"Staying or Leaving? Understanding Coalition Party Departures in Presidential Systems"
 This project examines when and why parties exit presidential coalitions, focusing on how ideological distance and presidential approval interact with the allocation of cabinet posts. I argue that parties are more likely to defect when they are ideologically distant or face declining approval—especially if they are undercompensated with fewer cabinet positions relative to their legislative strength.
"How Oversight Positions Shape Amendment Success in Coalition Presidentialism"
 The literature on coalition governments shows that parties use oversight tools and amendments to manage informational asymmetries and prevent policy drift, but few studies assess whether holding junior ministries or committee chairs—alone or together—enhances their ability to shape legislation. Junior ministers provide early policy signals, while committee chairs offer agenda-setting power crucial for amendment success. I test this in Chile, a presidential system with stable coalitions and institutional features—such as joint access to oversight posts and executive-led amendments—that give parties multiple avenues to influence legislation. 
 "Pre-Electoral Coalitions and Municipal Cabinet Size: Evidence from Brazil"
 At the local level, I analyze how coalition demands and fiscal constraints shape mayoral cabinet size in Brazilian municipalities. Cabinet expansion often reflects efforts to reward coalition partners, while fiscal rules and debt risks drive reductions, illustrating the complex interplay between local politics and financial management.
Dutra, Ana Beatriz and Lorena Barberia. “Personalism and Ministerial Replacement: How Personalistic Presidents Shape Cabinet Stability in Latin America”
This study examines how personalistic presidents influence ministerial tenure, arguing that personalism—defined as a leader’s dominance over their party—affects ministerial stability. We theorize that personalistic presidents have higher overall ministerial turnover but retain greater control over appointments from their own party and independent ministers, while coalition ministers face higher dismissal rates due to policy conflicts. Using data from 14 Latin American presidential systems between the 1980s and 2020s, we find that personalism decreases turnover among ministers from the president’s party, but it does not impact the overall replacement rates.
Dutra, Ana Beatriz, Johanna Dunaway, Spencer Goidel, Ali Kagalwala and Thiago Moreira. “Clarity of Responsibility, Media, and Political Corruption”
Foundational research in comparative politics highlights the importance of institutional context for political accountability and corruption. When institutional configurations encourage clarity of responsibility, they encourage political accountability and reduce corruption. Research in political communication highlights an important role for media in holding political leaders accountable and reducing corruption. Yet most research using the clarity of responsibility framework pays limited attention to the characteristics of the political information environment. Yet, when considered together, these bodies of research suggest that institutional systems of governance and media should operate in tandem to encourage democratic accountability and reduce corruption. Moreover, clarity of responsibility provides a fruitful theoretical framework with which to better incorporate the characteristics of media systems into large cross-national studies of comparative politics. We examine whether and how the characteristics of information environment interact with institutional configurations associated with clarity of responsibility to affect political corruption.
Dutra, Ana Beatriz, Saliha Garcia, Lindsey Gonzalez and Reshi Rajan. “Immigration Attitudes and Burocratic Capacity in Latin America”
The impact of perceived economic threat on immigration attitudes is well-established in Western countries. While heavily studied in this context, little work has sought to understand this relationship in the Latin American context. We advance a theory of perceived economic competition affecting immigration attitudes that emphasizes a different causal mechanism: differences in state capacity. We theorize that spatial variation in state capacity across contexts produce substantial variation in the immigration attitudes of natives. Utilizing an spatial approach, we test the influence state capacity on immigration policy opinions at the second-level administrative division.
Dutra, Ana Beatriz. Desvendando a estrutura do jogo: o papel dos relatores no presidencialismo de coalizão brasileiro. Master's Thesis in Political Science defended in 2020 at the University of São Paulo.
Dutra, Ana Beatriz, Joyce Luz and Hannah Aflalo. 2018. “A relação Executivo-Legislativo revisitada: a governabilidade da coalizão no Brasil”. In Governabilidade: Para Entender a Política Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro: Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung .