I am a Ph.D. candidate in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania and expect to complete my Ph.D. in the spring of 2027. I am on the job market in 2026-2027.
My research is in macroeconomics, with applications to international finance, political economy, and public finance. I study how political frictions and enforcement shape fiscal policy and macroeconomic outcomes.
You can find my CV here and my research statement here. Contact me: korolkov@sas.upenn.edu
References: Alessandro Dovis (advisor), Harold Cole, and Dirk Krueger.
Abstract: A common policy recommendation for high-debt countries is to consolidate debt by cutting current spending while preserving public investment. Yet actual fiscal consolidations often do the opposite. In this paper, I study the optimal dynamics of external debt and public investment in a small open economy subject to two political frictions. Governments are present-biased, placing greater weight on current consumption than households do, and cannot commit to repaying debt or following a household-optimal investment plan. I characterize the equilibrium that maximizes household welfare, conditional on repaying inherited debt. When inherited debt is sufficiently high but sustainable, the optimal path begins with a debt-consolidation phase: the economy reduces public debt by cutting investment and allowing the capital stock to decline, while keeping current spending relatively high. Subsequently, debt and capital accumulation resume. This fiscal consolidation runs counter to conventional policy recommendations and may explain why high-debt countries often struggle to follow them. High inherited debt makes repayment less attractive to the incumbent government, so sustaining repayment requires tilting the allocation toward its preferences: higher current consumption at the expense of investment. Temporary disinvestment thus makes room for politically sustainable debt reduction, allowing capital accumulation to resume.
Abstract: A commonly held view is that fiscal rules, such as a government debt or deficit cap, incentivize private investment: they prevent the government from accumulating high debt, reducing the temptation to expropriate investment. I ask whether this logic holds if the government has private information about spending shocks and is free to tax the capital invested in the economy. I demonstrate that tight fiscal rules can discourage investment even when the government’s preferences are fully aligned with social welfare. This result arises from asymmetric information about the government’s spending needs: the optimal arrangement provides insurance to governments with high spending needs while deterring governments with low spending needs from mimicking them. By restricting borrowing, fiscal rules force governments to rely on costlier signals: higher spending must be followed by money burning, implemented either as increased capital taxation or a reduction in private investment. Thus, fiscal rules intended to protect private investment can instead discourage it by pushing governments toward ex-ante inefficient policies.
Abstract: Pension entitlements in many developed countries are protected during economic downturns, even when younger generations experience substantial income losses. This pattern contrasts with standard intergenerational risk sharing: aggregate shocks should be shared across working and retired generations. I show that this rigidity can arise from the interaction between limited government commitment and imperfect information when pensions provide intergenerational insurance while also incentivizing younger generations to exert labor effort. The government is most tempted to deviate from its pension promises during downturns, when resources are scarce. However, workers observe only their individual productivity, not the underlying aggregate shock. This dispersed information prevents workers from coordinating punishment in response to deviations from state-contingent policies. To sustain credible pension promises, deviations must therefore be detectable precisely when they are most tempting. This requires protecting pension entitlements during downturns, so that any reduction constitutes an observable deviation rather than a response to an unobserved shock. Thus, politically sustainable pensions are downwardly rigid, even though optimal intergenerational risk sharing would require them to fall during downturns. In a richer stochastic environment, pensions can still react positively to favorable shocks, generating an asymmetric response to economic conditions.