Research Interest: Informality, Fiscal-Monetary policy, Productivity and Market Power
Abstract When an emerging-market central bank raises interest rates, the informal sector is supposed to cushion the blow by taking in workers who lose formal jobs. In Colombia, where more than half of workers are informal, it does the opposite. Using a structural VAR, I show that informal employment is the first to fall after a monetary tightening, while formal employment holds up for a year. To explain why, I extend a two-sector shadow-economy model with nominal rigidities and a monetary policy rule. Informal production is more labor-intensive, so informal firms shed hours fast; with fewer hours worked, formal wages fall, formal jobs are spared and inflation drops further. Informality makes monetary policy stronger, not weaker. It does not make disinflation cheaper: each point of disinflation costs as much output and more hours, most of them informal.
JEL E24; E26; E31; E32; E52; O17
Keywords: Informal employment; Monetary policy transmission; Dual labor markets; New Keynesian model; SVAR; Emerging economies.
Abstract Standard frameworks measuring labor market power in developing economies model informality solely as self-employment, ignoring that informal firms also hire wage labor and directly compete with formal employers. This paper develops a structural model of local labor markets where households allocate hours between formal firms and a competitive informal sector. When cross-sector mobility exceeds within-sector mobility, formal monopsony power is systematically overestimated by formal-only frameworks. Using Colombian data, empirical regressions validate the model's key theoretical predictions. Structural estimation on independent samples confirms that cross-sector elasticity strictly exceeds intra-sector elasticity, closely matching moments like the formal-informal wage gap. Counterfactual analyses show that omitting informal wage competition artificially inflates estimated markdowns and depresses formal wages. These findings demonstrate that traditional models misattribute informal competitive pressure to formal monopsony power, carrying key implications for formalization policies.
JEL E42; J46; J31; O17
Keywords: Monopsony power; Informal employment; Wage competition; Labor market duality; Structural estimation; Developing economies.
Abstract: This paper revisits the relationship between Artificial Intelligence (AI) and green productivity by explicitly modeling AI adoption as an endogenous and directed process. Existing literature typically treats AI as a homogeneous and exogenous increase in automation, documenting a “green productivity paradox” whereby digital investment does not necessarily translate into immediate productivity gains, particularly in energy-intensive economies. We propose a framework in which firms optimally choose the direction of AI innovation between green and non-green applications. Using firm-level patent data (PATSTAT/OECD REGPAT), we construct a measure of green-directed AI as the share of AI patents associated with climate mitigation technologies (Y02). This is combined with balance-sheet data (ORBIS/Amadeus) and country-level measures of energy prices and carbon regulation. We first estimate a policy function for the direction of AI adoption, and then assess its impact on green total factor productivity accounting for endogeneity. The results show that the effects of AI on environmental performance critically depend on its direction of use. The so-called green productivity paradox largely reflects the assumption of exogenous and undirected AI adoption. Once AI is modeled as endogenous and directed, its impact is shaped by firms’ characteristics and policy incentives.
JEL: O33, O30, Q55, Q58, L25
Keywords:Artificial Intelligence, Green Productivity, Directed Technological Change, Firm-Level Innovation, Environmental Regulation, Productivity Paradox