RESEARCH

PUBLISHED PAPERS

Naïve Realism and Phenomenal Similarity
Inquiry (forthcoming). Co-authored with Sam Clarke
DOI:10.1080/0020174X.2019.1688183

We argue that a style of argument against naïve realism will be ineffective unless it targets specific incarnations of the view, detailed enough to make specific predictions

Naïve Realism and Unconscious Perception: a reply to Berger and Nanay
Analysis 77(2), 2017: 267-273. Co-authored with Sam Clarke
DOI:10.1093/analys/anx050

We argue that, contrary to some suggestions, the alleged phenomenon of unconscious perception is no serious threat to naïve realism.

Moorean Inferences and Strength of Epistemic Position (Original in Spanish)
Signos Filosóficos, vol XVIII, no. 36, 2016: 118-137.

IN PROGRESS (drafts available on request - comments very welcome!)

Paper on epistemology of perception (anonymized for review). R&R.

I explore the importance of epistemic activity in gaining perceptual knowledge.

Paper on epistemic peer disagreement. (anonymized for review). Under review.
Co-authored with Diego Rodríguez Téllez.

We examine critically the prospects of Conciliationism with an emphasis on the cases which lend initial intuitive support for the view, as and with respect to the self-undermining problem.

Paper on idealized scientific models (anonymized for review). Under review.

Paper on agentive accounts of perception (anonimized for review). Under review.

Paper on epistemology of perception (anonymized for review). Under review.

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