which has misled many people, including Berkeley, whom it supplied with one of his arguments for subjective idealism. We may use "pain" as the opposite of "pleasure," and "painful" as the opposite of "pleasant," or we may use "pain" to mean a certain sort of sensation, on a level with the sensations of heat and cold and touch. The latter use of the word has prevailed in psychological literature, and it is now no longer used as the opposite of "pleasure." Dr. H. Head, in a recent publication, has stated this distinction as follows:** 589ccfa754
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