Bar Luzon
I'm a Mellon postdoctoral fellow in philosophy at Rutgers. Starting Fall 2025, I'll be an assistant professor in the department of linguistics and philosophy at MIT.
I work in the philosophy of mind and language, metaphysics, and epistemology. My research focuses on the nature of representation and the structure of reality. In the course of pursuing these issues, I write about mental content, metaphysical determination, the vehicles of mental representation, and the connection between truth and different epistemic notions.
I got my PhD in philosophy from NYU, and my BA in philosophy from the Hebrew University.
Publications
Forthcoming. Epistemic Akrasia and Treacherous Propositions. Philosophical Quarterly. [penultimate]
Epistemic akrasia is impermissible for epistemic reasons.
2024. The Euthyphro Challenge in Metasemantics. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. [penultimate] [final]
Functionalist metasemantic views fail because they reverse the order of explanation.
2022. Losing Grip on the Third Realm: Against Naive Realism for Intuitions. Analysis. (With Preston J. Werner.) [penultimate] [final]
Naive Realism about Intuition cannot ultimately explain our epistemic access to causally inefficacious domains.
Work in Progress
Determination itself is asymmetric.
The content of a mental item (such as a concept) is determined by what causes the formation of that item.
A paper developing a novel view of vehicles of representation. (With Verónica Gómez Sánchez.)
A paper developing an externalist yet defeat-friendly view of epistemic justification. (With Richard Roth.)
Dissertation
2024. Explaining Content. [penultimate]
Since determination is asymmetric (chapter 1), prominent metasemantic views fail to allow mental content to play its explanatory and justificatory role in our mental lives (chapter 2). We should adopt a causal-historical view instead (chapter 3).
