Ex-Post Loss Sharing In Consumer Financial Markets

(Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Finance)

Winner, BlackRock Applied Research Award, 2021

Winner, CEPR TFI Household Finance Best Paper Award, 2021

Winner, European Economic Association Econ Job Market Best Paper Award, 2021

Winner, Eastern Finance Association Doctoral Student Best Paper Award, 2022

Winner, Western Finance Association Best Paper Award, 2023

Finalist, AQR Asset Management Institute Fellowship Award, 2021

Insurance companies sell consumer financial products called variable annuities that combine mutual funds with minimum return guarantees over long horizons, retaining considerable market risk. I show that the guarantees embedded in variable annuities turned deeply in the money after the financial crisis. However, over the last decade, insurers removed more than $429 billion in variable annuities by having consumers exchange them into less generous products. The more generous contracts and harder to hedge guarantees got exchanged the most. Using data from a million regulatory filings and quasi-natural experiments, I uncover how insurance companies incentivize exchanges by providing conflicting incentives to the brokers servicing these policies. Raising brokers to a fiduciary standard reduces exchanges by half.


Presented at: Columbia Business School, Goethe University, Indiana Kelley, INSEAD, London Business School, Rochester Simon, UNC Kenan-Flagler, University of Wisconsin Madison, UT Austin, UT Rotman, FDIC, FED Board, the American Finance Association, Eastern Finance Association, Midwest Finance Association, NBER Insurance Meeting, Northern Finance Association, SFS Cavalcade, Western Finance Association, CEPR European Conference on Household Finance, Chicago Booth Conference on Empirical Finance, Colorado Finance Summit, Dauphine Finance PhD Workshop, ERMAS, INSEAD Finance Symposium, Nova Finance PhD Final Countdown, Princeton Young Economist Symposium, Queen Mary Finance PhD Workshop, Rome Junior Finance, Transatlantic Doctoral Conference, UT Austin PhD Symposium, and the Wharton Inter Finance PhD Seminar

Working Papers


The Evolution of Insurance Markets: Insurance Provision and Capital Regulation 

(with Ishita Sen and David Humphry)


The insurance sector has undergone significant changes in risk regulation in recent decades. This paper examines how risk-based capital regulation impacts the evolution of insurance product markets. Risk regulation affects insurance product markets through both supply, from insurers adjusting, and demand sides, from households limiting purchases from high risk insurers. We exploit a natural experiment, the adoption of risk-based regulation in the UK, to distinguish between supply and demand effects. We do so exploiting a first-of-a-kind granular database derived from regulatory stress tests detailing insurers' risk exposures across key factors. We show that the insurance sector is increasingly moving away from its traditional role of insuring against a range of different risks to merely serving as a pass-through for investments into mutual funds. We provide causal estimates of the shift in insurers' product composition and market concentration. Furthermore, we explore how differences in regulatory environments across countries contribute to variations in insurance portfolios, suggesting that stricter regulations correlate with reduced ownership of traditional insurance products, particularly among lower-income individuals. This research underscores the complex interplay between regulatory frameworks and the insurance market landscape.

Presented at: American Finance Association*, Bank of England*, BIS (scheduled), Bocconi, CEPR Workshop in Household Finance, Chicago Macro Finance Research Program*, European Finance Association, Harvard Business School*, INSEAD, London Business School*, Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, Georgetown, Midwest Finance Association


Employee Forgivable Loans (with Yiran Wang)


We study compensation in markets for expert advice. We document how a large class of client-facing professionals (lawyers, financial advisers, real estate agents) have employee forgivable loans — compensation advances structured as debt that employers can call back upon underperformance and separation. Analyzing millions of regulatory filings from the US securities industry, we illustrate how forgivable loans have become pervasive, large and long-dated, yet remain undisclosed to customers and credit bureaus. Financial advisers systematically spend the loan proceeds. Loans shape competition for advisory talent as they advantage large deep-pocketed firms and act as shadow non-competes preventing labor mobility towards entrepreneurship and small firms. At the same time, loans default, being the largest source of financial advisor delinquencies, and are conflicted, as advisers fund the resulting liquidity demands by defrauding their clients. Using a regression discontinuity design, we estimate that up to a third of all misconduct at large securities firms after the financial crisis is attributable to forgivable loans.

Presented at: INSEAD, Pennsylvania State University, Southern Methodist University, University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, University of Southern California, University of Texas Dallas, University of Kentucky Gatton, Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, Cornell (scheduled)


Hedging through Product Design (with Ishita Sen)


We document a large shift in the market for market risk insurance. Traditionally, insurers sell market risk protection to households via retirement savings products with minimum return guarantees. Frictions in hedging aggregate risk means insurers retain risk exposures inducing financial fragility. Over the last few years, insurance companies have sold more than $200Bn in long-dated short put products, effectively buying downside risk protection from households. Protection flows from households with the greatest risk bearing capacity to insurers that are most constrained. We show how hedging in the product markets has large advantages over hedging in financial markets and improves the financial stability of the insurance sector. We discuss implications for pricing, hedging, asset allocation and the allocation of aggregate risk in the economy

Presented at: CEPR European Summer Symposium in Financial Markets, HEC, INSEAD, University of St Gallen


Procyclical Asset Management and Bond Risk Premia (with Christoph Fricke and Emanuel Moench)

Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper, ESRB Discussion Paper, VoxEU Column, In Press

We use unique institutional securities holdings data to examine the trading behaviour of delegated institutional capital and its impact on bond risk premia. We show that institutional fund managers trade strongly procyclically: they actively move into higher yielding, longer duration and lower rated securities as yields fall and spreads compress, and vice versa. Funds more exposed to negative yields increase their risk-taking more strongly, and this effect is particularly pronounced for those offering explicit minimum return guarantees. Institutional funds' investments have large and persistent price impact in both corporate and sovereign bond markets. We provide evidence that this procyclical behaviour is driven by career concerns among institutional fund managers.

Presented at: BIS, Bundesbank Spring Conference, CEPR CAFFE Seminar, Copenhagen Business School, ECB, European Economic Association, ESSEC, Frankfurt School of Finance, University of St Gallen, Swiss Winter Conference in Financial Intermediation, Transatlantic Doctoral Conference, Vienna University, Western Economic Association


* presented by co-author