Research

Using variation in exam scheduling, I estimate the causal effect of grade shocks on college major selection. Writing two exams in quick succession hinders performance on the latter exam, reducing course grades by 1 percentage point and lowering the likelihood of majoring in that subject area by 11%. This occurs primarily through altered student preferences. These shifts have economic consequences: a 1 percentage point grade drop in course grade increases the likelihood of graduating in a lowerearning subject area by 21%. These findings underscore how sensitive long-term human capital decisions are to relatively minor academic disruptions.

Using a lab experiment, we study how beliefs about a job’s applicant pool influence application behaviour, with a focus on gender differences. We design a job application game where group members are either ranked randomly or based on test performance. Without knowing their rank, participants choose from three “jobs” with different hiring rules and pay. We find most participants consider the competitiveness of a job when applying, and that their willingness to apply decreases in the perceived competitiveness of its applicant pool. Gender differences in beliefs about a job’s competitiveness generate different application behaviours.

Information frictions can be a major barrier to the effectiveness of needs-based financial aid programs. Providing information often fails to change enrolment decisions due to uncertainty about the information's reliability. This project examines the impact of early financial aid guarantees on enrolment decisions at the University of Toronto through a randomized control trial (RCT) for prospective undergraduate students. All participants receive a personalized aid estimate, but treated subjects are guaranteed their estimated aid allocation. The guarantee has a maximum value of $3000, equal to approximately 50% of average tuition. I find that treatment has no effect on students who are guaranteed 100% of their estimated aid allocation. However, I detect a significant negative treatment effect for students who receive the maximum guarantee. This effect becomes more negative as the value of the estimated aid allocation increases. These results suggest that the relationship between guaranteed financial aid and enrolment rates is not strictly positive, especially when guaranteed aid is less than total estimated aid.