MORALITY FOR SCEPTICS
People who question accepted ideas find that the traditional concept of morality doesn't stand up to scrutiny. Sometimes they completely reject that morality because they believe it has no basis other than mere tradition. As the title suggests, this essay was written to refute that reaction. Traditional morality is nothing more than a set of guidelines which evolved to facilitate social life. When we accept it for what it is, we don't have to reject all the traditional moral rules and refuse to support or obey them, but we do change our attitudes to moral questions.
CONTENTS
Introduction
Where Traditional Morality Came From
A Rational Approach to Morality
Moral Feelings
The Meanings of Words Used in Moral Statements
Justice and Rights
Moral Decisions
Moral Contradictions
Debate and Advocacy
Rational Morality and Criminal Law
Determinism and Morality
Would General Acceptance of These Ides Be Desirable?
Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
Traditional morality is a set of rules and beliefs about appropriate social behaviour, which have evolved to facilitate and improve social life. Most people feel that morality is somehow more than this. They think it's not merely something that's developed in response to human needs, but that it's true in itself, part of the laws of nature, like the laws of Physics and Chemistry. This attitude is often generated and sustained by religious belief, but it's probably accepted by most non-believers as well.
However, when we question accepted ideas and discard those that aren't supported by evidence and reasoning, we can find no basis for this concept of morality. We no longer regard moral statements as factual propositions that can be true or false. And on the other hand, because we can so easily see how morality would have evolved to meet human social needs, it's easy to let go of the traditional notion.
However, those who seek to base their ideas on reason and experience alone still accept and support traditional morality simply because it's essential to life in society.
Nevertheless, when we give up the customary understanding of the nature of morality, it does change our attitudes to ethical matters, and this essay is about these consequential changes.
WHERE TRADITIONAL MORALITY CAME FROM
Traditional morality evolved to promote the welfare of the family, the tribe and the community. Its basic ideas developed long ago, and they've been passed on and elaborated ever since. And like all ideas handed down between generations, they've gathered the progressively increasing authority of tradition.
Though obeying its rules is often against our immediate self-interest (this is their very point), most of us benefit if people generally obey them. Even animals enforce rules of behaviour for the same purpose.
In personal relationships and in society generally, accepted morality fosters harmony, co-operation and good order. It oils the wheels of society, making life easier for everyone. We achieve our purposes by decisions and actions based on expectations of how others will behave, including expectations that they will obey the rules. Our intentions are frustrated when they don't behave reliably. For example, when people or organisations don't tell the truth or don't keep their promises, our expectations are disappointed and we lose confidence in our dealings with them. Trust breaks down, communication and co-operation become harder, and all the mutual benefits they afford are lost. In fact, our whole social organisation just wouldn't work without the trust and co-operation fostered by traditional morality.
Some elements of morality support or mediate existing power and privilege. People with power deliberately or unwittingly enforce or influence the attitudes and behaviour which benefit them and this behaviour becomes customary and accepted. As it becomes accepted there is no need for open coercion, and this makes life more comfortable for everybody. The process is reinforced by the way people generally accept and copy the values and behaviour of those of higher status.
The basic elements of morality appear to be universal. Other elements vary because in different cultures, in different historical periods, and in different environments, society is best served by different rules and attitudes eg the rules concerning property and sex. However, the rules often respond slowly to changes in society's needs and so morality often lags far behind those changing needs.
A RATIONAL APPROACH TO MORALITY
Accepting that traditional morality is nothing more than a socially evolved pattern of beliefs and attitudes doesn't lead to complete moral scepticism - the rejection of all morality - because morality is essential to co-operation and harmony. But it does mean that we can examine and question all the elements of traditional morality, and their consequences in contemporary society, and ask whether these consequences are (still) socially beneficial. And we can support elaboration and change of traditional rules and attitudes to meet contemporary needs.
MORAL FEELINGS
Moral feelings are an intense and pervasive aspect of our emotional lives because they link into powerful mental programming to ensure survival.
When children don't do what their parents want, the parents tell them they're naughty and show their anger or displeasure and perhaps punish them. Because babies and infants are completely helpless and dependent on their parents, this reaction arouses acute anxiety associated with fear of possible withdrawal of parental care and affection. So we associate "naughty" behaviour with these powerful childhood feelings, which persist for the rest of our lives. They are the highly uncomfortable feelings which accompany guilt and shame. This moral training produces habits of behaving, thinking and feeling. We're not usually taught why they should be obeyed and how they evolved, and we learn not to ask for reasons. So we grow up thinking the rules "just exist" without any justification, and this notion becomes familiar and accepted; the rules become "moral intuitions". Older children and adults rarely question basic fundamental concepts, and so they're left with this idea of morality as a natural element of the world they live in. The more strict the upbringing, the more the moral rules feel true in themselves. Some people used to think that even table manners were absolute and ought to be obeyed in all circumstances.
But the realisation that moral rules and values and beliefs are nothing more than a product of our culture can weaken the intensity of our feelings about them. For example, it can take some of the bite out of feelings of guilt or demands for retribution. It makes it easier to take a more rational and objective view of events and situations and to decide on the best response to them.
And it makes us less anxious when our moral attitudes and values are challenged. We can more easily examine and evaluate and change them. It can make it easier to understand and tolerate the values of others.
But because our intense moral feelings and attitudes are so deeply rooted, they don't just disappear when we acquire a more rational understanding of morality. We're emotional animals as well as rational animals - irrational feelings are an essential part of being human.
THE MEANINGS OF WORDS USED IN MORAL STATEMENTS
The customary meanings of these words, including their emotional connotations, naturally correspond to commonly-accepted moral concepts and beliefs. They are associated with the idea that Right and Wrong, Justice and rights and duties, are either "God-given" or if not, are at least somehow absolute, objective, and self-subsistent, inherent in the nature of things.
Those who adopt the alternative position set out here tend to use these words much less often. And when we do use them, the words take on the rather different meanings which this different perspective implies. As a result, we will be misunderstood unless we take particular care to make our meaning clear.
JUSTICE AND RIGHTS
Like the basic moral rules, justice and rights are only ideas which have evolved from our experience of satisfactory ways of dealing with each other. This is the source of our notions of just deserts, "natural" justice, natural rights, or fairness in the distribution of benefits or burdens. What is seen as fair, appropriate or reasonable is only what people have currently become used to. And these standards change continuously from one decade to the next.
But the fundamentals of human relationships don't change and so the fundamental aspects of these notions remain constant. And like the bases of morality, notions of justice and rights may also have become "wired" into our brains by evolution. And again like the moral rules, these ideas feel as if they are true in themselves - a natural element of the world.
Absolute notions of rights and justice lead to many difficulties and dilemmas. They arouse and encourage unreasonable expectations and demands. The difficulties are increased by the way these notions are expressed in brief over-simplified phrases, eg rights to "free speech" or "a fair trial". Such rights are never absolute, but are subject to all sorts of limitations, eg those arising from the rights of others and the general community, and practical considerations such as affordability. They are always subject to discussion, negotiation and change. It is more appropriate to regard them as ideal directions to aim at, rather than immediate goals.
If we can't say that heinous crimes, monstrous injustice, and flagrant violations of individual rights by cruel oppressive governments are wrong, what can we say and do about them? We can continue to say that they're unacceptable, and we can work for and support social, legal and political change to diminish or end them, mobilising whatever knowledge, power and influence is available.
MORAL DECISIONS
Let's first review how we make other decisions:
Our actions are often wholly or greatly decided by habit, without reflection. And when we do think before we act, this consideration is limited by the time and effort justified, and is influenced by irrational emotional considerations. In particular, we often do what we want to rather than what's best for us in long term.
When we do reflect and try to make a rational decision, we choose between alternative courses of action by evaluating which course of action is on the whole more likely to produce more beneficial or less detrimental consequences. Conflicts between desirable outcomes can make decisions difficult. Our choices are determined by our personal preferences and priorities - what outcomes we think desirable or undesirable and what relative values we assign to them. And unfortunately, our personal values and our personal interests often greatly affect our judgments about facts - viz. the probable consequences of alternative decisions. We can only try to be aware of these prejudices and counter them as best we can.
Differing experiences and differing interests produce differing values. So when we discuss public policy and public action with others, the diversity of personal values increases the difficulties arising from the inevitable conflicts between desirable goals. Our goals and values, preferences and priorities, are personal and subjective, a result of the "accidents" of our birth, our social environment, our experience. They result from the influences of our parents, peers, school, and the media. So we can't claim that they are authoritative and expect others to accept and endorse them, or claim the right to impose them on everyone else.
Where Moral Considerations are involved
Some understand morality to be god-given and absolutely authoritative, either in the sense that it MUST be obeyed, or at least in the sense that there's no argument about whether it OUGHT to be obeyed. And they often feel they must enforce their understandings of morality on the whole community.
But if we reject their absolute view, it's appropriate to deal with "moral" questions just as we make other decisions, by evaluating which course of action is on the whole more likely to produce more beneficial or less detrimental consequences. For us there's no specifically moral aspect (in the customary sense) to decisions on personal action or public policy.
But there IS a moral dimension in another closely related sense, viz. that in any specific situation, it's appropriate to consider the probable consequences of breaking or keeping the relevant rules of traditional morality in this particular way and to this particular extent. These consequences are the "moral dimension" for us, of personal and public decisions.
The "moral" consequences of public policy decisions are that when governments, agents of the state, or public figures are seen to obey or break a moral rule by lying or cheating or breaking their promises, they reinforce or undermine public morality [ie everyone's disposition to obey that rule] and weaken or reinforce their own disposition to obey it in future.
This is exactly analogous to the legal consequences when a court upholds or breaks established legal rules; there a legal precedent is reinforced or a new precedent is set. It's just that the legal process is formal and evident, whereas with the moral rules the process is informal and unnoticed.
These "moral" consequences aren't specially privileged in deciding what to do - they don't automatically override other considerations. And when we bring into consideration all consequences - including these "moral" consequences of breaking the rules - we can then leave out any consideration of morality in itself, because such consideration is then redundant.
So it's appropriate to make public policy decisions on "moral" questions like euthanasia and corporal punishment on the same basis as a decision on whether to build a bridge across a river or a tunnel underneath it, viz. on the basis of the long term public interest - taking into account the long term consequences for public and government morality.
Moral rules
It would be laborious and time-consuming to weigh up all the consequences every time we're faced with a "moral" decision. The traditional rules can be regarded as generally acceptable rules of thumb which can be used to reduce this effort. But these rules and rights are of necessity only very general guides. They must be short and simple; they can't be expected to deal with every exceptional case, as an Act of Parliament tries to do. However, life is complex and varied, and sometimes obeying the rule would produce very adverse consequences.
So despite the weighty reasons for upholding traditional ethics, a rational morality must avoid an absolute insistence on adherence to the rules, setting them above the goals they aim to achieve.
The Personal Moral Dilemma - "Why Should I be Good?":
The question is of growing significance in our secular society.
Often of course, we "do the right thing" without thinking, out of habit, because we've grown up that way. But if traditional morality is nothing more than a socially evolved pattern of beliefs and attitudes, why shouldn't we just do whatever we want?
We may weigh up the expected rewards of breaking the rules against the expected adverse consequences, which depend on the nature and severity and circumstances of the misdeed. We know we'll feel guilty. We know that if we're found out, we'll suffer the penalties in our personal relationships and in the wider community.
When we lie or fail to keep a promise and we're found out, we injure our personal relationships; we lose the trust and approval of others; we weaken friendship and intimacy. And we injure our public credibility. Legal penalties deter people from committing more serious offences.
There's also the effect on our character, though we don't stop to consider it. Every time we break or obey the rules, we make it easier to break or obey them next time. And the consensus of traditional wisdom is that it's in your best interests to be "a good person" - one who has the habit of doing the right thing.
These adverse consequences weigh differently with different people in different situations, but we all tend to underestimate their severity or think we'll probably get away with it.
I assume my readers have all been brought up to be "good". But what about the "bad" people who just ignore the rules? If there is no divine retribution and no absolute reason to be moral - why should THEY do the right thing?
I can only repeat the above answer to the question of why we should be good: to evade the discomfort of guilt, the loss of approval and trust and friendship, the adverse effects on our character, and the legal penalties. Apart from these reasons, no answer can be given.
That's why society couldn't function without guilt; it's an essential element of the process of socialisation. Children can't be socialised without rewards and sanctions, which instill the pride and guilt responses which in turn sustain the habit of obeying the moral rules.
Unfortunately, shame and guilt are often excessive and destructive. It's then wise to try to gain a proper perspective on our behaviour so as to reduce their hold on us to a more appropriate level.
MORAL CONTRADICTIONS
Sometimes traditional morality demands contradictory responses in particular situations, or dictates actions or policies which would have undesirable consequences. Some examples:
When keeping a promise or telling the truth will probably cause unnecessary suffering.
When policies which promote community prosperity will probably cause increasing inequality.
When there are conflicts between individual or minority rights and the welfare of the community as a whole.
When democratic rights and decision processes lead to bad decisions, excessive administrative costs or dangerous delays.
When individual rights to freedom and privacy conflict with the restrictions and violations of privacy demanded by the needs of public safety and security.
When there's a conflict between the law and the customary notion of justice.
The existence of ethical dilemmas can be perplexing to those who understand morality to be God-given or absolute. But those who accept that morality is simply an artifact of culture can accept these dilemmas without surprise and tackle them with fewer misgivings. Ethical contradictions don't surprise us because we know that traditional morality is not a consistent structure of ideas, developed systematically and logically like Euclidean Geometry. As with any traditional body of ideas which has slowly accumulated from diverse sources, it inevitably includes areas of inconsistency and vagueness.
There is often no satisfactory answer to the dilemmas inherent in traditional morality, and we can only try to approach the least unsatisfactory compromise in each case, avoiding the extremes demanded by each moral imperative. We do this just as we make other decisions - by evaluating as wisely as we can which course of action is on the whole more likely to produce more beneficial or less detrimental consequences.
DEBATE AND ADVOCACY
People are convinced and motivated by appealing to their prejudices and emotions rather than to reason and facts.
If you debate and advocate policy by appealing to strongly held traditional beliefs about rights and justice and right and wrong, you can arouse an automatic habitual response of approval. It's therefore common to appeal to those intense traditional beliefs which support your case and ignore those which weaken it. Unfortunately, the persuasive force of a case is sometimes greatly weakened by arguing honestly and rationally. And if you use traditional moral language but take the time and trouble to explain what YOU really mean by that language, most people will fall asleep or leave; the attention span of a typical audience just doesn't run to long and detailed explanations. Your case is further weakened if you admit honestly how difficult it really is to predict outcomes with any confidence.
All this is unfortunate, because reason and facts are the only basis for wise decisions. I hope one can debate successfully on an honest and rational basis, but not perhaps in a public forum.
RATIONAL MORALITY AND CRIMINAL LAW
The ultimate causes of a crime are not the criminal's "innate wickedness", but such things as economic and social conditions and mores, the inherited character of the criminal, his family and social background, his history and his environment, for all of which he's not responsible. To the extent that he's not responsible, then from the standpoint of traditional morality, it has to be admitted that the punishment of the criminal is unjust. This is just one of the many dilemmas of traditional morality.
From the standpoint of rational morality discussed in this essay, there's no such thing as "guilt which deserves punishment" in the customary sense. But there is a rational basis for sanctions against bad behaviour.
To train a child (or a pet) to behave acceptably and motivate them to continue to do so, punishment (or the threat of punishment) can sometimes be needed as well as rewards. (Though it's unfashionable to speak of "punishing" a child because the word makes us think of an old-time thrashing rather than more gentle sanctions.) But it's not appropriate to think of the child or pet as guilty and deserving of punishment. Punishment can only be reasonable when administered for the future benefit of the child or pet, the family, and the community.
Similarly, there is a rational basis for the sanctions of the Criminal Law. The main objectives of the Criminal Law are to declare and publicise which acts are so contrary to the interests of the community that they will not be tolerated, and to deter people from committing those acts by imposing penalties on those who do.
Some of the other objectives of criminal justice are:
To impose punishment, ie retribution, and thereby satisfy the desire for revenge in victims and the community, and replace private vengeance (which endangers public order)
To protect the community from the offender
To reform the offender
To provide some compensation to victims and/or the community
To provide an opportunity for expiation
And to achieve these ends at minimum cost to the community
I suggest it would be desirable that legislated objectives expressly include the care and support of victims of crime.
We can endorse all these objectives except punishment. It no longer makes sense to us to punish a criminal because he deserves it, because of his guilt.
If the law was changed to abolish punishment of offenders, criminal penalties would not be tailored to fit the crime and the "degree of guilt". Mitigating factors would no longer entitle offenders to leniency; considerations of mitigating factors [eg provocation] and "diminished responsibility" [eg due to brain damage or an abusive childhood] would become irrelevant. Offenders with a privileged background would not be subject to increased severity.
Penalties would instead be designed only to meet the other objectives set out above. This wouldn't always imply greater leniency because objectives such as deterrence and community protection can dictate more severe penalties than those based on punishment. For example it can be appropriate to keep an incorrigibly dangerous offender confined for life even though his behaviour is caused by a violently abusive upbringing for which he can't be held responsible.
Injustice, Punishment and Retribution:
When a child is disciplined, the question of justice doesn't arise. So what of the justice of criminal punishment? Well, as we've said , for us the notion of justice has simply lost its meaning and so here too the question of justice per se likewise doesn't arise.
On the other hand, I assume that most convicted criminals feel a considerable sense of injustice which further contributes to their criminality. And this would be exacerbated if the traditional absolute attitude to morality were abandoned. We would have to take account of this in our attitude to and treatment of convicted criminals.
Retribution is nothing more than revenge, and although the desire for revenge per se is irrational, it seems to be built into our brain, presumably to serve evolutionary purposes such as deterrence. So even if the criminal law expressly forbade judges to include considerations of punishment when deciding sentences, in practice it would often be difficult for a judge to dismiss from his mind the notions of wrongdoing, guilt and deserved punishment. And such legislative exclusion would leave unsatisfied the intense desire for revenge in victims and the community. The sense of "injustice" wouldn't go away.
There is no completely satisfactory answer to these dilemmas. A judge can only try to impose a penalty which balances the objectives of the Criminal Law with an understanding of and compassion for the individual criminal. Trying to minimise injustice - as perceived by victims, criminals and the community - must remain part of the difficult problem that judges face in trying to strike an appropriate balance between all the conflicting objectives when they decide on penalties. Judgments differ in the relative priorities they accord to these conflicting demands.
If the law were eventually changed to exclude the idea of punishment, we would have to continue to try to deal with the unsatisfactory outcomes as best we can, as we deal with all the other injustices of life such as inherited physical, intellectual, and psychological disabilities, or the accidents of birth into under-privileged families or societies.
How could we better deal with these outcomes? We could increase the energy and resources directed towards understanding and reducing the causes of crime, and towards crime prevention and rehabilitation We could provide increased support for victims. Perhaps we could also gain more ability to evaluate how effectively the rehabilitation/treatment of particular convicted criminals is progressing. This would make it increasingly desirable that the system make more provision for the continuing review of their cases, and, where appropriate, change of imposed penalties and treatments.
DETERMINISM AND MORALITY
Determinism is the belief that everything that happens is inevitable; I've set out my reasons for this belief in another essay on this website. It's a belief many people find it difficult to accept, even though they understand and accept the reasons for it. I've left discussion of its relevance for morality till last for this reason, and to make it quite clear that although Determinism seriously undermines elements of traditional morality, the view of ethics set out in this essay doesn't depend on an acceptance of determinism.
Our traditional understanding of ethics is based on the facts that we're free to act as we choose and that we act to produce intended consequences. We're therefore held responsible for those intended consequences and this responsibility is seen as the basis for deserving reward or punishment, praise or blame, and feeling pride or guilt.
In my essay on determinism I've explained why our actions are pre-determined and inevitable even though we're free to act as we choose. Those actions are inevitably predetermined by events prior to our birth. That's not inconsistent with freedom of choice and action; it's just that the freedom to do what we want to do is simply a freedom to do what it's inevitable we will do.
But it's essential to the notion of responsibility that the person responsible was the "real" cause, the originator, of what happened. The idea of just deserts is incompatible with the idea of a pre-determined and inevitable act. You're not responsible - in the traditional customary sense of the word "responsible" - if you're nothing more than an intermediate link in an inevitable chain of cause and effect, someone who in effect really only plays the role of a mere "instrument". Determinism makes our customary understanding of responsibility and deserts seem inappropriate even though we're free to act as we choose, and even though our actions are freely chosen and their results intended.
Consequently, the determinist regards as inappropriate all the traditional attitudes to guilt and innocence, praise and blame, pride and shame and guilt, reward and punishment - all the ideas associated with responsibility and deserts. These are still seen as necessary or desirable notions, but as notions which are nothing more than a useful means of achieving the objectives of parents, teachers and society, and a way to enable the individual to live successfully in a community.
This is the same position as that dictated by the realization that morality is nothing more than a set of rules which evolved to facilitate social life. But acceptance of determinism greatly strengthens the emotional force of that position.
WOULD GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THESE IDEAS BE DESIRABLE?
It's often said that our criminal justice system alone could not maintain acceptable civil order without the powerful restraints of traditional morality. One would assume that the rational morality here discussed would be inadequate to this task. And presumably the same difficulties would apply to community life in general. So widespread acceptance of these attitudes could weaken civil order and reduce the quality of social life.
However, widespread acceptance seems impossible in the foreseeable future; if it were to happen it could only be in the very long run. The change would create an increasing need for improved parenting and improved training by parents, teachers, leaders and role models, in the civic virtues of cooperation, courtesy and consideration. This is not impossible; over history much of humanity has moved very slowly in this direction. These changes have greatly enriched society and can be expected to continue to do so. We can wonder whether society might eventually reach a stage where rational attitudes to morality would be sufficient to meet our needs.
CONCLUSION
A rational approach to practical questions is the best way to achieve personal and community goals, but it's difficult to be rational about morality. I have some very strong and irrational moral feelings, particularly about injustice and rights, and in matters which affect me personally. But I can't deceive myself into believing that those feelings are objective facts based on absolute truths. On the contrary, I accept that traditional morality is nothing more than a set of guidelines which have evolved to enable us to live in a community as effectively as possible, and that my intense moral feelings are only the outcome of my own personal background and history.
© Barry Simons 2001, 2011