Research
Publications:
Publications:
"Sweeping the Dirt Under the Rug: Measuring Spillovers of an Anti-Corruption Measure" (Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, forthcoming) (Click Here)
Abstract: This paper studies the spillover effects of an anti-corruption measure on the procurement behavior of Italian municipalities. It documents two responses. First, municipalities neighboring treated ones issue smaller contracts in corruption-vulnerable sectors. These contracts involve less stringent evidentiary requirements, making them harder to monitor. In particular, neighboring municipalities avoid stricter procurement rules by splitting large projects into multiple below-threshold contracts. Second, neighboring municipalities renegotiate fewer contracts, a practice signaling potential irregularities. These results suggest that neighboring municipalities respond by exploiting less-monitored margins of the procurement process and engaging less in activities that signal potential irregularities.
JEL codes: D730, H570, K420
Working Papers:
Working Papers:
"€2 Gas! Tax Holidays, Incidence Heterogeneity, and Market Structure" with G. Brusco and L. Pessina (Submitted) (Click Here)
Abstract: This study explores the impact of competition on the pass-through of a tax holiday prompted by the 2022 energy crisis on consumer prices. Italian gas stations (treatment group) and German/Spanish counterparts (controls) are the focus. Stations with fewer competitors pass on only 65% of the tax cut, compared to around 80% for those with more competition. Less competitive stations also exhibit greater pass-through variability, consistent with sustainable competitive and collusive equilibria. When same-brand stations are neighbors, facilitating collusive behavior, pass-through decreases for less competitive stations, but not for those with more rivals.
JEL codes: H22, L11, L13
"The Effect of Fiscal Autonomy on Local Governments" with M. Shi (Submitted) (Click Here)
Abstract: This study investigates the impact of revenue decentralization on local government budgets, focusing on a 2012 Italian reform which shifted local revenue sources from national transfers to local property taxes. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we document three main outcomes: municipalities raise additional tax revenue (both the property and the personal income tax) to offset transfer losses. This shift enhances the progressivity of local taxation by changing the composition of tax revenue as well as directly increasing the progressivity of the local personal income tax schedule. The size of the personal income tax base is important in determining how local governments compensate for the lower-than-expected property tax revenue. The increase in income tax revenues is driven by municipalities with an above-median income tax base. In contrast, municipalities with a below-median base compensate by raising revenue from non-tax sources. Finally, we find a slight increase in public goods provision as a result of the reform, despite no increases in total revenue or expenditure.
JEL codes: H71, H72, H77Previously circulated as "Free to Spend? The Effect of Fiscal Autonomy on Local Governments"
Work in progress:
Work in progress:
"The Aggregate Cost of Inefficient Public Spending" with L. Piemontese
"The Cost of Mediocrity: Average Bid Auction versus First Price Auction" with Frank Stähler