Job Market Paper
Job Market Paper
Abstract: Regulators often demand that experts such as credit rating agencies be transparent. Suppose transparency means that the expert’s evaluation method and its results are public. I show that this requirement can backfire when a biased principal, such as an asset issuer, chooses the expert. Under a transparency mandate, the principal can hire an expert who shares his interests and designs the evaluation to persuade a decision-maker. Absent transparency, such an expert’s claims are not credible, and the principal must turn to more neutral experts. I identify conditions under which any principal would hire an expert who fully reveals the state absent transparency. Mandating transparency can then only harm the decision-maker.
Other Papers
Abstract: In the canonical dynamic reputation game with a single long-lived player, Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004) show that reputations for non-credible behavior eventually vanish. We revisit this question in a setting with two long-lived players competing to interact with a sequence of short-lived players. We show that when monitoring is sufficiently informative, competition for reputation sustains permanent reputation maintenance in all pure strategy Markov equilibria. The key force is that payoffs depend on the ranking of reputations rather than their absolute levels, and this gives each player a persistent incentive to maintain an advantage over his opponent.
Abstract: Does memory loss lead to more or less information acquisition? When information may be forgotten before it can be used to make decisions, the marginal value of an individual signal is subject to two opposite forces: it decreases since it is less likely to improve decisions and improves since having more information may improve overall retention. This leads to asymmetric distortions in sequential optimal information acquisition: memory loss leads to lower standards for information that confirms the status quo but over-confirmation for information that contradicts it.