Research
My current research agenda focuses on corruption in procurement auctions. I also have an interest in the empirics of auctions more generally for the economic history of Quebec and for the fields of Industrial Organization, Law and Economics, and Economic History.
Job Market Paper
"Corruption in Procurement Auctions: an Empirical Study of Illegal Behaviours in the Construction Industry."
Abstract
This paper studies the effect of corruption on outcomes public procurement auctions. I define corruption as any illegal behaviour used by firms to lower their costs. In Quebec, firms that are found to be involved in corrupt behaviour are not allowed to bid in public procurement auctions for a period of five years. As a result, a list of firms that were involved in corrupt behaviour is publicly available. I consider the outcome of auctions in markets where those firms were active. Bids by corrupt firms are on average lower than bids by clean firms and corrupt firms are more likely to participate in auctions and to win auctions in which they participate. The behaviour of clean firms adjust as they interact with corrupt firms. Structural estimation of the cost distributions of clean and corrupt firms shows that costs of corrupt firms are shifted down by around 4.1\% relative to clean firms. However, only about half of this cost advantage is actually reflected in bids their bids. I also discuss how the methodology developed in this paper could be used to help detect corruption.
Presented at:
CEA 2021 and SCSE 2022.
Featured Working Paper
"On the Timing of Auctions: The Effects of Complementarities on Bidding, Participation, and Welfare"
With Hayri A. Arslan (UTSA) and Matthew L. Gentry (Florida State)
Abstract
This paper empirically explores how varying the timing of a sequence of auctions affects both bidder behavior and the welfare of procurers and bidders. We develop a structural auction model with endogenous participation in which bidding may be either simultaneous or sequential, and bidders may perceive auctioned objects as either complements or substitutes. We then apply this model to data on auctions for roof-maintenance projects in Montreal. We show that complementarities can account for as high as 17\% of the total size of a contract combination. Finally, we develop an algorithm to search a schedule of auctions and show that the total cost of projects can be reduced by more than 8\%.
Presented at:
CEA 2019, SCSE 2019 and IIOC 2020
Working Paper: Revise and Resubmit
"The Lesser Shades of Labor Coercion: The Impact of Seigneurial Tenure in Nineteenth Century Quebec" with Vincent Geloso (George Mason) and Vadim Kufenko (Hohenheim)
Forthcoming at Journal of Development Economics
Link to working paper (SSRN) old version, old title
Publications
Alex Arsenault Morin, Vincent Geloso, Vadim Kufenko, The heights of French-Canadian convicts, 1780s–1820s, Economics & Human Biology, Volume 26, 2017, Pages 126-136
Alex Arsenault Morin, Vincent Geloso, Multilingualism and the decline of French in Quebec, Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 41:5, 2020, Pages 420-431
Other Work in Progress
On Corruption: The Case of Montreal School Boards
On Corruption: Political Cycles and Procurement Expenditures of Municipalities in Quebec
Infant Mortality and the Role of Seigneurial Tenure in Canada East, 1851 (With Vincent Geloso and Vadim Kufenko)