Working Papers
Working Papers
Embedded Files
Estimating Matching Games with Profit and Price (Job Market Paper) , with Jeremy T. Fox and Xun Tang
Empirical methods for transferable-utility matching games have previously been developed using the key outcome of the matches formed in equilibrium. We explore identification and estimation of match production functions and agent valuation functions using data on two additional outcomes of such matching games: monetary transfers (prices) and profits. We provide identification results for nonparametric models for the case of data on profits and for more parametric models for the case of data on prices. We provide estimators paralleling the identification results for both profit data and price data. Importantly, our identification results allow for agents to have valuations defined over the unmeasured characteristics of potential partners.
This paper investigates how additional data on firms' profits allow the identification of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity under a specific equilibrium selection rule in a two-sided matching model. When the equilibrium selection rule is relaxed, set identification of the distribution is achieved.
Work in Progress
Work in Progress
Within-Insurer Price Variation: Why Insurers Negotiate Lower Prices for Individual Market Compared to Group Market
Previous studies have analyzed the variations in the reimbursement rates for services at the same provider across different payers in the commercial group or individual markets. We provide evidence that commercial insurers simultaneously active in both individual and group markets may negotiate rates that are 35% lower for their individual market plans at the same provider. Moreover, we find that the share of the out-of-pocket cost for the individual market enrollees is about half the one for group market enrollees. Using an All-Payers Claims Database (APCD) from New Hampshire, we evaluate the effects of a higher cost-sharing rule for the individual market enrollees on the negotiated prices and plan networks.
The Effects of Deductibles on Hospital-Insurer Bargaining and Price Shopping in the New Hampshire Healthcare Market
The higher cost-sharing burden on the insured population is a recent feature of the U.S. healthcare market. This paper studies how the increasing deductibles, in concert with price transparency efforts in New Hampshire, affect hospital service prices in an equilibrium model of the healthcare market. Using the administrative claims data from New Hampshire, we estimate the demand effects of amplified price-shopping behavior among enrollees and analyze its consequences on the negotiated prices between hospitals and insurers.
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