Work in progress
"US go home! Local economic impact of NATO base closures in France" (with Abel François)
Abstract: This paper addresses the issue of the economic impact of local external shocks. More precisely, we examine the local economic effect of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bases located in France which were closed following President Charles de Gaulle’s 1966 decision to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command. Newly constructed data on NATO bases in France, together with a census panel of 34,473 municipalities, allow us to track municipalities over time to evaluate the causal impact of base closures on population growth as a proxy for economic activity. Using a difference-in-differences approach combined with propensity score matching, we exploit spatial variation in base closures to estimate their effect on population growth in affected cities. Our results indicate that cities within 35 km of a base experienced a 0.2 percentage point decrease in annual population growth for up to 30 years post-closure, suggesting that cities affected by military base activity returned to their steady state once NATO left.
"Does strategic voting payoff? Evidence from the US Senate, 1911-2013"
Abstract: It is often assumed that politicians act strategically to further their political careers, but little is known of the effectiveness of such strategies. In the U.S. Senate, roll calls are held in alphabetical order, which induces patterns of strategic behavior. This paper exploits the quasi-experimental setting of the US Senate to estimate the impact of strategic voting on the election outcomes of incumbent senators. Using an instrumental variable strategy where the probability of senators deviating from the party line on roll call votes is instrumented by their relative position in the alphabetical order, this paper examines whether strategic deviations impact the probability of re-election of incumbent senators. The results indicate that on average, strategic deviations have a large negative effect on senators’ chances of re-election. These effects are however predominantly driven by minority party senators, who put their party at greater risk when deviating. Conversely, majority party senators increased their re-election probability through strategic deviations. Adjusting for selection into candidacy, I document a positive effect of strategically deviating on re-election unconditional on running.