Additional Readings

Secretaries, Prophets, Bandits

1. Comparison of Threshold Stop Rules and Maximum for Independent Nonnegative Random Variables

2. Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs

3. Online Auctions and Generalized Secretary Problems 

4. When LP is the Cure for Your Matching Woes: Improved Bounds for Stochastic Matchings

5. Incentivizing exploration

6. Characterizing Truthful Multi-Armed Bandit Mechanisms

Auction Design

1. Hybrid keyword search auctions

2. Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations

3. Sequential posted pricing and multiparameter mechanism design

4. A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer

5. Optimum multidimensional mechanism design

6. The limits of price discrimination

No-Regret Learning

1. Efficient algorithms for online decision problems

2. Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems

3. The Multiplicative Weights Update Method: A Meta-Algorithm and Applications

4. Fast Algorithms for Online Stochastic Convex Programming

5. Econometrics for learning agents

Fair Allocations and Two-sided Matchings

1. Designing Random Allocation Mechanisms: Theory and Applications

2. The combinatorial assignment problem: Approximate competitive equilibria from equal incomes

3. The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard

4. On cores and indivisibility

5. Incentives in Large Random Two-Sided Markets

6. Nash Social Welfare, Matrix Permanent, and Stable Polynomials

7. The Santa Claus Problem

8. Mechanism Design for Fair Division

Social Choice and Public Goods

1. Randomized Social Choice Functions Under Metric Preferences

2. Optimal Social Choice Functions: A Utilitarian View

3. Approximate mechanism design without money

4. Proportional justified representation

5. Lindahl's solution and the core of an economy with public goods 

6. Quadratic voting