Flailing Firms and Joint Operating Agreements: An Application to U.S. Local Daily Print Newspapers from 1932 to 1992 (R&R, Journal of Political Economy)
E.U. Trade Restrictions and Heterogeneity among Malaysian Oil Palm Farmers
Spatial Mobility, Economic Opportunity and Crime, with Gaurav Khanna, Carlos Medina, Anant Nyshadhman, Daniel Ramos, and Jorge Tamayo
(R&R, American Economic Review)
Industrial Policy, Location Choice, and Firm Performance in High-Tech Manufacturing, with Ran Zhuo (older version - August 1)
Technology Upgrades, Demand Fluctuations, and Supply Coordination in Semiconductor Manufacturing, with Ran Zhuo
We study how supply capacity coordination can reduce social inefficiency from demand uncertainty and market power in the context of the semiconductor manufacturing industry. Market power generates misalignment between firm profit-maximizing capacity investments and welfare-maximizing capacity investments. To quantify the extent of this inefficiency and explore how various forms of supply coordination can mitigate it, we estimate a static structural model of semiconductor demand and a dynamic model of supply-side investment in technology and capacity. The data we have assembled to perform this exercise are, to our knowledge, the most comprehensive data on the industry in academic research. We obtain: (i) detailed proprietary buyer-level product demand data, covering around 20% of world orders, from 2004 to 2015, and (ii) proprietary world-wide, plant-level technology and capacity investment in semiconductor manufacturing plants from 1995 to 2015. We compare in counterfactual scenarios the relative efficacy of various forms of supply coordination (e.g., social planner, monopoly manufacturer, coordination on technology and capacity investment but competition in product market) in reducing inefficiency