Completed papers

1. Contribution to a Public Good under Subjective Uncertainty.  With Nicolas Gravel ( Journal of Public Economic Theory, 2020) [Download]

This paper examines how voluntary contributions to a public good are affected by the contributors’ heterogeneity in beliefs about the uncertain impact of their contributions. It assumes that contributors have Savagian preferences that are represented by a two-state-dependent expected utility function and different beliefs about the benefit that will result from the sum of their contributions. We establish general comparative static results on the effect of specific changes in the distribution of beliefs on the (unique) Nash equilibrium provision of the public good, under some conditions imposed on the preferences. We specifically show that the equilibrium public good provision is increasing with respect to both first and second order stochastic dominance changes in the distribution of beliefs. Hence increasing the contributors’ optimism about the uncertain benefit of their contributions increases aggregate public good provision provision, as does any homogeneization of these beliefs around their mean.

2. The effect of heterogeneity and risk on co-operation: Experimental evidence. ( Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 2023) [Download]

Using data from a laboratory experiment, I study how co-operation is affected when the benefit from the public good is risky(uncertain) and heterogeneous amongst members of a group. I investigate whether heterogeneity in benefits affects contributions differently under certainty and uncertainty, and whether the distribution of risk within the group affects contribution behavior. I find that heterogeneity in benefits affects contributions less under uncertainty as compared to certainty and that the distribution of risk within the group has no significant effect on co-operative behavior, but these results do not hold once we control for conditional contributions.

Working Papers

1. Contribution to a public good with altruistic preferences. [Download Latest Version ]

This paper presents a general model of private provision of a public good where individuals in a group have identical altruistic preferences and care about the private and public good consumption of the other members of the group. I show that this model has a unique Nash equilibrium. Strictly increasing the level of altruism strictly increases the level of the public good, demonstrating that caring about others improves public good provision. I also compare the Nash level of the public good to the benchmark level of provision by a social planner who aggregates the preferences of the group. I find that at if there are non-contributors to the public good in a Nash equilibrium, income inequality can cause over-provision of the public good as compared to the planner’s benchmark. Over-provision can occur because the poorest in the society do not contribute and the richer individuals contribute to the public good as a way to improve the welfare of the poor.

2. Climate Policy, Irreversibilities and Global Economic Shocks. With Stefano Barbieri and Kai A. Konrad  [Download]

Global systematic economic shocks may affect the Nash equilibrium contributions to international climate mitigation. We study how this effect depends on the flexibility countries have to adjust to these shocks. The kind of rigidities countries face because of technological irreversibilities plays a crucial role. Under the plausible assumption of 'prudence', higher global uncertainty tends to reduce equilibrium climate contributions if irreversibilities in the level of climate policy choices exist. And, if countries are committed to allocating a proportion of income to climate protection, rigidities may increase welfare. Thus, exercising the option to perfectly adjust one's contributions to shocks may be another form of free riding.