Research

• "Regulation and Competition in the U.S. Local Telephone Industry," with Mo Xiao, Elgar Encyclopedia on the Economics of Competition and Regulation, forthcoming.

Job Market Paper

• Are Solar Incentive Programs Effective at Reducing CO2 Emissions? Evidence from Massachusetts

How effective are demand-side incentive programs at encouraging households to adopt solar panels? I use data on residential solar panel installations in Massachusetts to estimate a dynamic model of solar panel adoption (or demand) that accounts for both current and future savings. The model allows me to evaluate several solar incentive programs implemented in Massachusetts in terms of their impacts on adoption rates, consumer welfare, and contribution to the reduction of CO2 emissions. In addition, I analyze each program’s cost effectiveness by comparing the social benefit generated due to displaced CO2 emissions to the government’s expenditure on each program. My estimates suggest that the social benefits generated are modest relative to the magnitude of public spending.

Working Papers

• Broadband Deployment in Equilibrium: Is Competition the Solution to the Digital Divide?, SSRN

Broadband access has become a near necessity, yet many U.S. households remain without access or significant choice among Internet service providers. This paper examines whether competition between broadband providers increases the availability and quality of broadband, as well as the effects of policies that have been proposed to ameliorate the digital divide. Combining data from a survey of Seattle households’ broadband subscriptions and broadband deployment data from the FCC, I estimate a structural model of Seattle’s broadband market, which allows me to quantify the effect of competition on broadband availability, quality, and price in equilibrium. I find that, of recent policies proposed to address the digital divide, a demand-side subsidy program increasing broadband affordability for low-income households is significantly more cost effective than a supply-side policy that subsidizes increased broadband deployment. Additionally, I find evidence that providers’ incentive to increase quality is weaker under competition, however, the benefits of competition to consumers, in terms of increased product choice and lower prices, are substantial.

• A Game of Quality Competition Among Internet Service Providers

Understanding the effects of competition among Internet service providers on the availability and quality of broadband is important for policies aimed at decreasing the digital divide. To improve this understanding, I develop and estimate a structural model of vertical differentiation using geographical data on providers' broadband deployment and speed. The model allows me to identify the effects of competition while accounting for strategic behavior as well as to identify the fixed costs associated with entry and product quality adjustments. My results indicate that (1) firms are more likely to enter and offer high speed service in larger, denser, and wealthier markets, (2) firms tend not to vertically differentiate within markets, and (3) fixed costs of entry are large. I use these parameter estimates to conduct counterfactual simulations in which I vary the degree of competition and the size of entry costs. I find (1) holding costs constant, providers would slightly increase quality if they behaved as monopolists, and (2) holding competition constant, large reductions in entry costs are required to induce firms to substantially increase quality.

Presentations