This document provides best practices for the secure planning and deployment of Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) and Web Application Proxy (WAP). It contains recommendations for additional security configurations, specific use cases, and security requirements.
This document applies to AD FS and WAP in Windows Server 2012 R2, 2016, and 2019. These recommendations can be used for either an on-premises network or in a cloud hosted environment such as Microsoft Azure.
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At each layer, AD FS and WAP, a hardware or software load balancer is placed in front of the server farm, and handles traffic routing. Firewalls are placed, in front of the external IP address, of the load balancer as needed.
AD FS requires a full writable Domain Controller to function as opposed to a Read-Only Domain Controller. If a planned topology includes a Read-Only Domain controller, the Read-Only domain controller can be used for authentication but LDAP claims processing will require a connection to the writable domain controller.
The below diagram depicts the firewall ports that must be enabled between and amongst the components of the AD FS and WAP deployment. If the deployment does not include Microsoft Entra ID / Office 365, the sync requirements can be disregarded.
Port 808 (Windows Server 2012R2) or port 1501 (Windows Server 2016+) is the Net. TCP port AD FS uses for the local WCF endpoint to transfer configuration data to the service process and PowerShell. This port can be seen by running Get-AdfsProperties | select NetTcpPort. This is a local port that will not need to be opened in the firewall but will be displayed in a port scan.
Federation servers on an AD FS farm communicate with other servers in the farm and the Web Application Proxy (WAP) servers via HTTP port 80 for configuration synchronization. Make sure that only these servers can communicate with each other and no other is a measure of defense in depth.
Organizations can do achieve this state, by setting up firewall rules on each server. The rules should only allow inbound communication from the IP addresses of the servers in the farm and WAP servers. Some Network Load Balancers (NLB) use HTTP port 80 for probing the health on individual federation servers. Make sure that you include the IP addresses of the NLB in the configured firewall rules.
When AD FS and WAP are installed, a default set of AD FS endpoints are enabled on the federation service and on the proxy. These defaults were chosen based on the most commonly required and used scenarios and it is not necessary to change them.
Organizations deploying AD FS and WAP only for Microsoft Entra ID and Office 365 scenarios can limit even further the number of AD FS endpoints enabled on the proxy to achieve a more minimal attack surface. Below is the list of endpoints that must be enabled on the proxy in these scenarios:
Extended protection for authentication is a feature that mitigates against man in the middle (MITM) attacks and is enabled by default with AD FS. The setting can be verified using the below PowerShell cmdlet:
The property is ExtendedProtectionTokenCheck. The default setting is Allow, so that the security benefits can be achieved without the compatibility concerns with browsers that do not support the capability.
The federation service proxy (part of the WAP) provides congestion control to protect the AD FS service from a flood of requests. The Web Application Proxy will reject external client authentication requests if the federation server is overloaded as detected by the latency between the Web Application Proxy and the federation server. This feature is configured by default with a recommended latency threshold level. To verify the settings, you can do the following:
Ensure all AD FS and WAP servers receive the most current updates. The most important security recommendation for your AD FS infrastructure is to ensure you have a means in place to keep your AD FS and WAP servers current with all security updates, as well as those optional updates specified as important for AD FS on this page.
The recommended way for Microsoft Entra customers to monitor and keep current their infrastructure is via Microsoft Entra Connect Health for AD FS, a feature of Microsoft Entra ID P1 or P2. Microsoft Entra Connect Health includes monitors and alerts that trigger if an AD FS or WAP machine is missing one of the important updates specifically for AD FS and WAP.
When you federate your AD FS with Microsoft Entra ID, it is critical that the federation configuration (trust relationship configured between AD FS and Microsoft Entra ID) is monitored closely, and any unusual or suspicious activity is captured. To do so, we recommend setting up alerts and getting notified whenever any changes are made to the federation configuration. To learn how to set up alerts, see Monitor changes to federation configuration.
With the extranet lockout feature in Windows Server 2012 R2, an AD FS administrator can set a maximum allowed number of failed authentication requests (ExtranetLockoutThreshold) and an observation window time period (ExtranetObservationWindow). When this maximum number (ExtranetLockoutThreshold) of authentication requests is reached, AD FS stops trying to authenticate the supplied account credentials against AD FS for the set time period (ExtranetObservationWindow). This action protects this account from an AD account lockout, in other words, it protects this account from losing access to corporate resources that rely on AD FS for authentication of the user. These settings apply to all domains that the AD FS service can authenticate.
WS-Trust Windows endpoints (/adfs/services/trust/2005/windowstransport and /adfs/services/trust/13/windowstransport) are meant only to be intranet facing endpoints that use WIA binding on HTTPS. Exposing them to extranet could allow requests against these endpoints to bypass lockout protections. These endpoints should be disabled on the proxy (i.e. disabled from extranet) to protect AD account lockout by using following PowerShell commands. There is no known end user impact by disabling these endpoints on the proxy.
If your AD FS farm runs on Windows Internal Databases (WID) and has a secondary AD FS server, after disabling the endpoints on primary server, wait for the SYNC to occur on secondary nodes before restarting the AD FS service on them. Use the PowerShell command Get-AdfsSyncProperties on the secondary node to track last SYNC process.
AD FS has the ability to differentiate access policies for requests that originate in the local, corporate network vs requests that come in from the internet via the proxy. This differentiation can be done per application or globally. For high business value applications or applications with sensitive information, consider requiring multifactor authentication. Multifactor authentication can be set up via the AD FS management snap-in.
AD FS can be configured to require strong authentication (such as multifactor authentication) specifically for requests coming in via the proxy, for individual applications, and for conditional access to both Microsoft Entra ID / Office 365 and on premises resources. Supported methods of MFA include both Microsoft Azure MF and third party providers. The user is prompted to provide the additional information (such as an SMS text containing a one time code), and AD FS works with the provider specific plug-in to allow access.
Enable protection to prevent bypassing of cloud Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication when federated with Microsoft Entra ID and using Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication as your multifactor authentication for your federated users.
Enabling the protection for a federated domain in your Microsoft Entra tenant will ensure that Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication is always performed when a federated user accesses an application that is governed by a conditional access policy requiring MFA. This includes performing Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication even when federated identity provider has indicated (via federated token claims) that on-premises MFA has been performed. Enforcing Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication every time assures that a compromised on-premises account cannot bypass Microsoft Entra multifactor authentication by imitating that a multifactor authentication has already been performed by the identity provider, and is highly recommended unless you perform MFA for your federated users using a third party MFA provider.
The protection can be enabled using a new security setting, federatedIdpMfaBehavior, which is exposed as a part of the Internal Federation MS Graph API or MS Graph PowerShell cmdlets. The federatedIdpMfaBehavior setting determines whether Microsoft Entra ID accepts the MFA performed by the federated identity provider when a federated user accesses an application that is governed by a conditional access policy that requires MFA.
In its default configuration, the keys AD FS uses to sign tokens never leave the federation servers on the intranet. They are never present in the DMZ or on the proxy machines. Optionally to provide more protection, we recommend protecting these keys in a hardware security module (HSM) attached to AD FS. Microsoft does not produce an HSM product, however there are several on the market that support AD FS. In order to implement this recommendation, follow the vendor guidance to create the X509 certs for signing and encryption, then use the AD FS installation PowerShell commandlets, specifying your custom certificates as follows:
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