Research

Working Papers

"Flip-flopping and Endogenous Turnout"  [Submitted]

Abstract: I consider an electoral competition model, where each candidate is associated with an exogenous initial position from which they can strategically deviate. A deviation from the initial position is called flip-flopping, it impacts negatively citizens’ utility. I introduce abstention due to alienation: citizens abstain when their utility for their preferred candidate falls below a common exogenous threshold (referred to as the alienation threshold). I show how the alienation threshold shapes candidates’ flip-flopping strategy. When the alienation threshold is high, i.e when citizens are reluctant to vote, there is no flip-flopping at equilibrium. When the alienation threshold is low, candidates flip-flop toward the center of the policy space. Surprisingly, I show that there is a positive correlation between flip-flopping and turnout at equilibrium. Finally, I study alternative models where I consider various objective functions for candidates. I show that electoral competition leads to polarization when candidates maximize their number of votes.

Presentations: RGS Doctoral Conference, AMSE PhD Seminar, MicroLab Seminar (UAB), Mediterranean Game Theory Symposium 2024, CEAFE/MWET, PET 2024, LAGV 2024, SSCW 2024, SING19.

Work in Progress

"Competences and Communication in Electoral Competition" (with G. Fournier) 

Presentations: AMSE PhD Seminar, AFSE 73rd Congress, PET 2025, LAGV 2025.