Research

Articles:

Published articles:

Kabré, Anicet B. and Julien, Ludovic A., and de Mesnard, Louis (2022), "Pollution in strategic multilateral exchange: taxing emissions or trading on permit markets? ", Bulletin of Economic Research, https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12378.

In this work, we introduce polluting emissions in a sequential non-cooperative oligopoly model of bilateral exchange. In one sector, a leader and a follower use polluting technologies that create negative externalities on the payoffs of strategic traders who belong to the other sector. All agents behave strategically and there is a double heterogeneity. First, the game includes a leader and several followers, which introduces heterogeneity in strategic behavior. Second, the producers have different technologies, which introduces a second source of heterogeneity. We consider and study the effects of implementing public policies to control emission levels, namely two taxation mechanisms and a permit market. We also determine the conditions under which these public policies can implement a Pareto-improving allocation.

Kabré, Anicet B. (2022) , "Strategic bilateral exchange with joint harm: A comparison of three liability sharing rules ", Environmental modeling and Assessment, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10666-022-09841-6.

This paper analyzes the emission levels of firms competing à la Stackelberg when producing the manufactured good generates environmental externalities. In some cases, many industrial activities are mutually the cause of air pollution for the surrounding population. Let’s imagine a local pollution situation where factories are polluting the air, and people around these factories are getting cancer. It is impossible to identify which person who has cancer because of its proximity to the factory. It may be due to the fact that this person smokes or may result from a genetic predisposition. In such a situation, we do not know who the victims are exactly, but we know that there are victims since pollution affects the quality of the air people breathe. On the other hand, we know that there are costs for the society. In order to provide economic agents with incentives to control their pollution levels (and thus limit the damage and high costs of repair associated with them), public regulators use a variety of policies. We use civil liability to internalize social damage, as it is less expensive to implement and has the advantage of providing justice ex post to the victims and gives the injurer incentives ex ante to control the damage. Thus, we investigate and compare the consequences of three out-of-contract civil liability mechanisms in terms of incentives to reduce pollution. The first liability rule, referred to as market share rule, divides harm according to the firms’ market shares. The second liability rule, referred to as uniform or per capita rule, divides harm equally between firms, irrespective of their market shares. The third rule combines the previous two in the sense that part of the harm is equally divided while the other part depends on the market shares.

Kabré, Anicet B. (2021). "Cobb-Douglas Preferences and Pollution in a Bilateral Oligopoly Market" The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, vol. , no. , 2021. https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2020-0090 .

In this paper, we rely on an economy where producers are also consumers, and the choice of heterogeneous preferences is related to the psychological foundations and identity aspects of group membership. We seek to find out how manipulating the preference settings of a target group (controlling for the difference in groups' market power) would affect the level of pollution. One way to affect preferences is to provide more information about the consumed goods. Promoting information disclosure to reduce pollution is what some have called the third wave in pollution control policy, the first and second wave being legal regulation and market-based instruments respectively. This third wave involves public and/or private attempts to increase the availability of information on pollution to workers, consumers, shareholders, and the public in large. Several means are often used by governments to alert their populations to the environmental consequences of their consumption patterns (public meetings, funding of associations, nudge theory, implementation of environmental labels, advertising spots, education in schools, etc.).