My dissertation project focuses on the production of global democratic standards that categorize state regime types and monitor state behavior. Despite lacking formal authority, having weak economic capacity, and no military capabilities, I argue that the power of these non-governmental ranking organizations is based on providing heuristics that help policymakers reduce uncertainty in world politics and influence targeted states’ status. Therefore, if they gain legitimacy in the global arena, they can sway actors by providing categories and boundaries that determine conformity or deviation from societal standards. For my analysis, I concentrate on the democratic classifications from the Freedom in the World (FITW) report by the American NGO Freedom House from 1973 to 2022. My dissertation examines how and to what extent shifting democratic credentials between states can lead to social, developmental, and diplomatic benefits or costs in the international arena. I focus on four observable implications of sanctioning or crediting: how states are talked about by others (‘naming and shaming’), inclusion or outcasting from the provision of developmental benefits, observable changes in states’ global democratic reputations, and diplomatic costs faced by states in agreements and treaties. Moreover, I tackle the puzzle of why states react differently after being downgraded or upgraded by Freedom House. By providing archival evidence, governmental and diplomatic data, and interviews with ranking and governmental officials, I present within-case evidence on the implications and rationales for their adherence or contestation.
Since the end of the 20th century, many countries have incorporated information contained in global rankings, ratings, and indicators when crafting their foreign policies. However, empirical evidence about their implications is limited. To assess the relevance of democratic indicators, I focus on the Freedom in the World (FITW) report created by the American-based non-governmental organization Freedom House in 1973. I focus on two observable implications to assess the sanctioning implications of the report: 'naming and shaming' and outcasting from developmental benefits provision. Given previous research about the relevance of the report in the U.S., I assess their influence on specific human rights shaming and developmental initiatives in which previous documents attest the use of the FITW report. I found that democratic discrediting to the ‘Not Free’ category was associated with posterior increases in human rights shaming by the U.S. and a higher likelihood of outcasting from developmental benefits. Conversely, democratic crediting was associated with a decrease in shaming when states were upgraded to the highest Tier in the FITW report (‘Free’). These results provide evidence about how global indicators credit and discredit countries’ reputations, leading to observable influences on political outcomes.
Global Performance Indicators (GPIs) have become one prominent way to assess the state of democracy globally. Despite a growing research agenda on GPIs, evidence about the influence of democratic indicators is limited. This study focuses on the implications of these indicators on democratic rhetoric in both credited and discredited states. I examine the effect of democratic classifications from the Freedom in the World report by Freedom House (1973--2022) on changes in the foreign policy orientation and democratic reputation in the UN General Assembly Sessions and General Debate.
While emerging work has provided insights into how countries' preferences are being shaped by the rise of China, the foreign policy implications of the limited but progressive rise of semi-peripheral countries have been left mostly unexplored. In this paper, I examine how the rising performance of these countries is perceived by Americans. Also, I examine its implications for their foreign policy preferences towards them. I rely on evidence of global political and economic trends, public officials’ statements, and two online experiments to gauge the foreign policy implications of the political and economic rise of semi-peripheral democracies and autocracies. Results show that the political rise of countries, rather than the economic rise, triggers more negative reactions and stronger support for U.S. retaliatory action towards rising countries. Similarly, rising democratic states are given more leniency when compared with rising autocracies, with more support for retaliatory action to prevent their rise, mostly through economic and diplomatic means.
How do individuals react towards their incumbents when their states underperform in global metrics compared to their peers? I argue that given Europe's deep economic and social integration as well as economic malaise after 2008, relative economic performance considerations among European countries gained increased relevance to domestic populations. I claim that internationalist dispositions amplify international comparisons with key reference countries as benchmarks for Europeans to assess the performance of their governments and institutions. Internationalist dispositions amplify comparisons with key benchmark countries, influencing public satisfaction with governments. Relying on data from fifteen European countries (2002–2019), I find that individuals’ international orientations moderate the perception of economic performance gaps between European countries, negatively affecting Europeans' satisfaction with their governments.
Co-authored with Büşra Nur Karakoç and Stephen C. Nelson.
Do rhetorical frames used by politicians to deflect blame or to claim credit have any impact on public attitudes when economic times are tough? When consumer prices soar, the public’s confidence in the ability of semi-authoritarian governments to competently steer the economy should collapse. However, the causes and consequences of inflation are complex, and some people may be swayed by the incumbent government’s efforts to pin the blame for economic problems on misfortune (such as natural disasters and international commodity price shocks) and “bad” actors (such as domestic political opponents). A survey experiment reveals that when people are exposed to rhetorical frames that blame high inflation on international factors beyond the incumbent’s control, they are less likely to assign full responsibility for the economic problem to the government. This result shows that even during economic hardship, shaping individual perceptions of international conditions can have discernable implications for their governance evaluations.
2019. Regionalism and Democracy: A Review of Mercosur’s democratic clause, with Lucas Chiodi and Carla Gebetsberger, Debates Latinoamericanos, 17(35).
2019. The need to strengthen social cohesion and global governance dynamics, in The G20 Agenda at the Argentine and Japan Meetings. What to expect from South Arabia G20?, Konrad Adenauer Foundation-CARI: Buenos Aires.
2019, April 19. La Argentina y su relación con el mundo, Diagonales (Argentina).
2018. A vision about regional contribution to a more effective global governance: the case of the multilateral international trade system, with Félix Peña, Think 20 Communiqué - Global Solutions Journal.
2017, October 4. Argentina frente a un mundo cambiante, Diagonales (Argentina).
2016, August 26. Asia, primer objetivo para la política exterior argentina, with Gino Pauselli, La Nacion (Argentina).