Research

Working papers:

Presentations: SIEP 2023, PhD-EVS, 2nd Workshop on The Political Economy of Municipal Fiscal Policy*, EEA 2024*, XXI Workshop CiMET*

In the world of government and politics, the interaction between the executive and the legislature raises a fundamental question: Does an increased political class boost financial resources or burden the state's finances? Using unique administrative data from Italian municipalities and an instrumental difference-in-difference strategy, this paper explores how roles that politicians play within the government matter. The study finds that the presence of more executive politicians leads to increased expenditure, primarily driven by higher investments financed through capital transfers, while a surplus of councilors exerts a constraining effect on public spending. These patterns are explained through the lens of specialization within a larger executive body and political fragmentation within a larger council. Voters respond positively to the additional spending by the executive, supporting upward career movements for the mayor and the re-appointment of executive board members. However, councilors' careers do not benefit from their spending behavior. This research contributes to the understanding of the complex relationship between political class size and state finances, which the literature found ambiguous.


Do agglomeration or congestion effects dominate when municipalities merge government functions? I exploit an Italian policy reform, which forced municipalities below 5,000 residents to join inter-municipal communities (IMC), to estimate the effects on local real estate prices and public services. Affected areas see an increase in house prices reflecting an improvement in public goods provision. Cooperating municipalities provide better services without increasing investments, suggesting that small municipalities were operating below an efficient scale before the reform.

Despite the extensive literature on unemployment benefits, little is known about how a change in Potential Benefit Duration affects workers with unstable and fragmented careers. Using a large administrative dataset from Italy and a regression discontinuity design, I exploit a reform that links the duration of unemployment benefits to the number of weeks worked before the unemployment event, generating an ambiguous effect on the duration of workers with different histories. I find that the new contributory system makes workers spend 20 days less in unemployment and it increases the likelihood of getting a permanent contract by 15%. Workers are also more likely to change employer and sector of occupation. There is no detectable effect on tenure and wages. These effects are driven by workers on temporary contracts, who suffer the larges loss in benefit duration.


Honorable Mention, S4 Graduate Student Paper Prize 2022, Brown University 

Presentations: CSAE 2021

Over one billion people worldwide live in rural areas without access to electricity. In developing countries, while governments use electrification programs to stimulate non-agricultural employment, they may also have benefits for the agricultural sector. We estimate the impacts of India's large-scale rural electrification program on agricultural output using a difference-in-difference design and a combination of administrative and satellite data. We find that electrification leads to a 1.7% increase in agricultural output which is largely driven by the rain-fed summer cropping season. Agriculture in electrified villages becomes less sensitive to rainfall shocks, which is of growing importance given worsening environmental conditions. We provide suggestive evidence that this decline in sensitivity is due to an increase in the uptake of electric shallow tube wells, particularly at the intensive margin. 


*forthcoming

Work in progress: