Disambiguating the Principle of Sufficient Reason in Émilie du Châtelet’s Foundations of Physics

Justin Steinberg (Cornell University)

Abstract: Several ambiguities haunt Émilie du Châtelet’s deployment of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) in her Foundations of Physics [Institutions de physique] (1740). The first concerns its modal scope. The second concerns its explanatory role. And the third concerns what kinds of reasons it demands/certifies. In this paper, I offer an interpretation of du Châtelet’s PSR that reveals the consistency and univocity of her account, while making sense of the passages that generate these ambiguities. Against the epistemic reading of du Châtelet’s PSR that has gained currency in recent scholarship, I argue that du Châtelet’s PSR is in fact distinguished by its metaphysical robustness.  

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Katie Coyne (University of California, Berkeley)

The Soul's Mirror: Eros in Phaedrus and Alcibiades

Megan Wu (University of California, Berkeley)

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Janum Sethi (University of Michigan)

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Anselm Ramelow (Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology)

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Julia Borcherding (Cambridge)

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Vanessa de Harven (UMass Amherst)

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Karolina Hübner (UCLA)