Research
Indirect Savings from Public Procurement Centralization (Forthcoming at AEJ: Policy)
Joint with Clarissa Lotti (LEAR), Giancarlo Spagnolo (Stockholm University), and Tommaso Valletti (Imperial College)
Abstract: Centralization of public procurement can lower prices for the government’s direct purchase of goods and services. This paper focuses on indirect savings. Public administrations that do not procure directly through a central procurement agency might benefit from the availability of centrally procured goods. We exploit the introduction of a central purchasing agency in Italy and find that prices came down by 22 % among administrations that bought autonomously. These indirect effects appear to be driven by informational externalities, especially for less competent public buyers purchasing technologically more complex goods. Accounting for indirect savings increases the estimate of direct ones.
A previous version of the article was cited in Nada es Gratis (in Spanish)
Abstract: I examine the extent to which news of a local politician’s corruption leads to electoral spillovers to the political party in neighboring jurisdictions and presidential candidates. Using random audits in Brazilian local governments along with novel data on antenna location and coverage, I identify relevant neighboring jurisdictions. Additionally, I use rich text data and Natural Language Processing (NLP) algorithms to create a corruption case ranking index. The findings reveal that electoral spillovers extend beyond the area of origin, affecting neighboring local politicians and presidential candidates. Furthermore, by analyzing a decade’s worth of national newspaper articles, I show that local corruption gets national media attention, particularly in cases of high corruption. The sentiment of news coverage during national elections is more likely to be negative for parties with national candidates, highlighting the significant role national media plays in amplifying local events and shaping the sentiment.
The Xerox Effect: Communication Technologies and Political Actions in Autocracy
joint with Marton Fleck (Central European University)
Abstract: We investigate the role of new communication technologies in the fall of autocratic regimes. For this, we use a unique setting: the distribution of photocopy machines, the Xerox program, in communist Hungary. The photocopy machines were seen as a transformative technology, similar to the impact of the Gutenberg press. We use newly digitalized data on machine allocation between 1985 and 1989 and show that areas with machines are more likely to support democratic values, participate in elections, and establish more entrepreneurial activity in the short and long run. Moreover, we show that adjacent areas are also affected. Our results suggest that new communication technologies help overthrow autocracies by promoting democratic values even when political competition is limited and traditional media is censored.
Corruption, Intimidation, and Whistleblowing: Empirical Approach
Joint with Sylvain Chassang (Princeton University)
Unintended Consequences of Legislation
joint with Oliver Kiss (Central European University)
Can Online Dissent be (Effectively) Censored?
joint with Arvind Magesan (University of Calgary) and Juan Morales (University of Waterloo)