Published work
The partnership context of first parenthood - and how it varies by parental clas and birth cohort in the United Kingdom
Juno (2007) by Jason Reitman
When do people in the UK have their first child, and are they married, cohabiting, or single at that time? Do these patterns differ depending on parents’ social class and birth cohort? I followed individuals from their teens into adulthood (ages 15–50). I estimated the annual chance of a first birth and identified the partnership context at that birth: within marriage, within cohabitation (living together without being married), or outside any co-residential union. I related these outcomes to parental socioeconomic background, measured by the occupational class of the parents (a standard SES indicator) when they were teenagers.
I found that parental class is strongly linked to the timing of first birth. People born from working-class parents tend to become parents earlier, often outside marriage—most often within cohabitation, and to a smaller extent outside any union. Those from middle/upper-middle class delay first parenthood and tend to transition to parenthood within marriage. Across cohorts, cohabiting first births have become more common in all groups, yet the relative tilt remains visible: earlier and more non-marital among those from lower-class families, later and more marital among those from higher-class families.
Sleeping with the enemy. Partners’ heterogamy by political preferences and union dissolution: Evidence from the United Kingdom
with Bruno Arpino, Demography 2025
Relationships are often built on shared values and beliefs, but what happens when political preferences create a divide? Our study investigates the role of political heterogamy—partners holding differing political affiliations or opinions—on union dissolution. Using data on nearly 29,000 British couples from the British Household Panel Study (BHPS) and the UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) spanning 1991 to 2019, we explore how political differences within couples influence the stability of their unions. We highlight two main results.
First, political heterogamy is negatively associated with relationship stability. Couples with differing political preferences are at a higher risk of separation compared to those who share the same political affiliation. This association is as strong as, or even stronger than, the effects of other well-documented forms of heterogamy, such as differences in education or religion. Second, Brexit had an impact by itself. The 2016 Brexit referendum provided a case study to examine the effects of emerging political cleavages. Couples with opposing views on Brexit (e.g., “Remain” vs. “Leave”) faced a notably higher risk of union dissolution. This suggests that politically charged and divisive events can exacerbate relationship conflicts. Our findings highlight the growing relevance of political preferences in intimate relationships, particularly in polarized political climates. We suggest that political alignment—or the lack of it—should be considered a key factor in understanding relationship dynamics alongside traditional markers like education, age, religion and ethnicity.
Couples' Subjective Well-being around Live Birth and Pregnancy Loss
How do pregnancy outcomes affect the well-being of both partners? This study in explores the psychological impact of pregnancy outcomes—both live births and losses—on couples’ subjective well-being over time. Using 13 waves of UKHLS data, this research highlights the gendered nature of emotional responses and their implications for partnership stability.
Women experience a temporary boost in well-being before and after childbirth, while men’s well-being remains relatively stable. Pregnancy loss leads to a short-term decline in well-being, with a gradual return to baseline levels. Men’s emotional responses to pregnancy loss are often delayed and less pronounced than women’s.
Women’s physical health around live births and pregnancy losses. A longitudinal study.
How do pregnancy outcomes—live births and pregnancy losses (miscarriages or stillbirths)—affect women’s physical health over time? Using data from the Understanding Society survey, I analyzed the health trajectories of 2,386 women before and after their first reported pregnancy, including 257 who experienced a pregnancy loss. The findings reveal that while physical health declines for all women following pregnancy, the decline is more pronounced among those who experienced pregnancy loss, particularly within the first two years post-pregnancy. These disparities persist even after accounting for socio-demographic and mental health factors, highlighting the importance of long-term healthcare support for women affected by pregnancy loss.
Raining Stones (1993) by Ken Loach
Not all types of job separation produce the same effect on workers and their partners.
The study reveals that involuntary and unexpected job losses (like dismissals and redundancies) have a more substantial negative impact on well-being compared to less involuntary or unexpected separations, such as limited-time contract terminations or resignations. The effect varies between workers and their partners and also shows gender differences: women tend to suffer if their spouses lose their job, while men tend to be less affected if their partners are displaced from the workplace. This paper also explores anticipation and adaptation patterns around job terminations, highlighting that redundancies (such as mass lay-offs and company downsizing) tend to be anticipated by at least one year, while dismissals, which usually target individual workers for disciplinary or productivity-related reasons, are generally not anticipated. Time-limited contract ends, instead, do not have any distinct effect. The job terminations that are reported as "unspecified", instead, resemble pretty much voluntary terminations (e.g., resignations) as workers' well-being increases thereafter.
with Selin Köksal, Human Reproduction 2023
Socioeconomic factors affect pregnancy outcomes. This study reveals that when a woman or her partner experiences job loss during pregnancy, the risk of miscarriage and stillbirth significantly increases. Job loss can trigger the release of stress hormones, reduce income and self-care opportunities, and potentially lead to harmful behaviors during pregnancy, all of which can jeopardize the pregnancy.
Drawing on data from various waves of Understanding Society, our research shows that the incidence of job loss during pregnancy nearly doubles the risk of pregnancy loss, even after accounting for socioeconomic and partnership-related factors. While our data limitations prevented us from exploring specific mechanisms, our sensitivity analyses indicate that this relationship may be influenced not only by economic factors but also by physiological and emotional factors.
Despite its social and economic significance, pregnancy loss is an under-discussed public health issue. We emphasize that improving labor market protection and expanding social security for pregnant women and their partners can help mitigate the occurrence of pregnancy losses.
with Oliver Lipps, Journal of Marriage and Family 2023
Losing a job might be an impactful event for a couple. We find that unions hit by men's, and to larger extent, women's job loss are less likely to have children in the short/medium term. We analyse two large longitudinal surveys from the UK and Germany spanning from 1991 to 2020, and assess the effect of generally involuntary episodes of job separation, such as layoffs and dismissals. Contrary to a generic episode of joblessness, which might also be expected, such as the termination of a limited-time contract, or even voluntary, such as the resignation, a job loss is considered involuntary and, hence, more likely to conflict with couples' plans of having a child. Couples hit by women's job loss are less likely to have a child for 3 and 5 years in Germany and UK, respectively. The effect of men's job loss lasts at most for 3 years in the UK, and 1 year only in Germany. We also explore these effects by couples' income, partners' earnings division, number of children, and women's age. The consequences of job loss do not fall entirely on the groups that are considered by the literature as the most disadvantaged and/or prone to job loss.
Two Days, One Night (2014) by Luc and Jean-Pierre Dardenne
with Daniel Oesch, European Journal of Population 2023
Kramer vs. Kramer (1979) by Robert Benton
Union dissolution is, to some extent, passed from one generation to another for social, cultural and, possibly, genetic reasons. If your parents broke up, you are more likely to separate or divorce too. We confirm this evidence in a sample of British individuals from the surveys BHPS and UKHLS (N~28,000). What's new in this study is the fact that this "intergenerational reproduction" of partnership dissolution is also clearly conditioned by socio-economic factors. If your parents are from high social classes (managers, high-skilled workers, etc...) and separate, you are less at risk of breaking up than similar people who did experience parental dissolution but come from low social classes (white collars, routine workers, etc...). However, there is no full compensation: a gap in the risk of break-up between different-class children, who had their partners separating or divorcing, persists. In other words, the class advantage is not sufficient to neutralize the higher risk of dissolution if your parents themselves parted ways.
The other relevant finding is that this gap between children of separated and non-separated parents is narrowing over time at high but not at low social classes. Is some full compensation of social class emerging with respect to the risk of union dissolution? Not yet, but in the future....
with Katya Ivanova and Nicoletta Balbo, Population Studies 2023
We examine the different chances of repartnering of mothers and non-mothers following the dissolution of a previous relationship. Using data from the American National Survey of Family Growth (N = 11,479), we find 1) a motherhood gap where mothers are less likely to repartner than non-mothers; 2) a negative association between education and repartnering probability for women; and 3) that the motherhood gap is observed only for low-educated women.
Our study is the first to address how the interplay of maternal status and SES shapes the chances of repartnering in the United States.
We point out that the 'attractiveness' of mothers in the marriage market is hampered by the presence of children, and this is particularly true for the low-SES.
The Florida Project (2017) by Sean Baker
Marriage Story (2019) by Noah Baumbach
with Oliver Lipps, Daniel Oesch and Marieke Voorpostel, Journal of Marriage and Family 2022
How does unemployment affect the risk of separation of couples? Unemployment may decrease the separation risk as a drop in resources makes separation more costly—or it may increase the separation risk if unemployment creates stress and reduces the quality of couple relations. Also, unemployment may be more detrimental for couples if men rather than women, or low-earners rather than high-earners, become unemployed.
In both Germany and the UK, we find that the annual separation rate almost doubles after unemployment, from 0.9% to 1.6% per year. The separation risk is somewhat higher for low-income couples than high-income couples in the UK, but overall differences are small. We show that unemployment does not strengthen unions, but makes them more vulnerable—regardless of which partner becomes unemployed and regardless of economic resources.
with Daniel Oesch, European Sociological Review 2021
Unemployment is a critical life event that may affect the income trajectories of displaced workers very unequally. It may lead to cumulative disadvantage and hit vulnerable groups hardest. Alternatively, it may level the playing field because higher classes have more to lose.
Using two household panels—Understanding Society 2009–2017 and the Swiss Household Panel 1999–2017— we show that individual labour income drops in the 2 years after an unemployment spell by 20 and 25 per cent in Switzerland and by 25 and 55 per cent in the United Kingdom. Welfare state transfers reduce these losses by half in Switzerland, but have only a marginal impact in the United Kingdom. In both countries, income losses do not differ much across social classes. If anything, they are smaller in the working class. We thus find no evidence for cumulative disadvantage. The middle classes face a lower risk of becoming unemployed, but are not less vulnerable to its consequences.
Does parenthood influence repartnering for women and men differently? How is repartnering associated with parental status of the prospective partners?
Previous research has not demonstrated whether gender differences in repartnering are conditional on the presence of children. In this study, I try to better disentangle the specific gender differentials in repartnering probabilities conditional on parenthood and child custody status.
Using data from the British Understanding Society, I estimate the probabilities of (a) finding a new partner and (b) finding a new childless partner or a new partner who has children.
I find that mothers, and to a lesser extent fathers, are less likely to repartner than their childless counterparts. Among parents who have child custody, there is a distinct gender gap because mothers exhibit a significantly lower rate of repartnering than fathers. Finally, coresident single parents are relatively less likely to repartner with childless individuals, and single fathers more frequently form two‐parent stepfamilies than do mothers.
This suggests the presence of a gender divide in repartnering that is especially apparent when child custody is taken into account. The presence of children also reduces the possibility of forming unions with childless individuals.