Hello. I am an Economics PhD candidate at the Paris School of Economics and EHESS. I am fortunate to be advised by Olivier Tercieux (PSE, CNRS) and Julien Combe (CREST, IP Paris). This year I am part of the research staff of CREST (IP Paris).
In spring 2026, I visited Yeon-Koo Che at Columbia University.
My interests lie in market design and matching theory. For more details, dowload my CV.
This paper studies the design of unemployment benefits within a Crawford–Knoer framework. First, we provide a new characterization of the worker-optimal stable allocation and show how an increase in the benefits of an unemployed worker propagates within the market. To capture this propagation, we construct a directed acyclic graph that identifies workers whose targeting maximizes aggregate welfare. Building on this network structure, we design the optimal policy that maximizes the gains in aggregate welfare using a modified version of the eating algorithm of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001). Finally, we analyze how the introduction of unemployment benefits affects the set of stable allocations and derive design recommendations.