Imposing Commitment to Rein in Overconfidence in Learning (with M. A. Fernandez and T. Mayskaya), Games and Economic Behavior 144 (2024): 29-48 presentation

The Dark Side of Transparency: When Hiding in Plain Sight Works (with T. Mayskaya), Journal of Economic Theory, 212 (2023)

presentation supplementary material

Dynamic project selection (with R. Pancs), Theoretical Economics 13, 115–144 (2018)

Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning (with R. Pancs), Journal of Economic Theory, 171: 174–212 (2017)

The Effect of Mergers on Innovation (joint with Kaustav Das and Tatiana Mayskaya)

R&R American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 

We study the effect of a merger on R&D activity in a dynamic model in which there is uncertainty about the feasibility of innovation. The merger has three effects on innovation. Once an innovation has already taken place, the merger may reduce the number of follow-up innovations (cannibalization effect). At the same time, the merger may increase the probability of the first game-changer innovation (appropriability effect) and bring this innovation forward in time (informational effect). A surprising policy implication of our model is that the benefit of the merger may be higher if the first and subsequent innovations are closer substitutes.

Data Linkage between Markets: Does the Emergence of an Informed Insurer Cause Consumer Harm? (joint with Claudia Herresthal and Tatiana Mayskaya)

presentation

A merger of two companies that are active in seemingly unrelated markets creates data linkage: by selling a product in one market, the merged company acquires informational advantage in a competitive insurance market. In the insurance market, the informed insurer earns an economic rent through cream-skimming. Some of this rent is competed away in the product market. Overall, the data linkage makes the consumers better off.