“Under Pressure: Women’s Leadership During the COVID-19 Crisis”, with R. Bruce, L. Meloni, and M. Remígio. Journal of Development Economics, 154 (2022), Article 102761.
“Policy Enforcement in the Presence of Organized Crime: Evidence from Rio de Janeiro”, with R. Bruce and L. Meloni. Journal of Development Economics, 162 (2023), Article 103071.
“Media Manipulation in Young Democracies: Evidence from the 1989 Brazilian Presidential Election”, with R. Corbi, L. Meloni, and L. M. Novaes. Comparative Political Studies, 57(2) (2024), 221–253.
WORKING PAPERS
“Seeds of Prejudice: The Impact of British Colonization on Attitudes Towards Sexual Minorities”, with C. Navarro, 2026. Submitted.
Abstract. This paper provides the first causal test of the hypothesis that British colonial institutions promoted sexual prejudice in postcolonial societies. OLS estimates across former European colonies show higher sexual prejudice in former British colonies than in those of other European powers, conditional on contemporary economic development. Geo-RDD estimates similarly show significantly higher sexual prejudice in former British than Portuguese colonies in Southern and Eastern Africa, where local norms did not systematically condemn same-sex relations. Evidence from South America and Southeast Asia reveals the same pattern. By contrast, British and French colonies display similar levels of sexual prejudice in Western Africa, where non-colonial religious norms condemning same-sex acts are more prevalent. Mechanisms analysis suggests that exposure to alien social norms through colonial legislation is the key mechanism linking British colonial institutions to contemporary sexual prejudice. Overall, our results indicate that British colonialism increased sexual prejudice where social norms differed from colonizers' penal codes.
Presentations: SAEe 2026, EEA-ESEM 2025, GDEC 2025, ECC UGhent 2025, SPANDE Workshop 2024, SITES-GLO 2024, GLO Virtual Seminar 2024, IE-UGhent Internal Seminar 2023, ASREC Europe 2023, EBRD OCE seminar 2023
"Procurement Set-Asides and Small-Firm Employment", with D. Fazio, L. Meloni, and V. Titl. To be submitted soon.
Abstract. We study a 2014 Brazilian reform that made set-asides mandatory for federal contracts below BRL 80{,}000. Set-asides raise the SME winning probability by 19.3 percentage points and procurement prices by 12.2%. Mechanism analysis shows that approximately two-fifths of the price effect reflects supplier selection, i.e., different firms winning and different matches between winning firms and products. Following the reform that substantially expanded set-aside auctions, SME procurement suppliers experienced 0.93 more formal workers per establishment (9.2%) and BRL 42 higher average monthly earnings per worker (3.8%) relative to similar non-supplier SMEs. These employment gains imply a cost per job at the lower end of estimates reported in the literature.
Presentations: IE-UGhent Internal Seminar 2024, LEW-UGhent Internal Seminar 2025, EEA-ESEM 2025, COMPIE 2026, ACRPP 2026
“Media as Political Currency”, with L. Meloni and A. Alberti, 2026. To be submitted soon.
Abstract. Unlike fiscal transfers, broadcast licenses can generate political returns long after they are granted. Under the hypothesis that media concessions increase electoral valence, a probabilistic-voting model of executive–legislative bargaining makes three predictions: the Executive targets legislators close to its institutional position, concessions induce recipients to support the government on institutional but not ideological votes, and media ownership increases the electoral return to holding office. To test these predictions, we link the administrative record of radio and television grants issued during Brazil’s 1987–88 National Constituent Assembly—when the president licensed broadcasters at will while Congress wrote a new Constitution—to every candidate for federal deputy in 1986. We document three main findings. First, in a close-election regression discontinuity design, winning a seat raised concession receipt by 14.0 percentage points and by 18.8 points among the governing coalition. Second, recipients align with the government 36 percentage points more on institutional votes than on ideological ones, a gap measured within deputies. Third, the incumbency premium is 26.2 percentage points larger for media-owning legislators than for non-owners.
Presentations: LACEA-2025, SBE-2025, IE-UGhent Internal Seminar 2025, HYRCE 2026
“Campaign Money for Nothing? Understanding the Consequences of a Ban on Corporate Contributions: Evidence from Brazil.”, with F. Granella, 2023. Under Review. Available Upon Request.
Abstract. We study the effects of the 2015 ban on corporate contributions in Brazil on the allocation of procurement contracts and the frequency of large personal contributions of corporate members, a channel to circumvent the ban. We use difference-in-differences regression models that compare outcomes of contributing and non-contributing firms before and after the ban. We document three findings. First, before the ban, contributing firms won 20 to 25% more procurement tenders per year than non-contributing firms. Second, the ban on corporate contributions significantly decreased the number of national procurement contracts won by contributing firms by 2 to 11 percentage points, a magnitude that only partially offset their previous advantage. Third, firms previously making large contributions circumvent the ban in national and local elections with donations from owners and board members. Our findings suggest that a ban on corporate contributions has limited effects on the average influence of contributing firms when there are mechanisms to circumvent the ban.
Presentations: TU Dresden Economics Seminar 2022, UGhent Economics Seminar 2022, Bielefeld Economics Seminar 2022; EPSA 2021, SMYE 2021, MPSA 2021, RES 2021; Zurich Public Finance in Developing Countries 2020, Econometric Society Winter Meeting 2020, INFER 2020, EALE 2020, APSA 2020.
(SELECTED) WORK IN PROGRESS
"Making Discretionary Procurement Work: Evidence from Causal Machine Learning.", with D. Fazio and V. Loios. 2026. Available upon request.
"Predicting Bid Rigging Before Auctions: A Machine Learning Approach Using Brazilian Public Procurement Data.", with D. Fazio and Multiple Co-authors. 2026.
"December Fever in the Tropics: Expiring Budgets and Public Procurement Prices.", with D. Fazio and D. G. Martins. 2026.
“We Are Short on Men! The Long-run Effects of the Transatlantic Slave Trade on Sexual Prejudice.”, with C. Navarro, and S. P. Vincent. 2026. Available upon request.
"Severing the Pipeline: Platform Bans and Misinformation in Closed Messaging Networks.", with F. Bailez (Palver), L. Meloni (USP), T. Rotesi (U. Turin). 2026.