Publications:
Towards a Solution Concept for Network Formation Games (with Claudia Meroni), Economics Letters, 2021.
Abstract: Network formation games (Myerson, 1991) typically present a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. Some of them are such that mutually beneficial links are not formed, thus inducing networks that are not pairwise stable. We offer an equilibrium refinement for this class of games which naturally involves pairwise stability while guaranteeing admissibility.
Job Market Paper:
Sequential Peer Pressure Games
Abstract: We develop a model of sequential decision-making under peer pressure, where agents
balance intrinsic preferences against social misalignment costs. We show that equilibrium outcomes
depend on the distribution of sensitivities to peer pressure and on the order of moves, identify global
orderings that favour specific outcomes, and characterize cascades under which equilibrium behaviour
becomes order-invariant. We apply the model to a voting framework and identify conditions leading
to dictatorial outcomes, and highlight institutional difficulties in designing rules that faithfully reflect
sincere preferences.
Work in Progress:
A Strategic Model of Conformity (with Ester Sudano)
Evolutionary-Poisson Games (with Claudia Meroni)
Updating Values in a Changing Environment (with Ester Sudano)
Social Networks and Miscoordination in Games