Research

Publications and forthcoming papers:

"Sweeping the Dirt Under the Rug: Measuring Spillovers of an Anti-Corruption Measure" (Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 2025) (Click Here)

Abstract: This paper studies the spillover effects of an anti-corruption measure on the procurement behavior of Italian municipalities. It documents two responses. First, municipalities neighboring treated ones issue smaller contracts in corruption-vulnerable sectors. These contracts involve less stringent evidentiary requirements, making them harder to monitor. In particular, neighboring municipalities avoid stricter procurement rules by splitting large projects into multiple below-threshold contracts. Second, neighboring municipalities renegotiate fewer contracts, a practice signaling potential irregularities. These results suggest that neighboring municipalities respond by exploiting less-monitored margins of the procurement process and engaging less in activities that signal potential irregularities.
JEL codes: D730, H570, K420

"€2 Gas! Tax Incidence Heterogeneity under a War Time Tax Holiday" with G. Brusco and L. Pessina (Accepted at Scottish Journal of Political Economy) (Click Here)

Abstract: This study explores the impact of competition on the pass-through of a tax holiday prompted by the 2022 energy crisis on consumer prices. Italian gas stations (treatment group) and German/Spanish counterparts (controls) are the focus. Stations with fewer competitors pass on only 65% of the tax cut, compared to around 80% for those with more competition. Less competitive stations also exhibit greater pass-through variability, consistent with sustainable competitive and collusive equilibria. When same-brand stations are neighbors, facilitating collusive behavior, pass-through decreases for less competitive stations, but not for those with more rivals.
JEL codes: H22, L11, L13

Working Papers:

"The Effect of Fiscal Autonomy on Local Governments" (Submitted) (Click Here)

Abstract: This study examines the impact of revenue decentralization on local government tax behavior, focusing on a 2012 Italian reform that replaced national transfers with local property taxes. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we identify three key findings. First, municipalities respond to decentralization by increasing property tax rates. Second, greater autonomy also influences the composition of local taxation, with municipalities more affected by the reform increasing even tax rates that were not directly targeted by the decentralization policy. Finally, municipalities refrain from increasing tax rates for lower-income individuals, thereby affecting local tax progressivity.
JEL codes: H71, H72, H77Previously circulated as "Free to Spend? The Effect of Fiscal Autonomy on Local Governments"

"Public Demand Allocation and Productivity of the Private Sector" with L. Piemontese (Submitted) (Click Here)

Abstract: We study how variation in the allocation mechanism of public demand shapes firm performance and aggregate productivity. Exploiting the quasi-random implementation of an efficient or lottery-like auction format in the Italian context, we find that when the same amount of public resources is allocated through the efficient mechanism, recipient firms experience about 8% higher revenue growth within three years. The effect is strongest where contracting authorities exhibit greater screening capacity and in less competitive markets. Efficient allocation targets more productive firms, which subsequently secure a larger amount of future public resources. Simulations suggest that replacing lottery-like mechanisms with efficient ones could raise sectoral productivity by about 4%.
JEL codes: H57, D22, D61

Work in progress:

"The Cost of Mediocrity: Average Bid Auction versus First Price Auction" with Frank Stähler

"Organized Crime Dynamics and the Legal Economy" with Lavinia Piemontese and Marlene Thomas

Winner of the EIEF research grant 2025 (5,000 Euro)

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