Why do so many tournaments award multiple prizes? When performance affects future career prospects, contestants already face labor-market incentives and may be reluctant to enter winner-take-all competitions. We show that awarding multiple prizes can encourage participation and maximize performance, even among identical, risk-neutral contestants. The optimal prize structure depends on uncertainty about talent and on how much information about performance is revealed to the labor market.

How should an organization select experts when each favors their own area of expertise? We show that the best committee composition depends on the voting rule. A principal who favors the status quo prefers less partisan experts under low approval thresholds, more partisan experts under intermediate thresholds, and moderately partisan experts near unanimity. Selecting members helps align strategic voting with the organization’s objectives.

Should committee votes be public or secret? We study experts who fear blame from observers with a stake in the decision. Moderate social pressure can improve collective decisions by correcting a voting externality, making public voting desirable. When pressure becomes too strong, however, secrecy protects decision quality. The analysis shows how voting rules and the intensity of social pressure determine the value of transparency.

Committees can do more than pool information: they can make outside influence harder and more expensive. We show how committee size and voting rules can deter capture by interested parties, even when additional members bring no new information. Greater vulnerability to capture calls for larger committees, while keeping members anonymous and requiring them to justify their votes can provide further protection.

Fundraisers become more effective through experience, but reaching more donors also intensifies free-riding. I study how charities balance these forces when planning a campaign. A charity may optimally approach donors whose gifts do not cover their solicitation costs because doing so builds experience. Faster learning need not lead to a larger campaign, and unobservable solicitations can create a commitment problem.

Direct requests for donations create social pressure to meet a giving norm. We show that this pressure makes gifts cluster around the norm: those who would otherwise give less increase their donations, while more generous donors may give less. Although total giving rises, some donors are worse off. Social pressure can alleviate underprovision of public goods, but excessive pressure can also lead to overprovision.

Whom should a charity ask for donations when asking is costly? We characterize the strategy that maximizes donations net of fundraising expenses: target donors whose contributions exceed the cost of soliciting them. Accounting for these costs changes standard predictions about income redistribution and government grants, showing how fundraising decisions shape the provision of public goods.

Online Appendix

Reprinted in The Economics of Philanthropy and Fundraising, Volume II, edited by James Andreoni, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015 (ISBN-10: 1782546057).

How should firms design training when promotions signal workers’ abilities to outside employers? We study the balance between common core skills and skills that differentiate workers, and the resulting trade-off between productivity and career incentives. The analysis also examines why firms certify training and when they make acquired skills transferable to other employers.

This project studies team competitions in which the labor market infers individual talent from team rankings. It examines how uncertainty about abilities, and team size shape career incentives and performance. The analysis also explores how task allocation can balance strong incentives with workers’ willingness to participate.