Publications:
Towards a Solution Concept for Network Formation Games (with Claudia Meroni), Economics Letters, 2021.
Network formation games (Myerson, 1991) typically present a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Some of them are such that mutually beneficial links are not formed, thus inducing networks that are not pairwise stable. We offer an equilibrium refinement for this class of games which naturally involves pairwise stability while guaranteeing admissibility.
Work in Progress:
A Strategic Model of Conformity (with Ester Sudano) [Presented at AMASES 2024, SAET 2025 (scheduled)]
We build a model of choice under social influence where agents’ decision depends on their preference over a set of alternatives as well as their desire to conform to their peers. A choice under social influence is a compromise between an individual preference relation over a common set of alternatives and a social fitness index capturing the intrinsic desire to adopt a consideration set as close as possible to the environment. We incorporate this choice model into a strategic game. We show that when a sufficiently large majority of agents share similar preferences, minorities are susceptible to peer pressure, compelling them to select alternatives that detrimentally impact their welfare compared to agents in the majority. Instead, a more diverse environment makes peer pressure less effective and promotes individual freedom and welfare also for agents whose preferences diverge from the majority.
Evolutionary-Poisson Games (with Claudia Meroni)
Updating Values in a Changing Environment (with Ester Sudano)
Social Networks and Miscoordination in Games [Presented at SING 19]
We develop the solution concept of network-stable equilibrium to exclude some unreasonable rationalizable outcomes of a strategic game. To this end, we let players play a network formation game (Myerson, 1991) before engaging in the interaction, which allows them to form connections that guarantee correct conjectures on the behavior of the opponents. A network-stable equilibrium is a strategy profile of the strategic game that is induced by a stable outcome of the network formation game. We show that every network-stable equilibrium is a rationalizable strategy profile, but is not necessarily a Nash Equilibrium. We identify conditions on the payoff function that ensure the elimination of Pareto dominated rationalizable outcomes. We offer an application to political protests.