Research
Publications
Subcontracting Requirements and the Cost of Government Procurement, RAND Journal of Economics 55(1), 2024, 3-32.
Summary: Subcontracting requirements for Disadvantaged Business Enterprises (DBEs) lower markups, resulting in a 13.8 percent increase in DBE contract dollars and a negligible change in procurement costs in New Mexico.
Bid Credits in Simultaneous Ascending Auctions, Games and Economic Behavior 132, 2022, 189-203.
Summary: Bid credits in simultaneous ascending auctions—typically used when awarding spectrum—may lower revenues if bidders desire multiple objects and credited firms are competitive and bid locally.
Affirmative Action Subcontracting Regulations in Dynamic Procurement Auctions, International Journal of Industrial Organization 72, 2020, 102657.
Summary: Regulations requiring prime contractors to use disadvantaged subcontractors can lower bids over time while increasing the level of disadvantaged subcontracting if prime contractors maintain relationships with their subcontractors.
Resident Bid Preference, Affiliation, and Procurement Competition: Evidence from New Mexico, The Journal of Industrial Economics 67(2), 2019, 161-208.
Summary: Positive dependence—or affiliation—in highway construction project costs for contractors in New Mexico makes projects 3.3 percent more expensive but gives bid preferences more leverage in awarding contracts to resident contractors.
WORKING PAPERS
Diversity versus Equity in Government Contracting
Abstract: Many governments aim to give disadvantaged firms an equal opportunity to compete for government contracts and will use diversity in awards as a measure of success. I show theoretically that, when ex ante identical disadvantaged firms differ in an identifiable but irrelevant characteristic, diversity in awards may not translate into equity in opportunity—as buyers may discriminate within the disadvantaged group. Subcontracting data on Disadvantaged Business Enterprises in New Mexico suggest that inequities can arise in practice.
Winner’s Curse and Entry in Highway Procurement (with Dakshina G. De Silva, revise and resubmit, RAND Journal of Economics)
Abstract: In procurement auctions, there are situations where a bidder’s cost is uncertain at the time of bidding, leading to a “winner’s curse.” We use bridgework data from the State of Oklahoma and an empirical auction model to explore whether the winner’s curse also affects entry, which can have serious implications for procurement costs and efficiency. We find that the winner’s curse generally reduces entry in Oklahoma by reducing bidder markups conditional on participating. We then investigate various entry policies—including taxes, subsidies, and entry rights auctions.
OTHER PAPERS
The Stability in Student Organizations over Time, (with Omari Swinton and Gerald Daniels), The Journal of Campus Activities Practice & Scholarship 2(1), 2020, 45-56.
RESEARCH IN PROGRESS
Fiscal Stimulus in the Highway Procurement Market (with Dakshina G. De Silva).
Unbalanced Bidding and the Time Preferences of Contractors in Public Procurement (with Justin Marion).
Evaluating the Efficacy of Place-Based Procurement Benefits (with Mallick Hossain).