Dissertation Chapters
Self-image, self-signaling, and the socially adapted mind (Link, Publication)
Recent work in behavioral economics has suggested that individuals derive utility from the beliefs that they hold. The objective of this paper is to reevaluate the idea that (i) individuals care about their self-image and (ii) individuals self-signal. I first argue that the desired self-image is best seen as the desired reputation. Then, I defend the idea that what appears to be self-signaling in the laboratory reflects the workings of a psychology well-adapted to the social incentives of everyday life, which spills over when individuals find themselves in new, contrived environments.
An evolutionary perspective on social preferences (Link)
In this paper, I argue that the theory of social evolution has the necessary scope and power to provide a useful theoretical framework for human social preferences. Social evolution theory applies to any social interaction and makes sharp predictions about the kinds of social traits that can be observed in the population. It illuminates the function of our social emotions, which are context-dependent, endogenous mechanisms that modulate our social relationships with others. I discuss two mechanisms that underlie the wide variation in the expression of social preferences: social norms (or institutions) and local ecology. The wealth of findings on human social preferences supports their context-dependent nature and prompts us to investigate the incentives underlying their expression.
The signaling value of social identity in polarized environments (Link)
This paper proposes a theory of social identity adoption and expression, which ties the choice of social identity to material and social benefits present in an individual's social environment. I argue that in an environment in which receivers aim at uncovering the sender's motives and commitments, the beliefs and values adopted by an individual can serve as a signal of trustworthiness. In such an environment, individuals are expected to adopt the social identity which will provide them with the greatest amount of (social) benefits. I formalize this choice in a game-theoretic framework, embed in a broader niche selection structure. I argue that the main predictions of the model help illuminate several empirical findings, such as the malleability of beliefs and values, the resistance of beliefs and values to evidence, and the existing correlation between beliefs and values and individual-level traits such as personality.
The persuasive function of positive illusions (co-authored with Daniel Nettle) (Link)
Positive illusions are commonly defined as positively biased beliefs about oneself and one’s prospects. The prevalence of such biased perceptions has been a puzzle for researchers given the potentially high costs individuals might incur as a result of having inaccurate perceptions about themselves. The objective of this paper is to investigate one potential function of positive illusions: persuasion. We present two game-theoretic models in which senders are incentivized to persuade receivers that they are of high quality. In a two-player "Partner Choice" game, we show that senders can persuade receivers to accept them as partners by adopting positive illusions, while receivers correctly anticipate the average value of the sender’s type. The equilibrium size of the illusion is predicted to be smaller where the reputational costs of lying are larger, and smaller when the agent’s underlying type is more observable. In a three-player "Community" game, we show that positive illusions can remain stable in group settings provided that the equilibrium size of the lie is small enough, so that the sender retains plausible deniability about lying. The empirical literature on positive illusions appears to support the main predictions of both models: positive illusions are modulated by the desirability and the observability of the trait, as well as the degree of plausible deniability that individuals have.
Distance in beliefs and individually-consistent sequential equilibrium (co-authored with Gisèle Umbhauer) (Link)
The concept of Individually-Consistent-Sequential-Equilibrium broadens the concept of Sequential Equilibrium by allowing players to have different beliefs on potential deviations. This heterogeneity spontaneously gives rise to a notion of distance between beliefs. Yet, studying distance between beliefs in a strategic context reveals to be intricate. Announced beliefs may be different from revealed beliefs, and the meaning of distance depends on the role assigned to beliefs. If out-of-equilibrium beliefs help getting a larger payoff at equilibrium, then we might need to reconsider the traditional definition of sequential rationality: more than just requiring that players behave optimally at every information set given their beliefs and the strategies played by others players, we might additionally require that there does not exist another perturbation scheme that is individually-consistent and which provides higher payoffs to the players.